The IDF will present the lion’s share of its probes into the October 7 disaster between February 25 and March 4, with IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi being replaced by incoming chief Maj. Gen. Eyal Zamir on March 5.
Halevi and the military have also called for a state commission of inquiry to address broader issues about Israel’s security failures, including decisions by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, but the premier has indefinitely postponed such a probe, concerned about its impact on his political standing.
According to the IDF, controversially, Halevi will not lay specific blame publicly on individual officers in the written reports.
However, the IDF said that behind the scenes, Halevi is likely to force out certain officers for their role on October 7 if they do not voluntarily step down.
Also, the fate of some officers will be left to the incoming IDF chief, Maj. Gen. Eyal Zamir, given that he will shape the future of the top levels of the IDF.
Despite the controversy of Halevi not laying specific blame on the written reports, the vast majority of the most deeply involved IDF officials have already resigned or are due to resign soon.
Halevi himself is ending his term 10 months early, given that his minimal term in normal circumstances would have run until January 2026 and could have been extended even a year beyond that.
IDF intelligence chief Maj. Gen. Aharon Haliva resigned in August 2024 and was replaced by Maj. Gen. Shlomi Binder.
Haliva’s top aides, including the intelligence chiefs of: IDF analysis, Unit 8200 (Israel’s NSA), the Southern Command, and several intelligence aides below them have all previously resigned.
IDF Southern Command Chief Maj. Gen. Yaron Finkleman offered his resignation on January 21, the same day Halevi did, and is merely waiting for Zamir to enter office and choose his replacement.
The IDF Gaza Division commander also previously resigned.
Halevi probe
A significant missing piece of the probes will be an outsider probing Halevi himself.
Though Halevi will admit to various errors, initially, in January 2024, he had hoped to have an external commission probe him and other top IDF decisions and policies.
Initially, the IDF even announced former IDF chief Shaul Mofaz, former IDF intelligence chief Aharon Zeevi Farkash, and former IDF major general Sami Turgeman and Yoav Har-Even would lead the external probe.
However, Netanyahu was so concerned about any probe-raising questions and problems that could also implicate him and the cabinet that he successfully pressed Halevi to drop the external probe idea.
The IDF probes can roughly be broken down into four macro-investigations, which themselves have 18 components to them, and then another 41 smaller probes into individual battles which took place in specific villages on the GazA border on October 7.
The first part of the probes will deal with the national security concepts for handling Gaza, including the defense strategy, the multi-billion dollar hi-tech border fence, operational concepts, and developing intelligence, especially in understanding Hamas.
Next, the second probe focuses exclusively on intelligence and especially on the estimate of the chances of war by Hamas, studies about Hamas and its capabilities, how intelligence was collected, and how much or little willingness there was within the intelligence establishment to tolerate dissenting views which viewed A Hamas invasion as a real potential threat.
Third, the probes will look at the intelligence and decisions specifically from the evening before the invasion as well as regarding the orders given in light of the evolving threat situation.
This aspect may be the most controversial of the probes as there is a battle between those political and defense officials who were not updated about the increased Hamas threat level that night who have claimed that they might have ordered reinforcements.
Such officials would like to focus the public’s anger on Halevi and others who vastly underestimated the danger that night, as opposed to having the public focus on earlier political and defense decisions, such as developing a strategy to contain Hamas, believing it was deterred, facilitating Qatar funding Hamas, and the destabilization of the IDF from the judicial overhaul.
Fourth, the probes will focus on the decisions and battles for the day of the invasion and the 72 hours or so after that, during which the IDF gradually retook over the 22 Israeli villages which Hamas initially conquered.
Probe will break down roles and responsibility
This probe will break down the roles and responsibilities of the Southern Command, the Gaza Division, the Operations Command, specific lower level commanders, the air force, the navy, and other relevant forces.
The IDF said it will unveil its findings first on these four main segments and then on some of the larger individual battles among the 41 battles, including: Kfar Aza, Nir Oz, Nahal Oz (both the battle over the Kibbutz and the battle over the nearby lookout position) Netiv Haasara, and the Nova Festival.
Further, the IDF noted that in July 2024 it put out its probe of the battle of Beeri and that the criticism it received from that probe led to a restructuring of the process for publicizing the probes.
At one point, the IDF had said it would publish all of the probes over the course of July-August 2024, starting with the smaller battles and eventually reaching the larger macro issues probes, which were more complex and taking longer.
However, a wider range of IDF field commanders bristled at the idea that they would be criticized for small-level errors they made on October 7 when they were taken by surprise by Hamas, while their superiors in the IDF high command who set the stage for them to be surprised would only be critiqued later.
This led the IDF to decide to delay issuing out further probes, even those from smaller battles that were ready until the larger macro probes could be issued first.
Moreover, the IDF claims that unexpected additional fighting with Yemen, Iran, and then an extended several months more intense war with Hezbollah from July-November 2024, followed by ceasefire negotiations with Hamas in December 2024, led to further delaying publicizing the probes.
Despite these explanations, there has been heavy criticism within the IDF that the probes are only being issued now, around 17 months after October 7, and that Halevi did not announce his resignation until last month.
Aspects of the probes also required dialogue with the police and the Shin Bet, who had many combat fighters in the field who were killed or fought to repel the Hamas invasion.
Some of the smaller battle probes will only be issued by the end of March after Halevi has stepped down.
According to the IDF, this timing was determined by making sure the macro probes come out first, and then that the families of the attacked villages and hostages get to see the results before the public.
There are some other side issues that will also come out at some unclear point, including information security (Hamas knew where many IDF bases were located and how to maneuver within them) and the handling and mobilization of the reservists.
Although the IDF has started probing at a macro level its invasions of Gaza, Halevi is leaving the completion of those probes to Zamir so he can focus on getting out the October 7 probes before he steps down.
The IDF said Halevi had spent 230 hours working on the probes to get them out to the military and the public.
The probes generally investigate decisions and moves dating back to 2018, but in some cases go even further back.
A major question is whether any of the probes will go back earlier than 2015, given that National unity party leader Benny Gantz was IDF chief from 2011-2015. Gantz’s number two, Gadi Eisenkot, was IDF chief from 2015-2019, such that he is expected to receive some criticism during the probes.
It is unclear how the probes will impact the political future of Aviv Kohavi, who was IDF chief from 2019-January 2023.
Specifically, the probes will address how the IDF mishandled intelligence it had about the “Jericho Plan”, a scenario of a Hamas invasion which significantly marched what happened on October 7.
The IDF said it has started to dialogue with the five female lookouts who were held hostage and were recently returned to Israel about receiving information relating to the October 7 probes and will add their information as it comes in.
Other recently returned hostages like Sagi Dekel Chen, who fought at Nir Oz, before being taken hostage, will also eventually have the accounts added to the probes, but given that Dekel is currently hospitalized, this process could take time.
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