One year ago, experts had many reasons to think China and North Korea would become closer than ever before. But that’s not what happened. Instead, Beijing and Pyongyang have become distinctly discordant and discourteous. This gap between the expectations and the reality raises questions about the true nature of Sino-North Korean relations, especially since the onset of the Russo-Ukrainian War. North Korea’s deepening ties with Russia seems to have come at the expense of its relationship with China. Although it might be difficult to imagine, this path could lead China and the United States to a place where they could cooperate on North Korea and nuclear proliferation.
The Pendulum Swings
Since its founding, North Korea has typically been close to either the Soviet Union (and now Russia) or China — not both. For instance, in the mid-1960s, North Korea’s rapprochement with the Soviet Union coincided with weaker Sino-North Korean relations. And since the establishment of ties between China and the United States during the Nixon administration, Sino-North Korean relations have largely been shaped by China’s relationship with the United States. However, as the Soviet Union dissolved in late 1991, North Korea lost this alternative and became more dependent on China, making it vulnerable to Beijing’s stance and pressure. While improving relations with the United States and South Korea could have provide an alternative, which was explored in the Geneva Agreed Framework in the 1990s, the second North Korea crisis of the early 2000s obstructed this path. As a result, North Korea had little choice but to deepen its dependence on China.
As North Korea worked to destabilize the Korean Peninsula, Beijing often sought closer cooperation with Washington. For example, in 1992, following Deng Xiaoping’s historic southern tour and China’s decision to prioritize economic reform and openness, the Chinese government reduced its security and economic support for North Korea and revised food trade terms to require hard currency payment through the following year. Rather than vetoing a U.N. Security Council vote condemning North Korea’s withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, China abstained. As a result, Sino-North Korean relations deteriorated and by 1999, political exchanges had ceased for six years. Ties began to normalize only after China’s Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan visited Pyongyang in April 1999.
Years later, China found its relationship with North Korea diminished once again when Xi Jinping sought to establish “New Great Power Relations” with Washington. These efforts, emphasizing non-collision, non-confrontation, and mutual respect between the United States and China, implied greater Sino-American cooperation on addressing North Korean nuclear issues. In response to North Korea’s third nuclear test in February 2013, China backed a U.N. Security Council Resolution against Pyongyang. While China didn’t take proactive measures to prevent North Korea from evading sanctions through China’s own economy, its coordination on international sanctions marked a significant improvement compared to its previous stance, which had unilaterally advocated North Korea since Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to Pyongyang in October 2009. During the Sino-American summit in June 2013, Xi reaffirmed China’s commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, further widening diplomatic distance with North Korea, which had formally declared its nuclear weapons development policy that same year. By 2018, China resumed high-level talks with North Korea only after the prospect of the negotiations between President Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un. With the exchange realized amid intensifying Sino-American strategic competition, North Korea and China could hold five rounds of summitry, including Xi’s visit to Pyongyang in June 2019.
Interestingly, in 2024, Sino-American relations related to Korea appeared to stabilize after President Joe Biden and Xi held a phone conversation and agreed to manage strategic competition through guardrails designed to prevent unintended escalation. Subsequently, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and its Chinese counterpart held a working group meeting to address risks of inadvertent conflict. In mid-April, the defense secretaries of both nations met, signifying the reopening of military communication between the United States and China. The improvement in the Sino-American relationship suggested a potential weakening of Beijing’s relations with Pyongyang. As Sino-American discussions also addressed North Korea’s provocations, Beijing was compelled to take a more active role in diplomacy on Pyongyang’s aggressive actions. For example, China resumed high-level talks with South Korea and engaged in foreign ministerial-level dialogues and summitry with South Korea and Japan, where North Korea’s provocations were a key topic of discussion — much to the Kim regime’s discontent.
At the same time, the recent Russo-North Korean military alliance treaty marked the return of Russia as a viable alternative partner. In July 2023, when Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited Pyongyang, Kim granted full ceremonial treatment to a letter from President Vladimir Putin, receiving it inside his office, whereas he accepted Xi’s confidential letter in a corridor outside his office — an apparent diplomatic slight. Following Putin’s fifth inauguration as president in May 2024, North Korea began addressing him as “the respected comrade,” a title previously reserved for Xi. When Russia and North Korea signed their treaty last summer, Moscow pledged mutual military assistance and economic cooperation to circumvent international sanctions. After early October 2024, North Korea’s deployment of troops to support Russia in the Ukraine conflict highlighted a deepening rift in its relationship with Beijing. On an episode of Geopolitics Decanted, Sergey Radchenko, having recently returned from a research trip to China, observed, “I bet you [Chinese officials] were not informed about the treaty that was about to be signed, or at least if they were informed, they were not consulted on this subject about the treaty between Russia and North Korea. I’m sure they’re not very happy about this.”
From Hope to Discord
The beginning of 2024 showcased efforts by China and North Korea to commemorate the 75th anniversary of their diplomatic relations. At the end of 2023, the foreign ministries of both countries designated 2024 as the “Year of Sino-North Korea Friendship.” On Jan. 1, Kim and Xi exchanged congratulatory telegrams. Xi emphasized the geopolitical closeness of the two nations, while Kim expressed that strengthening their traditional friendship aligned with the expectations and aspirations of both peoples. Soon after, Sun Weidong, a vice minister of foreign affairs in China, visited Pyongyang to meet the North Korean foreign minister, Choi Sun-Hee, where they agreed on an annual path to celebrate a year meant to be auspicious.
As a first step, a cultural delegation from Liaoning province traveled to Pyongyang in late January, participating in the Lunar New Year festival with dance and orchestral performances. Following this, a North Korean delegation led by Kim Song-Nam, the head of the Worker’s Party of Korea International Department, conducted a 20-day visit to China from March 21 to April 12. The delegation engaged in discussions with senior Chinese officials, including Wang Huning and Cai Qi — members of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party — and Wang Yi, the minister of foreign affairs.
Against the backdrop of renewed Sino-American military communications, China sent a high-ranking political delegation to North Korea to attend the friendship year’s April 12 opening ceremony. Zhao Leji, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and the third-ranking member of the Chinese leadership, led the delegation. Zhao’s leadership marked an upgrade from the previous year, when the delegation was led by Li Hongzhong, vice chairman of the same committee. Zhao’s visit reflected China’s intention to prioritize Sino-North Korean ties, a move seen as critical to restraining Pyongyang’s provocative behavior while managing Sino-American conflict risks. Zhao met with Kim before departing from the Pyongyang International Airport. Beyond this visit, however, interactions between the two nations were limited to minor exchanges such as a local business association’s visit from Dandong in late May, prior to the Russo-North Korean summit in June 2024.
Since the Russo-North Korean summit in Vladivostok in September 2023, Kim has refrained from calling Xi “the respected comrade.” In July of last year, reports surfaced that Kim had instructed North Korean diplomats in China “not to mind China” in their official duties. Against this backdrop, claims arose that China intended to expel North Korean laborers, sparking speculation of political friction between the two nations, though Beijing denied the claims. Further doubts emerged the same month, at the Korean War armistice anniversary ceremony — the Chinese ambassador to North Korea was conspicuously absent from this important event, citing illness.
Although China and North Korea maintained appearances for the 75th anniversary of their diplomatic ties in October, Pyongyang’s deepening relationship with Moscow loomed over that ceremony. At around the same time, North Korea began deploying troops to Russia, prompting the United States to pressure China to curb Russo-North Korean military cooperation. While not exerting immediate pressure on Pyongyang, China signaled a willingness to discuss the issue of North Korean troops with the U.S. government. As a result, Sino-North Korean relations remained strained.
There was no closing ceremony for the “Year of Sino-North Korea Friendship” in 2024.
What’s Next?
The most important factor that has influenced Sino-North Korean relations since the early 1970s has been Sino-American relations. The conventional wisdom is that ties between China and the United States are set to worsen, particularly with Trump back in the Oval Office. However, Trump has emphasized maintaining friendly relations with Beijing. At the same time, he has imposed tariffs on China. Like many things involving the American president, it can be hard to understand what he is going to do next. As such, we would be wise to refrain from automatically assuming that America will be tougher on China under Trump, as many have. Relations might actually improve and, if they do, relations between China and North Korea could be expected to remain distant and perhaps even continue to worsen. If that happens, Washington could be in a position to leverage improved ties with Beijing to affect a number of challenges, including North Korea’s behavior. While it surely seems far-fetched today, it will be worth monitoring whether the United States and China can find common ground to reverse North Korea’s nuclear development.
China is concerned that the United States might redeploy nuclear weapons to South Korea. Tokyo has openly raised the idea of positioning U.S. nuclear weapons in Japan. And surely Beijing is also monitoring increasingly serious conversations among South Koreans about whether they should have their own nuclear arsenal.
Needless to say, if any of this happens, Beijing would see its own strategic position worsen. It could explain why China joined a joint declaration with South Korea and Japan in May 2024, reiterating the call for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. As such, China may be inclined to facilitate denuclearization negotiations between the United States and North Korea. Unlike the last U.S.-North Korean summit in Hanoi in 2019, which took place amid heightened Sino-American competition, Beijing’s support for Washington’s negotiations with Pyongyang could significantly enhance U.S. bargaining power. Although North Korea has shown little interest in negotiations with the United States, China could be a difference-maker.
And there is another x-factor: Should the Ukraine conflict end in 2025, Russia may reassess its strategic interests and potentially reduce its intensified cooperation with North Korea. On Geopolitics Decanted, long-time North Korea watcher Andrei Lankov explained, “Russia is both unwilling and unable to replace China as a major sponsor of North Korea. The current relations between Russia and North Korea are unlikely to survive the end of hostilities in Europe.” As a result, Russo-North Korean ties are likely to weaken once the war concludes, probably prompting North Korea to seek closer, albeit still limited, relations with China. In this dynamic between China and North Korea, China would hold the upper hand. If Washington and Beijing can sustain cooperation on North Korean nuclear issues, favorable conditions for negotiations with Pyongyang could emerge over time.
Choong-Koo Lee, Ph.D., is a research fellow at the Korean Institute for Defense Analyses. His research has covered North Korea, U.S.-Chinese relations, and the impact of emerging technologies on security and defense. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official positions of the Korean Institute for Defense Analyses or the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea.
Image: Rodong Sinmun via KCNA Watch.
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