With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility: How to Make Big Tech Accountable for its Global Influence
“Big Tech” — or large multinational corporations that manufacture, own, and operate the digital ecosystems and physical infrastructure constituting cyberspace — wield state-like influence, advancing their interests with a reach that rivals powerful state actors.
But as these companies grow more powerful, the systems that are meant to enforce accountability seem ill-equipped to do so. Where Big Tech companies cherry-pick the privileges of state-like power, without submitting to the associated responsibilities, they risk fraying the public’s trust. To preserve and strengthen the post-World War II international order, which is already facing profound challenges, there should be a clear-eyed reckoning with Big Tech’s agency as influential international actors.
Critiques of Big Tech are abundant. Accusations range from anti-competitive practices, neglect of social harms, democratic encroachment, and the warping of humanity itself. And these concerns are not without merit: Unchecked corporate power threatens societal cohesion and traditional governance structures. Yet, relentless condemnation of lawful and highly successful enterprises risks paralysis. When every flaw is fatal, we risk letting perfect become the enemy of good enough. The challenge lies in finding a middle ground — acknowledging Big Tech’s power can be a force for social benefit, while creating sensible mechanisms to ensure their accountability.
The rise of Big Tech reflects a seismic shift in international relations. Power has leaked out of the corridors of government. It’s now exercised in data centers, server rooms, and undersea cables. Recognizing this, the U.K. Secretary of State for Science, Innovation, and Technology argued in November of last year that countries should approach Big Tech with “humility,” and treat them like nation-states. More recently, some of the most exclusive seats at President Donald Trump’s inauguration were taken by powerful Big Tech executives — filling the space typically reserved for elected officials. Their presence and prominence reflects how the international order is changing. It is not only multipolar but multistakeholder.
The question, then, should not just be whether to accept Big Tech’s influence, but also how to channel it responsibly. We propose three possible pathways. First, grant Big Tech formal membership in international organizations. Second, enhance and expand existing treaties and national legislation with an increased focus on enforcement. Lastly, encourage companies to adopt transparent reporting on their global activities. The solution is uncertain, but a common goal is in reach: make Big Tech accountable for its power.
Establishing and Exerting influence
The term “Big Tech” echoes legacy descriptors like “Big Oil,” “Big Banks,” and “Big Pharma,” highlighting the scale and dominance of multinational corporations that shape influential industries. However, unlike its predecessors, Big Tech wields a unique, quasi-sovereign power over cyberspace — a recognized domain of war and the backbone of our economic and social interactions. Their control extends beyond monopolizing products — it grants them the ability to shape the rules, norms, and processes governing our digital lives.
Big Tech’s quasi-statecraft can be understood through three distinct functions: diplomacy, state-like involvement in armed conflicts and crises, and ownership and operation of domains through which state interactions are mediated (e.g., cyberspace).
Take diplomacy: During the first Trump administration, Microsoft led calls for a Digital Geneva Convention to establish international rules protecting civilians from state-led cyber threats. While the initiative stalled amid diplomatic wrangling, it revealed how Big Tech companies were beginning to rethink their role in the world. By 2020, Microsoft went further, establishing a U.N. representation office in New York. Two years later, the United Nations responded in kind by creating the Secretary General’s Envoy on Technology. These moves underscore how Big Tech is embedding itself in international institutions. State actors are taking notice. Denmark was the first country to appoint a dedicated tech ambassador, a trend now mirrored by several states seeking to engage Big Tech on equal footing.
Regarding armed conflict, Big Tech companies have played a pivotal role in the ongoing war in Ukraine. Starlink has ensured mostly uninterrupted connectivity for Ukrainian forces. The Ukrainian government migrated critical data and government services to the cloud to protect against Russian attacks, and private companies have gathered intelligence, hardened targets, and responded to incidents. This level of involvement in the war goes beyond the traditional role of suppliers or contractors. It resembles a form of deputization, whereby private companies are given authority to perform state-like activities under specific circumstances. At most, these activities reflect how companies are seizing an opportunity to elevate their agency and status through unilateral or multilateral actions that materially change conditions in active conflict zones.
Underpinning the functions of diplomacy and state-like involvement in armed conflicts is a third function: ownership and operation of cyberspace and associated capabilities. Cyberspace — the fifth sphere of power projection — is distinct when compared to the other four, which are owned and/or shared by states through treaties and principles of sovereignty. Cyberspace is simultaneously a physical infrastructure as well as an information ecosystem. The two are inextricably linked.
Unlike the corridors and meeting rooms of the United Nations — where states are the operators — in cyberspace, the private sector owns the pitch, largely sets the rules of the game, and has the best players.
As a result, Big Tech occupies a privileged position in one of the most consequential arenas: cyberspace. Big Tech’s influence, however, also exposes a fundamental tension. While these companies have become de facto actors in the international system, they are free from many of the accountability systems that constrain state actors. This is not a lawless, zero-sum “Wild West,” however. Big Tech is beholden to shareholder expectations, national regulations, and international standards. Yet these mechanisms, based on a concern for consumers and principals, are no substitute for broader responsibility to citizens and global society. The issue is not necessarily Big Tech’s influence, but the inability of existing international frameworks to adapt to its emergence as a dominant actor in cyberspace and a near-peer in world affairs.
Don’t Hate The Player, Change the Game
Adapting to Big Tech’s growing global role is not just about blaming companies for taking initiative. It is also about reforming structures and processes to introduce accountability. To date, similar attempts in multilateral forums to integrate the private sector have had limited success. As the international system reckons with the rise of Big Tech actors, three intuitive pathways appear.
First, Big Tech companies could be granted formal membership of key international organizations — recognizing the multistakeholder status quo. This could range from observer status at the United Nations to increased participation rights in specialized governance forums like the International Telecommunications Union. For example, Big Tech companies could get a vote in setting international standards or in selecting leadership, and participate in world radiocommunication conferences. Inclusion would bring companies into existing frameworks, creating opportunities to enforce accountability among peers through existing mechanisms. Doubtlessly controversial, this approach could normalize and better define the remit of their contribution to a rules-based system.
Second, countries and international organizations could enhance international treaties and national legislation to better control private sector influence. Multilateral agreements, akin to those governing arms control or nuclear proliferation — each of which already have some private sector oversight — could set controls on Big Tech’s operations in critical areas such as global digital infrastructure. Simultaneously, national governments can update legislation and regulatory frameworks to close loopholes and bolster enforcement against company excesses. The European Union is broadly taking this approach under the auspices of the Digital Markets Act and the Cyber Resilience Act, though these aims are not always made explicit. Alas, these initiatives have also been criticized as a veiled attempt to pursue industrial policy along geopolitical fault lines and makeup for European regulation stifling the growth of the technology sector.
Third, companies can adopt greater corporate transparency. Tech companies could apply standards like environmental, social, and governance statements that are tailored to their international activities. These “international engagement, compliance, and governance” reports would represent a bespoke opportunity for firms to outline their global posture. Such reports could self-assess a company’s activities in the preceding year and narrate their plans — including future strategy, partnerships, and upcoming participation in international processes. These disclosures would produce additional sources of qualitative and quantitative data — similar to governments setting out strategies or policy papers. In turn, this data could empower civil society, companies’ employees and shareholders, as well as governments to hold these companies accountable for their actions on the world stage.
None of these proposals will settle the total balance of the accountability deficit, and in all likelihood, the status quo will persist. Even those countries that acknowledge that action should be taken to redress the power and accountability imbalance ultimately have limited bandwidth — amid a “studs up” trade war between the United States and China — to dedicate resources to reconciling corporate accountability. Countries and trading blocs may also use an accountability agenda as cover to promote national or regional interests and champions to undermine those of rival powers.
Additionally, historical precedents — such as efforts to engage Big Tech in the United Nations and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe counter-terrorism forums — suggest that expectations should be managed. International institutions can be notoriously slow to adapt, while Big Tech moves fast — and often breaks things. We hope this reflection offers a starting point to consider accountability for Big Tech’s exercise of international influence.
On balance, it is neither feasible nor desirable to show Big Tech a “red card.” The transformative impact of technology on power dynamics within international society is undeniable and will only intensify. The challenge lies in ensuring that Big Tech’s immense influence is aligned with the rules of the game. It should be accountable — not just to shareholders or national regulators but to the wider public. Through our ongoing research with King’s College London and the University of Bath, we aim to drive the conversation forward, shedding light on the critical intersections of technology, governance, and statecraft.
Joseph Jarnecki is a research fellow for cyber and technology at the Royal United Services Institute and a 2024-2025 European cyber security fellow at Virtual Routes.
Gareth Mott is a research fellow for cyber and technology at the Royal United Services Institute.
Image: Trevor Cokley via DVIDS
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