Israel’s recent military success has left Iran uniquely vulnerable, but for how long? Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu celebrated President Donald Trump’s reimposition of “maximum pressure” sanctions, but unless that pressure yields Iranian concessions soon, U.S. and Israeli national interests may diverge. The first Trump administration concluded that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was a flawed agreement and withdrew from the deal. In his second term, it seems that Trump is willing to give time to find a tightened and lasting diplomatic solution to curbing Iran’s nuclear program — time Israel may not have. If Iran poses an existential threat to Israel, how long can it wait for maximum pressure to bear fruit?
A Sense of Urgency
There are a number of variables contributing to Israel’s current sense of urgency. First, the overthrow of the Bashar al Assad regime, Iran’s ally, has allowed Israel to strike Syrian air defenses that would threaten Israeli fighters on their path to Iran. Now, any operation against Iran is less likely to be detected before Israeli fighters enter Iranian airspace. In addition, Israel’s October 2024 raid against Iran destroyed its three remaining Russian-made S-300 surface-to-air missile systems. According to a former U.S. official, “Iran is essentially naked” — nearly defenseless against future air strikes.
But Iran has options to harden its defenses. 25-year oil-for-security accord between Iran and China is flourishing. Iran has received Chinese precursor chemicals essential for rebuilding its ballistic missile program and solid rocket fuel production. Also, an Iranian-Russian strategic partnership has deepened since Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine. Iran supplies thousands of drones to Russia and helped Russia open its own drone factory. In exchange, Iran is seeking to upgrade to Russia’s S-400 system, some variants of which are equipped with radars that can defeat stealth technology used by fifth-generation fighters like the F-35. The New York Times reported in August 2024 that “two Iranian officials … confirmed that Iran has made the request [for advanced air defense systems] and said Russia has started delivering advanced radars and air-defense equipment.” Although the timing is unclear, an improved Iranian air defense may soon be online. Israel would want to strike before then while it still enjoys the element of surprise.
Second, Iran’s primary deterrent against attacks on its nuclear facilities — the threat of retaliatory strikes by proxy forces — has been crippled. In southern Lebanon, Israel degraded Hizballah’s massive stockpiles of missiles and rockets by up to 80 percent, which could have devastated Israel in a matter of minutes. Israel now has greater freedom of action to target Iranian nuclear facilities without fear of a fierce Iranian-sponsored terrorist invasion if Israel bombed Iran. Yet, recent reports indicate that Hizballah is already rebuilding by recruiting new fighters and rearming. Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations warned “there have been several attempts to transfer weapons and cash to Hizballah.” Thus, it is clear that despite the collapse of the Assad regime, Syria will remain the primary smuggling route. Iran’s proxies might be weak now, but they may not be forever. Israeli strategists may want to exploit Iran’s current weakness before it rebuilds its terrorist proxies.
Third, based on Iran’s unsuccessful October attack, Israel has proven it can absorb Iran’s best shot. Since many of the ballistic and hypersonic missiles were intercepted or inaccurate, Iran’s attack exposed that its arsenal is less of a deterrent for Israel. But Iran still has thousands of ballistic missiles, receives technical assistance from Russia, and claims to be developing “new special missiles.” As a recent report argued, Iran will likely “double down” on ballistic missiles, seeking ways to achieve greater accuracy and penetrate enemy air defenses.
Finally, and most importantly, Iran is on the precipice of nuclear breakout. On Feb. 14, 2025, the International Atomic Energy Agency warned that Iran may be close to achieving irreversible gains. Indeed, it would likely soon have about 250 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent, just short of the level typically needed to produce a weapon. With over 90 kilograms produced since December 2024 alone, the increased supply of near-weapons-grade nuclear material could be used to create “several” crude nuclear devices in a matter of months, not years. Alternatively, Iran could choose to produce fewer bombs using less enriched material, trading quantity for quality.
Either way, Iran has options. It has enough weapons-level material to either get a crude bomb in a few months’ time, or to enrich further to develop a more sophisticated bomb, albeit fewer of them with a longer lead time. Both outcomes would bolster the Iranian regime, boosting its terrorist networks and posing a grave threat to Israel, in addition to setting off a potential chain reaction of nuclear proliferation among its regional rivals.
A Window of Opportunity?
Taken together, these factors have left many Israelis wondering why the Netanyahu government has not taken advantage of this relatively appealing strategic environment. A recent poll revealed 68 percent of Israelis favored striking Iran after recent successes against Hizballah. Without backing from the United States, however, only 37 percent of Israelis support a strike. Israelis understand that their informal alliance with the United States is critical to their security in a neighborhood as dangerous as the Middle East.
Trump seems to be against a military strike, at least for now. In his inauguration speech, he said that his legacy will be measured by the “wars that we end — and perhaps most importantly, the wars we never get into.” During Netanyahu’s Feb. 4 visit to the White House, Trump downplayed the urgency to strike Iran immediately, stating “There’s two ways of stopping them: with bombs or with a written piece of paper. I’d much rather do a deal that’s not going to hurt them.” Trump’s first term demonstrated he is willing to use force against Iran in a way his successor would not. Nonetheless, he remains optimistic about a negotiated outcome.
While Netanyahu and Trump appear aligned on Iran for now, several factors will shape whether Israel will choose to go it alone. First, what is maximum pressure’s likelihood of success, and what do American and Israeli definitions of “success” look like? Can it compel Iran to modify its behavior? While maximum pressure during the first Trump administration devastated Iran’s economy, it took over two years to force Iran to the brink of insolvency. Further, Iran showed little sign of capitulating despite facing economic ruin, suggesting the limits of economic coercion. Because of President Joe Biden’s conciliatory approach to draw Iran back to the negotiating table, Iran has enjoyed some sanctions relief in recent years. This may blunt the initial effects of newly applied sanctions — like the ones imposed on Iran’s oil tanker shadow fleet — at least during the window of maximum danger, while Iran redresses its vulnerabilities such as reinforcing its air defenses and rebuilding its regional proxy forces.
If Iran’s economy remains resilient or if Russia and China continue providing an economic lifeline to weather Western sanctions, Netanyahu may conclude that maximum pressure will fail and take matters into his own hands. Additionally, Netanyahu will gauge whether he thinks Trump is seriously committed to preventing Iran from building a nuclear weapon. If Trump decides that Iran cannot be deterred, or is too difficult to strike, Netanyahu may conclude Israel must act.
When it comes to a possible divergence between the two leaders, Trump may have leverage over Netanyahu. Israel would prefer to work in concert with the United States, which could bring heavy munitions like “bunker buster” bombs likely necessary to penetrate an Iranian centrifuge facility embedded into a mountain. But Israel has acted alone before. In 1981, Israel bombed Iraq’s nuclear site. And in 2007, Israel decided to act without the United States and bomb Syria’s nuclear reactor at al-Kibar. Israel has also employed novel, daring methods to cripple its adversaries: Take the recent Israeli raid into Syria to destroy a Hizballah underground missile production site, or the September 2024 deception operation against Hizballah when thousands of pagers simultaneously exploded. It cannot be ruled out that Israel has an ingenious plan to severely degrade Iran’s nuclear program without U.S. involvement.
Under Pressure
Israel’s success against Hamas, its weakening of Hizballah, and the overthrow of Iran’s ally Assad leaves Iran in its most precarious position in decades. For now, Netanyahu and Trump are aligned. But Israel views a nuclear-enabled Iran as an existential threat and may conclude it cannot squander a window of Iranian vulnerability on a gamble that maximum pressure will eventually force Tehran to take a step back from its nuclear program. The Trump administration should consider these exigencies and Israel’s predicament as it re-embarks on a strategy of maximum pressure against Iran.
Michael Allen is the former senior director for counterproliferation strategies for the National Security Council and former majority staff director of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Image: Israeli Defence Forces Spokesperson’s Unit via Wikimedia Commons.
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