Francis Fukuyama’s 1989 essay, “The End of History?” posited that liberal democracy had triumphed as the ultimate form of government, marking an endpoint in humanity’s ideological evolution. While Fukuyama’s thesis captured the optimism of the post-Cold War era, it overlooked the enduring complexities of global power dynamics.
Nonetheless, the belief that the era of war was over and a new, unbridled era of peace beckoned—guaranteed and backstopped by American military might—took root in the capitals of Western Europe.
The unfolding debate over European security—centered on Ukraine but extending to the continent’s broader role in global affairs—has torn this gossamer notion asunder once and for all.
It stands exposed as the flight of whimsy it always was.
History did not end with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Instead, Europe stopped paying attention to the existential threats that surround it.
The continent’s overreliance on American military might, and its complacency in the face of emerging global threats suggest that history, far from ending, is reasserting itself with force and urgency.
Europe’s Security Reckoning
Europe has enjoyed a decades-long holiday from history—content to let the United States shoulder the burden of its defense. As geopolitical tensions rise and America reassesses its alliances, that vacation is ending abruptly.
Since the end of World War II, Europe has relied heavily on American military might. NATO was formed as a collective defense against Soviet aggression, but it became less a partnership and more a security umbrella—one funded, staffed, and enforced by the United States.
For 80 years, Europe has benefited from this arrangement, spending far less on defense than agreed while funneling resources into expansive welfare states.
In 2014, NATO allies pledged to spend at least 2% of their GDP on defense by 2024. A decade later, only a handful have met that target. Germany—the continent’s economic powerhouse—spent years falling short. France only recently pledged to meet the target in 2024, while nations like Spain remain at the bottom, allocating just 1.28% of GDP.
America’s patience is wearing thin.
During his first term and now, President Trump made it clear: if Europe wants continued U.S. support, it needs to invest in its own defense. The message wasn’t subtle. Pay up or risk losing the U.S. security umbrella.
Trump’s bluntness forced action—tepid action, but still notable. Germany claims it will finally hit the 2% target this year, with optimistic projections suggesting spending could climb to 3.5%—though such forecasts remain speculative. As history has shown, political promises made do not always translate into promises kept, especially in Germany’s complex parliamentary environment.
Even so, seeing this shift as a genuine reawakening isn’t easy. Years of neglect and inconsistent investment have weakened most European militaries, which are incompatible with each other and lack the resources and readiness to meet today’s security challenges. A McKinsey report reveals a concerning trend: significant portions of Europe’s defense budgets are absorbed by administrative overhead rather than directed toward combat readiness.
Bureaucratic inefficiency won’t win wars—modern armies require weapons, ammunition, and advanced technologies to remain effective.
This problem isn’t limited to Europe. Another NATO member, Canada, allocates just 1.37% of its GDP to defense. Thus, the Canadian government seems gratified to leverage its location on the American northern border for national security.
Meanwhile, despite unveiling a record defense budget of $37 billion, Australia still struggles to meet growing security demands in the Indo-Pacific.
While our allies dither, China and Russia are forging closer ties, emboldened by perceived Western weakness and driven together by the West’s failed effort to isolate Russia.
The Waning Pax Americana
America’s role as the world’s policeman has stretched its defenses thin. As highlighted in The National Interest, the Pax Americana—a period of relative global stability underpinned by U.S. power—is waning.
The U.S. faces growing threats not only from China and Russia but also from Iran and North Korea. America can no longer afford to subsidize allies who refuse to invest in their security.
The Heritage Foundation bluntly states, “America’s allies must step up—before it’s too late.”
The U.S. military is strained, with little budgetary investment in critical munitions and weaponry, leaving American forces stretched thin.
National missile defense systems are under pressure and ill-prepared to counter hypersonic and advanced technology.
Trump’s second-term foreign policy reflects a new reality. The current president’s diplomacy is vastly different from any predecessor in the last half century or more: it is mainly transactional, pragmatic, and focused squarely on U.S. interests.
Allies that contribute to their defense are welcome partners; those that freeload are increasingly sidelined and isolated.
Europe at a Crossroads
Our European NATO allies face a stark choice. Continental nations can continue to rely on American military might, betting a future administration will reverse Trump’s course.
Alternatively, these nations can finally take ownership of their security.
Yet, as Washington demands more from Europe, it often misreads the continent’s shifting dynamics.
For decades, American foreign policy elites viewed NATO through a narrow lens—France, Germany, and whichever governments aligned with their left-of-center orthodoxy.
But that narrative ignores the rising influence of nations like Poland, one of NATO’s most committed defense spenders, and Hungary, whose right-of-center leadership makes it a pariah among some U.S. policymakers despite its growing regional clout.
Meanwhile, France and Germany face mounting instability at home. Populist parties are gaining ground, challenging the legitimacy of long-standing political establishments, despite efforts to shut populists out of governance.
If we’re serious about strengthening NATO, we can’t afford to ignore the new centers of power on the continent simply because they don’t fit outdated foreign policy narratives.
Will Europe Pay Heed?
Europe’s long vacation from history is over. The world has grown too dangerous for complacency. American foreign policy—now more transactional and interest-driven—demands more from its allies.
If Europe wants to avoid national security vulnerability, it must invest in its defense. That means meeting NATO’s 2% target and exceeding it to correct for chronic underinvestment.
President Trump has consistently stated his wish to make America great again by putting America first.
The question for Europe is whether it can forge a shared vision strong enough to make the continent relevant again on the global stage.
Simply put, will Trump Make Europe Relevant Again?
Charlton Allen is an attorney, former chief executive officer, and chief judicial officer of the North Carolina Industrial Commission. He is the founder of the Madison Center for Law & Liberty, Inc., editor of The American Salient, and the host of the Modern Federalist podcast. X: @CharltonAllenNC
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