As the new American president shook allied capitals all over the world, a Virginia-class submarine — the USS Minnesota — arrived at a port in western Australia for the first of many routine Australian port visits slated for American submarines this year. It seemed like a positive signal for the U.S.-Australian alliance. And, despite uncertainty over America’s commitments, officials in the Trump administration have praised the AUKUS security compact.
Still, these are the only sorts of Virginia-class submarines Australians should expect to arrive on their shores anytime soon: visiting American submarines crewed by Americans. Despite the promises of the first and core pillar of the AUKUS security compact, the United States simply won’t have enough Virginia-class submarines to spare. To make matters worse, the SSN AUKUS — meant to be Australia’s long-term solution — is likely to encounter significant delays and issues, similar to Britain’s past submarine programs, due to challenges in design maturity, production capacity, and technical complexities, making it an unreliable solution for Australia’s submarine needs. Faced with a stark reality, it is time for Australia to reconsider its options.
Background
As readers of War on the Rocks likely remember, in September 2021, the Biden administration and its counterparts in Australia and the United States announced a new “enhanced trilateral security partnership” in 2021, called AUKUS. Made up of two pillars — one on submarines and the other on advanced technology sharing — it was and remains aimed at deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, mainly against China.
The crux of this is the transition from Australia’s older Collins-class submarines to nuclear-powered attack submarines. The party most directly affected was France’s Naval Group, which had been contracted with Australia to deliver a fleet of conventionally powered submarines (a variant of the nuclear-powered French Suffren design), to be produced in Australia — a deal worth tens of billions of dollars and representing a substantial French industrial investment. Needless to say, ties between Australia and France — itself a significant power in the Indo-Pacific — have never fully recovered, with the latter understandably perceiving this secretly negotiated deal with Washington and London as a dramatic betrayal. And Australia, having already spent $2.6 billion (Australian) on the project, was forced to pay over $800 million in penalties to Naval Group for reneging on the deal.
Under the latest AUKUS plans, Australia is promised three Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines from the United States at three-year intervals, starting in 2032, to fill the gap left by Australia’s aging Collins-class submarines. After this, a new class of submarine, known as SSN-AUKUS, is supposed to be on the way. It is based on a British design but incorporating technology from all three AUKUS nations. A further two Virginia-class submarines may be sold to Australia to cover any delays in the arrival of SSN-AUKUS. In order to make all of this happen, Australia is paying heftily, investing in both the American and British submarine industrial bases. This includes a $3 billion investment planned over the next four years. To be sure, this funding is also aimed at helping set up Australia’s own emerging submarine industrial base in Adelaide and to allow for Australian professionals to work in U.S. shipyards. But, over four years later, it is prudent for Australian leaders to finally look more critically at where this choice has taken Australia’s ability to project naval and undersea power.
The Virginias Aren’t Coming
The United States currently faces a significant shortfall in the number of operational nuclear submarines, as ageing Los Angeles-class submarines retire faster than replacement Virginia-class submarines can be commissioned. This makes it impractical for the United States to fulfill its promise of selling three to five Virginia-class submarines to Australia without degrading its own undersea capabilities. Key American leaders such as Sen. Roger Wicker, now the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, seemed to recognize this as early as 2023, but investments in America’s maritime and — specifically — nuclear submarine production capacity are coming much too late. The recent Government Audit Office report highlights shortcomings in the coordination and effectiveness of the significant sums being invested, including by Australia.
The pandemic had a dramatic impact on the two shipyards building Virginia-class submarines: General Dynamics Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls Industries. In addition, many small industries in the supply chain were badly affected, resulting in a large backlog as partly built nuclear submarines accumulated in the shipyards. Outsourcing construction of modules to other U.S. shipyards will assist but it is doubtful that this will overcome the backlog or fill the gaps in capacity in the two major shipyards and their supply chains by the early 2030s. There is a similar backlog in shipyards undertaking maintenance on the in-service submarines.
The United States is struggling to clear the backlog and achieve a tempo of 2.3 boat deliveries per year, in order to sell Australia the three to five submarines required under AUKUS. The sale is conditional, however, because under the AUKUS legislation the U.S. president must certify to Congress 270 days before any sale that the transfer of a Virginia will not “degrade U.S. underseas capabilities.” Given the current shortfall in U.S. Navy nuclear submarine numbers and the difficult recovery ahead, selling a submarine, up-to-date for maintenance and with at least 15 years of reactor life remaining, is bound to degrade American capabilities.
The situation in America’s two submarine-building yards is stark. In the five years from 2020–2024 inclusive, six Virginia class submarines were commissioned, an average of 1.2 per year. The U.S. Navy has only requested funding for one Virginia in Fiscal Year 2025, “due to limits on Navy’s budget topline and the growing Virginia class production backlog.” Exacerbating the problem for the yards, the Block V submarines just ordered are 30 percent larger and far more complex, requiring 25 percent more manhours to build. The first is yet to be delivered, but a return to shorter build times appears unlikely. Even if it is achieved, the “two-plus” production tempo does not fill the pandemic-related gaps now in the system.
Speaking to their shareholders in October 2024, the chief executives of Huntington Ingalls Industries and General Dynamics Electric Boat blamed their slowing delivery tempo and reduced cash flows on supply chain and workforce issues and offered no optimistic forecasts for early improvement. Increasing costs have also impacted profitability: Huntington Ingalls Industries indicated that it is renegotiating the contracts for 17 Block IV and Block V nuclear submarines. The issues are longstanding and will not be rectified quickly, despite the massive effort now underway.
Further, General Dynamics Electric Boat have diverted their most experienced workers to prevent further slippage to the U.S. Navy’s highest-priority shipbuilding program, the construction of the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines, the second of which was laid down in 2024.
Against this backdrop, the shipbuilders are being asked to achieve a significant lift in production. The building effort required for one Columbia-class submarine equates to two and a half that of Block IV Virginia class. The Congressional Research Service noted that the build rate in 2028 to achieve one Columbia-class submarine and two of the latest Virginia-class submarines is five times that required to build one Virginia in 2015. Huntington Ingalls Industries is building sections of the Columbia class submarines, so the priority will impact both yards.
What will be the U.S. Navy’s nuclear submarine situation in 2032? According to my research, the U.S. Navy currently has 49 nuclear submarines, including 23 Los Angeles-class nuclear submarines in service. The Los Angeles-class submarines are typically decommissioned after 36 years in service. By 2032 when the first Virginia-class submarine is to be sold to Australia, the youngest, the USS Cheyenne, will be 36 years old. The first two Seawolf-class nuclear submarines will also be reaching their end of life. The Congressional Research Service has advised that up to seven are being considered for life extension programs. At least in the view of this experienced submariner, they cannot be considered frontline submarines despite their many updates. Age catches up with us all.
The fork in the road on whether the United States can sell Australia its first of three of five frontline nuclear submarines appears likely to coincide with the nadir in U.S. Navy attack submarine numbers. In 2032 the U.S. Navy will have, in the best-case scenario, 42 attack submarines if you count the seven aging Los Angeles-class submarines. The accepted requirement is for 66. This is a 36 percent shortfall — and again that is in the best case. In the worst case, the shortfall could be as high as 47 percent.
As incoming Under Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby noted in his testimony on Capitol Hill, he might not support America’s commitments to send three to five Virginia-class submarines if it would diminish America’s undersea capabilities. And that diminishment is coming. The White House is beginning to grasp how severe the problem is, according to recent reporting. It will not be an easy decision. There will be significant political pressure to proceed with the sale, given all the assurances and public expectation. Should the decision be taken not to sell Australia nuclear submarines because of the U.S. Navy’s inadequate inventory, Australia will be left with no stop-gap capability to cover the withdrawal of the Collins class.
The SSN-AUKUS Program Is Heading for Problems
As I noted, the successful delivery of a new class of submarine — the SSN-AUKUS — is the real long-term bet of AUKUS. Given the problems being encountered by the British submarine enterprise, it seems highly likely that the SSN-AUKUS program, like the Astute program, will run late and deliver a problem-laden class of submarines.
The AUKUS optimal pathway sets out an ambitious schedule, with operational deliveries “as early as the late 2030s” and the follow-on submarines to be produced in Australia “by the end of this decade.” The design is said to be mature, but given the lack of published schedule or record of successful milestones achieved, I agree with analyst Marcus Hellyer’s skepticism:
Despite AUKUS leaders’ fondness for the term ‘mature’, there is little evidence that suggests that SSN-AUKUS is mature. … SSN-AUKUS likely hasn’t started detailed design. Moreover, detailed design will take a massive ramp up in design resources from where the program has been over the past few years. We are still a long way from retiring the schedule risk around achieving the start of construction.
Britain’s Astute program required significant design and project management assistance from the U.S. submarine design authority, General Dynamics Electric Boat, and the U.S. Navy to complete. Informal reports that similar design support is now being sought for SSN-AUKUS reinforces doubts about the maturity of the design and the ability of the British designer, BAE Systems, to complete it in a timely and competent fashion.
BAE Systems are already heavily committed to the construction of the four Dreadnought ballistic missile submarines, the United Kingdom’s highest national priority, and completing the final two Astute attack submarines. SSN-AUKUS is at the back of the queue. A recent fire affecting the delivery of the final Astute-class nuclear submarine can only add to these woes. These concerns are reinforced by issues over the timeliness and functionality of the PWR3 reactor to power both Dreadnought and SSN-AUKUS. The project to provide the core for the nuclear reactor being built to power the both submarines has been given a red “unachievable” rating in the Infrastructure and Projects Authority Annual Report on Major Projects 2023–24. This is the third such annual assessment by the U.K. government’s watchdog. The agency defines its red rating as:
Successful delivery of the project appears to be unachievable. There are major issues with project definition, schedule, budget, quality and/or benefits delivery, which at this stage do not appear to be manageable or resolvable. The project may need re-scoping and/or its overall viability reassessed.
Problems with the PWR3 reactor would delay the Dreadnought program and hence SSN-AUKUS. If the problems prove systemic then they could directly impact on the success of SSN-AUKUS. Rectifying the problems against a backdrop of financial and manpower stringency will also drain scarce resources away from SSN-AUKUS. The PWR3 reactor is no stranger to controversy. It was conceived as a critical replacement after safety issues were found in its predecessor, the PWR2 reactor. The test reactor that raised the alarm was a prototype PWR2, installed ashore in northern Scotland. It was shut down as a cost-saving measure in 2015. As a further cost-saving measure, there will be no shore-based prototype for the PWR3 — instead the United Kingdom is relying on computer simulation to identify any hazards. This is hardly reassuring, since computer simulation proved unable to detect the earlier problems in the PWR2. The PWR3 is said to be a copy of the successful U.S.-designed reactor used in the Virginia class and hence, a prototype is not required. If so, the United Kingdom seems to be struggling to produce a simple copy, even without consideration of material and manufacturing differences.
Knowing that Britain’s Strategic Defence Review is grappling with serious funding shortfalls and the shift in British priorities to Europe’s defense arising from the Trump administration’s disinterest in continuing to finance the conventional defense of Europe, I am not confident in their ability to deliver on their promises, especially with their history of difficulties in getting any nuclear submarines to sea.
What Should Australia Do Next
To sum up, Australia seems to be standing on a precipice. Its closest allies are likely going to fail to meet their commitments in providing Australia with submarines and the means to build more. And the Collins-class submarines will be below critical mass by 2042 and out of service entirely by 2048. An alternative solution lies in the French Suffren-class submarine, which presents a more practical and cost-effective option for Australia’s naval needs.
The Suffren class is a mature and tested design, already in service with the French Navy. This submarine class offers a lower-risk alternative compared to the untested SSN-AUKUS, providing a solid baseline from which Australia can build and evolve its submarine capability. Notably, the Suffren class boasts features such as electric propulsion and an X-configuration aft control surface, enhancing stealth and maneuverability. These characteristics are particularly advantageous in the shallow and confined waters north of Australia, where enhanced maneuverability is crucial.
Moreover, the Suffren class is optimized for anti-submarine warfare and intelligence gathering, equipped with a capacity for 24 torpedoes or missiles. While it may not match the Virginia or SSN-AUKUS classes in terms of weapon load or endurance, the Suffren class meets the essential requirements for Australia’s defense strategy at a significantly lower cost. Not only is the Suffren-class submarine cheaper to build, but it also requires a smaller crew, thus reducing long-term operational expenses.
One of the critical advantages of the Suffren class is its use of low-enriched uranium fuel, which necessitates refueling every 10 years. This approach not only aligns with non-proliferation norms but also simplifies the logistical and security challenges associated with handling and transporting highly enriched uranium. The ability to install the reactor early in the construction process without fuel and to fuel it later significantly reduces complexity and enhances safety during the submarine’s building phase.
Financially, a Suffren-class submarine costs substantially less than its British and American counterparts. This cost-effectiveness is coupled with a more predictable budgeting framework, as the Suffren would have a firm contracted price, avoiding the uncertainties of the open-ended financial commitments involved with the Virginia and SSN-AUKUS submarines.
Strategically, adopting the Suffren class does not necessitate a restructuring of the broader AUKUS framework. Australia can maintain its commitments under AUKUS, focusing on enhanced industrial cooperation, training, and maintenance programs with the United States and the United Kingdom, while also establishing a repair facility that supports allied submarines.
Australia should urgently begin preparations to build the first batch of Suffren submarines jointly with France, transitioning to an Australian build with local design enhancements. This approach not only ensures timely delivery and technological relevance but also establishes a sovereign capability for submarine design and maintenance. By pivoting to the Suffren class, Australia will secure a sustainable, operational submarine force that is both affordable and capable of meeting the strategic demands of the Indo-Pacific region. This shift also gives America an easy way out of a tough situation. Alleviating the burden on the United States to fulfill submarine delivery commitments that could potentially degrade its naval capabilities will strengthen the overall alliance. A failure to make the change will indeed leave Australia high and dry, without a viable sovereign submarine capability.
Rear. Adm. (ret.) Peter Briggs is a retired Australian submariner whose commands included two Oberon-class submarines, the Australian Submarine Squadron, HMAS Stirling, and Naval Training Command. He also held the senior submarine policy position for the Oberon-class force. He led the Submarine Capability Team, which was established to rectify the problems with the introduction of the Collins-class submarines into service. He is a past president of the Submarine Institute of Australia.
Image: Lt. Corey Todd Jones
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