Decoding Pakistan’s 2024 Airstrikes in Afghanistan

Was Pakistan’s military gambit across the Durand Line a clever maneuver or a spectacular miscalculation? The question hangs heavy over the volatile and still-contested Afghan-Pakistani border as a dangerous cycle of escalation unfolds. In December 2024, Pakistan launched airstrikes in Afghanistan’s Khost and Paktika provinces, targeting suspected Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan strongholds. The ruling Afghan Taliban’s aggressive rhetoric — threatening retaliation — was followed by border skirmishes as Taliban forces fired across the Durand line. The Tehrik-e-Taliban answered with a brazen escalation of its own: the abduction of several Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission civilian workers, raising the stakes in a dangerous cycle of action and reaction. Pakistan’s cross-border strikes — its second operation in 2024 — raised widespread concerns about Pakistan’s pivot to a more aggressive posture, deteriorating Pakistani-Taliban relations, and the potential for outbreak of war. Why would Pakistan risk such military escalation at this precarious moment — amid overlapping political, socioeconomic, and security crises — and how should we interpret its seemingly contradictory pattern of alternating between negotiations, military action, and diplomatic overtures? 

What Went Wrong?

The Taliban’s return to power was welcomed by Pakistani leaders. As Pakistan’s closest strategic ally, the Taliban benefitted from Islamabad’s material and logistical support along with sanctuaries during its two-decade struggle against the Western-backed Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. One might think, as Pakistani leadership did, that the Afghan Taliban would return the favor by being responsive to Pakistan’s security concerns about cross-border militant attacks. This expectation, however, proved to be mistaken. Post-2021, the Afghan Taliban’s reluctance to get involved was on full display, when they framed the problem as an internal security matter for Pakistan. The Taliban’s support for the Tehrik-e-Taliban, which was founded in 2007, is rooted not only in their shared Pashtun identity and ideology, but crucially in their years of joint battlefield experience in Afghanistan. For years, Tehrik-e-Taliban militants served as a force multiplier for the Afghan Taliban, participating in combat operations against Afghan government forces, lending manpower, tactical expertise, and logistical assistance. This alliance has created a security conundrum for Pakistan: its Afghan ally now shelters its most lethal domestic threat. This is a rich irony, given Pakistan supported the Afghan Taliban in large part to provide itself with “strategic depth.” 

A New Bargaining Position

Recognizing that both the Taliban and Tehrik-e-Taliban’s strategic calculus has fundamentally shifted after the U.S. withdrawal — with the Taliban asserting greater autonomy and the Tehrik-e-Taliban exploiting its Afghan sanctuary — Pakistan has recalibrated its bargaining position aligned with its new geopolitical realities. Pakistan’s airstrikes constitute a form of strategic signaling, aimed at both the Tehrik-e-Taliban and Afghan Taliban, within a broader framework of hybrid coercion that combines military force with economic and diplomatic pressure. By employing calculated, costly signaling that risks retaliation, Pakistan seeks to probe strategic boundaries, extract information about resolve from elicited responses, and redefine the bargaining landscape. 

However, both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban have countered Pakistani coercion with their own sources of leverage, limiting its effectiveness. Pakistan’s inability to extract meaningful concessions has introduced a cycle of retaliatory violence, heightening the risk of miscalculations between distrustful parties. The real risk here is that a protracted conflict between an intransigent Taliban, violent Tehrik-e-Taliban, and the Pakistani state will inflict severe socioeconomic and human costs on Pakistan, triggering cascading effects — from deeper political instability to a surge in militancy and illicit cross-border activities. This could plunge Pakistan deeper into its crises, with destabilizing spillover effects for the broader region. For the United States and regional actors, understanding Pakistan’s evolving strategy is critical — especially as Washington considers counter-terrorism engagement with either the Taliban or Pakistan. While the success of Pakistan’s approach depends on sustaining pressure without depleting resources or triggering escalation, any international intervention could significantly reshape these actors’ strategic calculations. 

Why Strike Now? 

The precipitating trigger for the December strikes appeared to be a Tehrik-e-Taliban attack that killed 16 Pakistani soldiers. However, the broader strategic context is critical to understanding these developments. The December strikes occurred during what has been Pakistan’s bloodiest year in over a decade, compounded by severe political instability, protests, and economic woes. In 2024 alone, Pakistan recorded 685 security personnel and over 900 civilian fatalities, underscoring the country’s ongoing battle against a three-pronged militant threat: the increasingly aggressive Tehrik-e-Taliban, Baloch insurgents, and the relatively weakened yet operational Islamic State Khorasan Province.

This deteriorating security environment coincides with a crisis of economic stability and institutional legitimacy. The Pakistani army is facing unprecedented levels of public discontent. Widely perceived as expanding its economic dominance while simultaneously clashing with Imran Khan — who remains behind bars — the military is also accused of suppressing civilians and journalists, and engaging in censorship under the guise of counter-terrorism. This erosion of legitimacy further complicates Pakistan’s dealings with the Afghan Taliban and Tehrik-e-Taliban, as both parties are acutely aware of Pakistan’s vulnerabilities, creating a conundrum: Pakistan must counter this perception of fragility and assert its authority — but doing so without further escalation presents a delicate and complex challenge. 

In any strategic multi-party negotiation, the “bargaining range” refers to the spectrum of terms each party is willing to accept in a deal — or agreements that are perceived as preferable to the costs of war. However, in reality, this range is often opaque and fraught with complexities, as parties conceal hidden agendas, harbor misperceptions, or operate with deep mistrust. These challenges make negotiated agreements not only difficult but also inherently fragile. In the post-2021 era, Pakistan’s kinetic actions serve to relay its resolve through credible threats — positioning itself to bargain from a position of strength subsequently. 

Pakistan’s Hybrid Coercion

Pakistan’s approach to dealing with the Taliban and the Tehrik-e-Taliban has shifted to combine kinetic and non-kinetic tools designed to achieve two interconnected objectives: degrading Tehrik-e-Taliban’s capabilities while raising the costs for the Afghan Taliban’s continued support of the group. This strategy is reminiscent of hybrid coercion, where states combine military, economic, and diplomatic instruments to manipulate adversaries’ cost-benefit calculations. Unlike “maximum pressure” campaigns that apply overwhelming force across all domains, hybrid coercion represents a more adaptive and deliberately ambiguous approach, coercing opponents into concessions while avoiding outright conflict.

Precision Strikes as Coercive Signaling

Pakistan’s targeted airstrikes in Afghanistan exemplify the use of limited force to compel change in both Tehrik-e-Taliban and the Afghan Taliban’s behavior through the threat of punishment while avoiding full-scale conflict. Beyond their tactical impact on Tehrik-e-Taliban’s infrastructure, the December airstrikes embodied strategic signaling. To the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani strikes relayed information about the consequences of continued support for Tehrik-e-Taliban. Demonstration of Pakistan’s willingness to act unilaterally pressures the Taliban to reassess their tolerance for Tehrik-e-Taliban’s activities — with their response revealing the depth of their commitment to protecting the group or willingness to risk Pakistani angst. To the Tehrik-e-Taliban, the strikes constituted a credible threat, reinforcing Pakistan’s determination and capability to counter the group — with the Tehrik-e-Taliban’s retaliation choices indicating their threshold for absorbing costs. To domestic audiences, these strikes serve as a reassurance of the military’s commitment to safeguarding national security and civilians, buffering the government and army’s legitimacy. 

Leveraging Structural Economic Dependence

Pakistan’s control of critical border crossings (e.g., Torkham and Chaman) provides asymmetric leverage, with about 40 percent of Afghanistan’s customs revenue flowing through these nodes — a crucial source of Taliban funding. By weaponizing these economic dependencies through new bank guarantees, import restrictions, and tariffs, the Pakistani state has sought to leverage economic statecraft to undermine the Taliban’s revenue, thereby increasing the costs of the their intransigence. The 10 percent duty on Afghan transit goods directly impacts the Taliban’s revenue, but has also triggered protests among Afghan traders, creating another source of pressure point for the Taliban.

Diplomatic Engagement and Pressure

Pakistan pursues a dual-track approach of engaging the Taliban diplomatically while simultaneously naming and shaming their support for the Tehrik-e-Taliban in international forums. In August 2024, Pakistan’s former special representative to Afghanistan, Asif Durrani, publicly stated that the Taliban “will have to come clean about their image as ideological cousins of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. This is the minimum for a durable [bilateral] relationship that [they] can do,” he stressed. Yet alongside this, the Pakistanis have always circled back to negotiations, working through traditional back channels.

Border Management and Migration Statecraft

States often manipulate cross-border flows for political goals, also referred to as “migration statecraft.” Pakistan’s tighter controls and forced repatriation of thousands of Afghan refugees is designed pressure the Taliban indirectly, again raising the costs of supporting the Tehrik-e-Taliban. Other measures have included enhanced surveillance to monitor cross-border activities, stricter travel documentation requirements, along with a serving of accusations that elements of the Afghan diaspora are actively involved in anti-Pakistan activities. 

While Pakistan’s actions have drawn international scrutiny with respect to the treatment of Afghans and widespread abuse, these efforts collectively signal a clear message to the Taliban: cooperation comes with benefits, but non-compliance has tangible consequences. The effectiveness of these tools ultimately depends on how both the Afghan Taliban and Tehrik-e-Taliban interpret and respond to them. As discussed below, their reactions reveal complex calculations shaped by their own capabilities, constraints, and strategic priorities in the post-2021 environment.

The Afghan Taliban’s Calculated Ambiguity 

The Taliban’s reactions to Pakistan’s hybrid coercion strategy reveal a complex calculus shaped by competing domestic and international imperatives. Their responses have ranged from denial and aggressive rhetoric, including cross-border shelling, to attempts at pacifying Pakistan through facilitating negotiations and relocating Tehrik-e-Taliban members away from the border. The recent decision to relocate the group’s operatives to Ghazni province illustrates this calculated ambiguity — a symbolic gesture aimed at appeasing Pakistan without fundamentally severing ties with the Tehrik-e-Taliban. At the same time, the Taliban continue to accuse Pakistan of sponsoring anti-Taliban elements.

This apparent inconsistency reflects the Taliban’s broader strategy of maximizing leverage while minimizing risks. Despite their triumphant stance following the U.S. withdrawal, the Afghan government’s collapse, and growing international engagement — including overtures from China, India, and Russia — the Taliban remain wary of escalation with Pakistan. However, the Taliban also possess their own hybrid coercion tools. Their control over trade routes, ties to militant networks, and emerging economic relationships — particularly with China — enable them to push back against coercion while maintaining strategic ambiguity.

Their responses to the Pakistan-Tehrik-e-Taliban conflict relay specific signals to multiple audiences. To Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban seek to signal a willingness to cooperate without conceding too much, asserting their autonomy and independence. To internal factions and allies like the Tehrik-e-Taliban, they send a message that while symbolic gestures may be made to placate external powers, the ideological alignment and objectives of the movement remain intact. To regional powers, they aim to signal their potential as an economic partner and a desire for investment, while subtly asserting that they are no longer beholden to Pakistani influence.

However, the Taliban’s bargaining position has key vulnerabilities. While no longer reliant on Pakistani sanctuaries, they remain vulnerable to Pakistan’s ability to impose substantial economic and political costs — at least in the short term until they find alternative economic partners. This vulnerability was laid bare in March 2024, when a senior Taliban official reportedly stated, “Depending on a country that has been heavily involved in Afghanistan’s affairs in such a critical area was not the right thing for Afghanistan.” 

Additionally, the Taliban face significant internal constraints: any decisive crackdown on the Tehrik-e-Taliban risks alienating key factions within their own movement, potentially driving disaffected fighters into the arms of their domestic rival, Islamic State Khorasan. Ultimately, the Taliban’s cautious balancing act between appeasing Pakistan and maintaining ties with the Tehrik-e-Taliban reflects their recognition that mismanaging either relationship could undermine their domestic authority and international legitimacy. Ironically, Pakistan now finds itself on the receiving end of the same strategic ambiguity it once employed — tolerating or supporting select militant groups while claiming plausible deniability. Pakistan must now navigate a Taliban that is employing similar tactics to preserve its own strategic flexibility.

The Tehrik-e-Taliban’s Strategic Calculus: Maximizing Leverage through Violence

Understanding the Tehrik-e-Taliban’s strategic calculations provides the final piece in this bargaining dynamic. The group’s behavior provides insights into its intent, priorities, and self-perception as a key player in the region. Despite decades of pressure, the group has not only endured but expanded its influence, positioning itself as a resilient and formidable adversary. Its ability to rebuild its foundation, consolidate power through mergers with other militant factions has reinforced its image as a unified and enduring force. Through a deliberate strategy of alternating between extreme violence, short-lived ceasefires, and negotiations, the group continuously tests the resolve and limitations of the Pakistani state. 

The Tehrik-e-Taliban employs multiple tactics to reinforce its bargaining position. By maintaining hardline demands — such as reversing the merger of Federally Administered Tribal Areas into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or refusal to disarm — the group signals its confidence in achieving long-term goals through violence rather than concessions. This stance is also indicative of the Tehrik-e-Taliban’s belief that a prolonged conflict is less damaging to the group than acquiescing to Pakistan’s terms. The Tehrik-e-Taliban’s rigid approach to negotiations serves multiple purposes: the group projects strength to its adversaries, maintains cohesion among rank-and-file members, and demonstrates to potential supporters that it remains committed to its ideological and territorial ambitions. While engaging in talks allows the group to portray itself as a rational actor, its maximalist demands and unwillingness to offer meaningful concessions suggest negotiations serve primarily tactical purposes. The Tehrik-e-Taliban’s lack of genuine compromise likely stems from fundamental commitment problems — the group may doubt the Pakistani military’s willingness to credibly guarantee future promises, particularly given the history of broken agreements between the two sides. While the Tehrik-e-Taliban is frequently blamed for breaching past peace agreements, its leaders have also accused the Pakistani government and military of failing to uphold certain commitments, leading to mutual distrust.

Ultimately, the Tehrik-e-Taliban exploits opportunities for dialogue to consolidate strength and secure short-term gains like prisoner releases or operational reprieves, without making substantive concessions. The group’s ideological rigidity also relays unwavering resolve to its followers, mitigating the chance of defections to other groups such as the Islamic State or splintering. Meanwhile, its expanding campaign of violence against Pakistani security personnel and military-run businesses serve as costly signals — risking retaliation to demonstrate the group’s capabilities and Pakistan’s vulnerabilities. However, the Tehrik-e-Taliban’s reliance on violence as its primary bargaining tool also exposes its key vulnerabilities. Most immediately, the group remains in part dependent on cross-border sanctuaries in Afghanistan, making it susceptible to shifts in Taliban support under international pressure. The group’s increasingly lethal tactics, especially the use of suicide attacks, risk triggering widespread local backlash and alienating local populations. While the group attempts to justify collateral damage as unintentional, mounting civilian deaths could alienate tribal communities and undermine its narrative of fighting for Islamic governance. And finally, its strategy of launching highly provocative attacks on Pakistan’s security forces could trigger a more aggressive Pakistani response that could elicit international backing. While the group has proven resilient, its heavy reliance on violence and maximalist demands may ultimately prove self-defeating. The Tehrik-e-Taliban’s calculation that it can sustain a war of attrition against the Pakistani state while maintaining cross-border havens, local support, and organizational cohesion remains untested.

Strategic Implications and Risks

While Pakistan’s hybrid coercion strategy aims to reshape both the Afghan Taliban and Tehrik-e-Taliban’s behavior, it introduces significant risks. Most critically, signaling resolve through military force could lead to miscalculations on either side, leading to disproportionate retaliation, further escalation of tensions, and a persistent cycle of tit-for-tat violence. The Taliban’s continued resistance to Pakistan’s coercion is likely to result in another protracted and costly conflict between the Tehrik-e-Taliban and Pakistan, which could entail devastating costs like previous counter-terrorism campaigns. Prolonged military engagements not only impose significant economic and human costs, fueling domestic unrest, but they are likely to embolden other militant groups beyond the Tehrik-e-Taliban — such as Baloch separatists, the Islamic State, or sectarian outfits. Additionally, increased conflict along the border could drive a surge in illicit activities, including arms trafficking and cross-border militancy, further influencing security dynamics.

Pakistan faces three key challenges that render its hybrid coercion strategy high-risk and potentially ineffective. First, escalating military action risks prompting the Taliban to defect from their current posture of cautious engagement with Pakistan and realign with regional powers such as India, Russia, and Iran, further undermining Pakistan’s leverage. Second, increased Tehrik-e-Taliban attacks in response to Pakistani pressure could trigger domestic blowback, exacerbate domestic instability, and deepen the domestic population’s grievances with the state. Third, Pakistan’s coercion strategy assumes the Taliban will prioritize economic interests over ideological and tribal bonds with the Tehrik-e-Taliban — an assumption that remains untested and could prove costly if wrong. 

For the United States, understanding Pakistan’s strategic evolution is critical within the context of a Taliban-governed Afghanistan and an emboldened Tehrik-e-Taliban. Through escalation, Pakistan is attempting to reposition itself against two actors whose strategic calculus has shifted fundamentally after the U.S. withdrawal. Pakistan’s strategy is not to pursue total war, but to make it costlier for the Taliban to support the Tehrik-e-Taliban and demonstrate sufficient resolve to extract better terms in subsequent negotiations. The success of Pakistan’s approach, however, is contingent upon its ability to sustain pressure without overextending its resources and managing escalation risks. This precarious balance suggests that any external intervention — whether through direct support to Pakistan or counter-terrorism engagement with the Taliban — could significantly alter these actors’ strategic calculations and behavior. Any shift in U.S. policy should carefully weigh the risk of reinforcing adversarial alignments or inadvertently deepening Pakistan’s security dilemma, which could further entrench instability than mitigate it.

Amira Jadoon, Ph.D., is an assistant professor at Clemson University, specializing in international security, counter-terrorism strategies and political violence. She has published extensively on militant groups survival strategies in South and Central Asia and is the author of the book The Islamic State in Afghanistan and Pakistan: Strategic Alliances and Rivalries (Lynne Rienner, 2023).

Image: Colin Cooke via Wikimedia Commons

War on the Rocks