China is systematically building a legal framework for a potential invasion of Taiwan. How can Taiwan’s friends, partners, and allies push back?
We come together as a unique writing team: military lawyers from the U.S. and Taiwanese armed forces. We seek here to explore China’s ongoing legal preparations for the use of force against Taiwan and uncover likely legal maneuvers Beijing will employ in the lead-up to an invasion. On that basis, we outline key steps for Taiwan’s international supporters to strengthen deterrence, including dismantling China’s legal pretext for aggression and implementing coordinated counter-lawfare strategies to challenge Beijing’s lawfare campaign.
Why Does a Legal Framework for War Matter?
Legal frameworks shape the way conflicts are justified, perceived, and responded to — both domestically and internationally. By crafting a legal basis for war, China is not only preparing its domestic landscape for a Taiwan invasion but also seeking to influence global narratives, erode Taiwan’s international support, and reduce the likelihood of foreign intervention.
Beijing understands that modern warfare extends to the legal domain, where the struggle for perceived legitimacy is paramount. By embedding this mindset into its military strategy, China aims to frame an invasion as a lawful internal matter, fostering diplomatic ambiguity that could deter international opposition and delay collective security responses. This is particularly critical in an era where legitimacy plays a central role in shaping geopolitical alignments and the willingness of nations to take decisive action. Through legal instruments like the Anti-Secession Law, Beijing is setting conditions for the use of force by normalizing its legal claims, asserting jurisdictional control, and criminalizing resistance. This incremental approach to lawfare seeks to shift the strategic environment in China’s favor before conflict, making an eventual invasion seem like a reasonable and legally justified course of action.
Countering China’s legal preparations for war is therefore essential to preserving peace and security in the Western Pacific and ensuring that international law remains a bulwark against aggression, rather than a weapon used to facilitate it. The more China’s lawfare is exposed and opposed, the harder it becomes for Beijing to legitimize aggression against Taiwan, both at home and abroad.
China’s Legal Case for Taking Taiwan
China leverages its “one China principle” as a purported legal justification for a Taiwan invasion, labeling the issue an “internal matter” exempt from the U.N. Charter’s prohibition on the use of force. Amid rising geopolitical tensions over the past two decades, Beijing has intensified efforts to promote its one China principle internationally. Simultaneously, Beijing has institutionalized its one China principle domestically by establishing a legislative framework rooted in its 1982 constitution, which designates Taiwan as an inseparable part of the People’s Republic of China.
In 2005, after Taiwan reelected a president viewed by Beijing as pro-independence, China enacted the Anti-Secession Law to signal its resolve and willingness to use force. Notably, the law mandates “non-peaceful means” if Beijing identifies undefined “major incidents” entailing secession, or deems peaceful “reunification” unachievable. Since its enactment, the Anti-Secession Law has become a cornerstone of Beijing’s lawfare campaign against Taiwan, providing a domestic pretext for escalating coercion and military threats.
Throughout the 2000s, as Taiwan sought to deepen ties with democratic partners and expand its global presence, China reinforced the Anti-Secession Law with additional domestic laws that framed foreign engagement with Taiwan as a violation of its sovereignty. Among these, the National Security Law (2015) and National Defense Law (2020) authorize military action to defend China’s claimed territory, incorporating Taiwan-related preparations into a broader national security structure aligned with Xi Jinping’s push for modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (hereafter, Chinese military) and centralized war powers.
By 2021, as U.S. and allied naval operations increased in the Western Pacific, China enacted the Coast Guard Law and Maritime Traffic Safety Law, granting its maritime forces sweeping authority to regulate and control so-called jurisdictional waters. In Beijing’s view, this includes not only Taiwan’s territorial sea but also areas of the Taiwan Strait where international law guarantees high-seas freedoms to all nations. A series of maritime notices and coast guard regulations have since expanded domestic enforcement powers even further, enabling Chinese authorities to exclude, detain, and use force against foreign vessels. Meanwhile, in the airspace above the Taiwan Strait, China implemented modified civilian flight routes, creating opportunities for military aircraft to blend with civilian air traffic and strain Taiwan’s air defenses. Together, these legal maneuvers strengthen the Chinese military’s counter-intervention strategy by masking potential cross-Strait aggression within routine activity, buying time and space to amass forces for conflict without foreign interference.
Building on this foundation, China has adopted an increasingly aggressive and sustained posture in the Taiwan Strait, catalyzed by perceived provocations — most notably, former U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 visit to Taiwan. Since then, China has worked to normalize large-scale joint operations, routine centerline crossings, and persistent air and naval patrols near, and sometimes within, Taiwan’s claimed territorial sea and airspace. This pattern reached new heights with last year’s Joint Sword exercises, featuring unprecedented blockade and invasion rehearsals staged in response to Taiwan’s election of President William Lai, whom Beijing labels a separatist. Joint Sword also showcased Beijing’s military-civil fusion strategy, with the Chinese military integrating commercial roll-on/roll-off ferries in amphibious formations — intentionally blurring the legal distinction between civilian and military objects to obscure aggression and complicate decision-making by law-abiding adversaries.
Consistent with its military-civil fusion strategy, Beijing’s recent institutional reforms under the National Defense Mobilization Act (2010), Cybersecurity Law (2017), and National Defense Transportation Law (2017) support rapid force expansion during conflict by ensuring military access to dual-use technologies and infrastructure, such as commercial shipping, civil aviation, and artificial intelligence. The National Intelligence Law (2018) reinforces this approach by compelling Chinese companies and foreign firms to assist in intelligence gathering, potentially weaponizing foreign data against Taiwan’s supporters. Reports of newly developed, purpose-built landing barges reflect emerging dual-use threats on the front lines, as the Chinese military harnesses whole-of-society power to enhance critical capabilities for an invasion.
In addition to conventional force rehearsals during Joint Sword, Beijing seized on Lai’s election to escalate its lawfare campaign. Shortly after his inauguration, Beijing introduced 22 new rules to bolster enforcement of the Anti-Secession Law, criminalizing support for Taiwan independence and expanding its authority to prosecute alleged “separatists.” These measures, which allow trials in absentia and, in some cases, the death penalty, signal an intensified effort to pressure Taiwan’s leaders, businesses, and civil society into submission.
By strengthening its legal foundation for invasion, Beijing aims to achieve what the Chinese military’s “three warfares” strategy calls “legal principle superiority” — a position of strategic dominance intended to legitimize escalating coercion and potential aggression. A recent Lowy Institute report highlights progress toward this goal, revealing that nearly half of U.N. member states now endorse Beijing’s one China principle and all efforts toward unification. Crucially, this support comes without explicit conditions for peaceful resolution, arguably signaling tacit consent for Chinese military aggression. Indeed, Beijing’s strategic use of lawfare appears to be gaining ground in preparing both the legal and physical environments for potential conflict.
What’s Next? Anticipated Legal Maneuvers
China has already laid its legal groundwork for a Taiwan invasion, but we expect further legal maneuvers as Beijing aims to solidify its position and establish legal principle superiority. Accelerated efforts to advance Beijing’s one China principle will remain central, building on the trend highlighted in the Lowy Institute report. This will include coercive measures to secure international endorsements and embed Beijing’s one China principle in international instruments, as seen in China’s secret memorandums of understanding with U.N. organizations. In the information environment, Beijing will continue framing its one China principle as a “universal consensus,” while perpetuating the false assertion that U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2758 (1971) establishes Taiwan as subordinate to Communist China under international law. By shaping global perceptions of the legality of its one China principle, Beijing will seek to create a permissive environment that maximizes decision space for Party leadership.
Meanwhile, China will continue leveraging global development to foster complacency and suppress dissent. When there is resistance, including among the 12 nations maintaining official ties with Taiwan, China will weaponize domestic laws — such as the Foreign Relations Law (2023) and the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (2021) — to impose economic costs while shielding itself from sanctions in the event of an invasion. Internally, Beijing will advance military-civil fusion implementation, issuing incremental legal and regulatory mandates as necessary to swiftly mobilize resources and enhance military readiness.
To further tighten the noose in the Taiwan Strait, China may publish straight baselines around Taiwan under the guise of Article 16 of the Law of the Sea Convention, mirroring the legal strategy it used to assert control over the Paracels, Senkakus, and, more recently, the Gulf of Tonkin and Scarborough Shoal. In tandem with this, China will step up implementation of its Coast Guard Law and Maritime Traffic Safety Law, potentially through more frequent and closer patrols — like those near Kinmen and Matsu in 2024 — ultimately leading to enforcement within Taiwan’s claimed territorial sea and airspace. Leveraging its increasingly robust assertions of jurisdiction, China could establish unlawful exclusion zones, not only during exercises like Joint Sword but also amid everyday maritime activities. China’s law enforcement authorities previewed this tactic in April 2023, when they initiated a “special joint patrol and inspection operation,” permitting officials to board and inspect vessels in the Taiwan Strait.
Lastly, in line with the Anti-Secession Law and China’s 2022 white paper, Beijing may introduce a “One Country, Two Systems” model for Taiwan, similar to the construct in Hong Kong. China’s enactment of a “Basic Law” for Hong Kong in 1990 — seven years before the handover of sovereignty — could foreshadow similar preemptive legal measures for Taiwan. Some Chinese scholars have proposed a “Taiwan basic law” loosely modeled after the Hong Kong version, which outlines Taiwan’s purported autonomy under Communist China’s rule.
As part of a broader carrot-and-stick strategy, a basic law could serve as propaganda to weaken resistance in Taiwan — offering amnesty to those who comply alongside arrest warrants for designated “separatists.” If Taiwan rejects a basic law, Beijing could cite this as evidence that peaceful measures have been exhausted, or alternatively, use the law to justify declaring a “major incident” following a perceived provocation, thus triggering the mandatory use of force under the Anti-Secession Law. For Taiwan’s supporters, the potential for China to strengthen its position through such legal maneuvers highlights the need to not only expose these actions but also actively challenge them, while evaluating the implications for both the possibility of an invasion and the effectiveness of deterrence strategies.
Conclusion and Recommendations
While an invasion of Taiwan is neither inevitable nor tied to a specific timeline, China’s establishment of legal principle superiority could raise the risk of conflict by lowering the perceived costs of aggression for Beijing. Conversely, securing the legal high ground and denying China the veneer of legitimacy associated with legal principle superiority could reduce the likelihood of conflict. To achieve this deterrent effect, policymakers should recognize the legal environment as a battleground and implement coordinated counter-lawfare strategies to challenge China’s lawfare campaign. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s counter-lawfare initiative exemplifies an approach that others can replicate. Though not a panacea, counter-lawfare can bolster broader deterrence efforts.
Effective counter-lawfare requires confronting the two main pillars of China’s legal framework: the one China principle and the Anti-Secession Law. Strategic communications should go beyond standard talking points to expose the legal flaws and aggressive implications of Beijing’s stance. Whether in high-level dialogues or through security cooperation and legal diplomacy at the tactical level, officials should work to eliminate confusion surrounding national one China policies, distinguishing them from Beijing’s one China principle, and explaining why this distinction is crucial for peace and security. Notably, the recent United States-Japan-Republic of Korea trilateral statement opposing unilateral efforts to alter the status quo by force or coercion marked a significant show of solidarity — one that should be broadly echoed, particularly by those countries that, like the United States, “acknowledge,” “take note of,” or “respect” (but do not endorse) Beijing’s claim over Taiwan.
Additionally, the United States, along with other nations and international bodies, should back growing opposition to China’s distortion of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2758, while making clear that the resolution merely recognizes the People’s Republic of China as the representative of China at the United Nations without resolving Taiwan’s status. A recently proposed U.S. Senate resolution reflects bipartisan momentum on this issue, which could be harnessed into a whole-of-government campaign.
Part of that campaign should focus on dismantling the legal arguments underlying China’s position, including Beijing’s false assertion that the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations (1943/1945) affirm its sovereignty over Taiwan, despite these proclamations predating the founding of Communist China and bearing no legal relevance to the current regime. More pertinent to Taiwan’s status is the San Francisco Peace Treaty (1951), which confirmed Japan’s renunciation of sovereignty over Taiwan after World War II without designating a successor state. This omission was no accident. It left Taiwan’s legal status open pending a future resolution — an enduring ambiguity that China ignores. Furthermore, the reality of Taiwan’s de facto autonomy contradicts China’s claim that Taiwan is purely an internal matter and reinforces the opposing view that international law governs China’s actions in cross-Strait relations. In other words, the U.N. Charter’s prohibition on the use of force bars cross-Strait aggression, and Taiwan, as a peaceful, self-governing entity, retains an inherent right to self-defense, regardless of formal statehood.
To facilitate dialogue on these legal considerations, counter-lawfare strategies should break the China-imposed Taiwan taboo in international engagement by ensuring Taiwan has a meaningful voice in global forums, including international legal conferences. This does not equate to granting statehood, but rather acknowledges that Taiwan’s perspective deserves to be heard, and that its security experts can offer valuable insights to foster strategic empathy and inform cross-Strait policies. Practically, Taiwan’s participation in international bodies remains essential, as Taiwan continues to play a key role in global governance, from air traffic control to international trade, despite China’s opposition.
As China attempts to isolate Taiwan internationally, the growing number of nations — including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, the United States, and the United Kingdom — exercising navigational freedoms in the Taiwan Strait is a positive step toward preventing China from achieving air and sea dominance over Taiwan. Militaries should continue this drive by engaging in combined activities in the strait, potentially expanding their operations beyond simple transit to include other lawful uses of the sea and airspace. This would signal to Beijing that unilateral attempts to alter the legal status of the Taiwan Strait will not be tolerated. Moreover, it would reaffirm international commitment to operating in this vital waterway to the fullest extent permitted by international law, possibly undermining Beijing’s confidence in its counter-intervention strategy.
In support of the actions outlined above, officials should exercise combined legal vigilance as a core tenet of counter-lawfare. This entails continuous monitoring and assessment of the legal environment to ensure early detection of significant changes — ranging from subtle shifts in China’s national mobilization framework to overt declarations under the Anti-Secession Law. With fluency in Mandarin and a deep understanding of Beijing’s bureaucratic and legal discourse, Taiwan’s security experts are uniquely positioned to assist international partners in this area. By jointly developing legal indicators and warnings, integrating them into intelligence collection, and strengthening interorganizational cooperation, information sharing, and capacity building, Taiwan and its international partners can enhance readiness and response capabilities. These efforts depend on strong partnerships to project strength in numbers, reinforce deterrence, and safeguard peace and security in the Western Pacific.
Cheng Deng Feng (鄭登峰) is an officer in the armed forces of the Republic of China (Taiwan). He is currently serving as an operational law advisor with Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense. He has previously coordinated unofficial legal engagement with the U.S. Defense Institute of International Legal Studies and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.
Tim Boyle is an officer in the U.S. Navy Judge Advocate General’s Corps and was previously the head of operational law at U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. His next assignment will be as staff judge advocate for the U.S. Seventh Fleet. He has extensive experience working on and writing about strategies to counter China’s lawfare.
The views expressed in this post are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policies or positions of the Taiwan Ministry of Defense, the Taiwan government, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
Image: Midjourney
Jesus Christ is King
