It’s time Israel gets its act together and does an official Oct. 7 probe
The IDF’s internal investigations into the October 7 Hamas attacks revealed widespread failures at multiple levels, including intelligence oversight, delayed military response, and lack of coordination between security agencies. Military sources described the situation as one where they “had no legs or eyes and were just trying to figure out where to run.”
While these probes shed light on critical errors within the military, they are not enough.
The government must establish a state commission of inquiry to thoroughly investigate not only the IDF’s failures but also those of the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency), Israel Police, and the country’s political leadership, including the Prime Minister’s Office and the Defense Ministry.
The military’s readiness to examine its shortcomings is admirable but has its limitations. A military conducting its investigation will always face challenges due to institutional biases, the need to safeguard reputations, and internal hierarchies.
Suppose Israel aims to ensure accountability and avoid similar disasters in the future. In that case, it must create an independent, state-sanctioned commission with comprehensive investigatory powers, including the ability to issue subpoenas.
This commission should evaluate the IDF, the Shin Bet, the police, and, importantly, the political leadership.
Failures on October 7 run deep
The failures of October 7 were not merely due to errors on the battlefield; they stemmed from years of flawed policies, misinterpretations of intelligence, and a paralysis in leadership. To restore public trust, Israel’s top civilian and military decision-makers must be held accountable.
A comprehensive inquiry must answer fundamental questions beyond the IDF’s actions.
What role did the Shin Bet play in assessing the Hamas threat? Why were early warnings ignored? What about the Israel Police and their lack of preparedness? Why did government officials, including the Prime Minister’s Office and the Defense Ministry, fail to foresee or respond swiftly to the crisis?
These are critical questions that only an external commission can truly address.
The investigation should also examine the worldviews that influenced the choices that led to this failure. For decades, Israel’s leaders viewed Hamas as a manageable threat instead of a serious one.
The belief that Hamas was deterred – despite several close calls before October 7 – was a risky misunderstanding.
Intelligence that should have raised alarms was dismissed. Internal military and political fiefdoms prevented a coordinated response.
Thursday probes show investigation one is only tip of the iceberg
Thursday’s probes showed that IDF intelligence “failed to notice or detect three near mass invasions by Hamas before October 7,” in April 2022, October 2022, and April 2023.
This suggests a systemic failure beyond just military shortcomings and extends into national security policy at large.
Late prime minister Golda Meir once said, “When peace comes, we will perhaps in time be able to forgive the Arabs for killing our sons, but it will be harder for us to forgive them for having forced us to kill their sons. Peace will come when the Arabs will love their children more than they hate us.”
This sobering reminder emphasizes the tragic reality of conflict. If Israel is to ensure lasting security, it must not only defend itself against future threats but also critically examine how its own leadership failed its citizens on October 7.
History has shown that independent commissions have been instrumental in reforming Israel’s security apparatus. The Agranat Commission after the Yom Kippur War led to significant military restructuring. The Winograd Commission, after the First Lebanon War, exposed deep flaws in political-military decision-making.
What must Israel do now?
What is required now is a commission that will guarantee that the nation is never caught off guard like this again. Some may contend that an investigation during wartime could undermine morale or divert attention from the current conflict.
However, Israel has encountered similar situations in the past and has learned that transparency is not a liability; rather, it is essential, both to protect against future attacks and to restore public trust.
Soldiers, intelligence officers, and commanders must be assured that their leaders are held accountable.
The families of the victims and hostages deserve clear answers.
The government should create an independent, nonpartisan investigative body with the authority to thoroughly examine the security, intelligence, and political failures that occurred on October 7.
This commission must include credible legal, military, and intelligence experts who are not influenced by political agendas. Their mission should be to uncover the truth, determine accountability, and suggest practical reforms.