Deciphering French Strategy in the Indo-Pacific

From the fanfare-laden reopening of Notre-Dame to the Artificial Intelligence Action Summit held in the cavernous halls of the Grand Palais, to last-minute summits of European leaders hastily convened in the gilded chambers of the Elysee, French diplomacy appears to have been in overdrive in recent months. Emmanuel Macron, France’s hyper-energetic and peripatetic president, has been even more active than usual — tirelessly shuttling across a war-torn European continent and a widening Atlantic Ocean in a desperate effort to shore up trans-Atlantic unity at a time of historic upheaval.

And yet thousands of miles away, on the other side of the world, and for the first time since the 1960s, a French nuclear-powered carrier strike group is on a mission to steam though the Indian Ocean and beyond the Malacca Strait, all the way into the Pacific Ocean. As it ranges across these vast oceanic expanses, the carrier strike group — which incorporates a nuclear attack submarine, a fleet tanker, frigates, and maritime patrol aircraft — has participated in operations and led exercises in some of the most contested waters and maritime chokepoints in the world.

Why now, and for what purpose — especially at a time when, to the casual foreign observer, France seems to have so many more pressing geopolitical concerns closer to home? The answer to that simple question is twofold.

First of all, the Indo-Pacific is also France’s home. Its involvement is intangible with its own sovereignty, the protection of 1.6 million French citizens living in seven oversea territories and a nine million square kilometers of exclusive economic area. Their relationship with France dates back centuries. La Réunion has been French longer than Corsica, or than Hawaii has been American.

And second, France has a vested interest in the region’s security as a whole. The decision to send its most high-end naval asset such a great distance signals France’s long-term commitment to stability in the region and that it’s here to stay. To continue to stay engaged and credibly operate in a more contested environment, France should enhance its ability to deploy seamlessly through partnerships, integration, and interoperability with militaries all across the region. The United States is one of France’s most important partners in that respect, especially from an operational point of view, as shown by the carrier strike group’s interactions with the U.S. Seventh Fleet based in Yokosuka, Japan.

All of this is happening in a new context: with voices inside the new U.S. administration supporting burden-shifting away from Europe rather than burden-sharing across theaters. The crisis theaters in Europe and the Indo-Pacific will however remain increasingly linked, in particular given China’s support to Russia and North Korea’s involvement in Ukraine. Recognizing this, certain key democracies in the region, especially Japan as a member of the G7, Australia and South Korea, have provided diplomatic, economic and military support to Ukraine. Competitors use similar or coordinated strategies of influence, intimidation or even coercion from the South China Sea and the Pacific, all the way into the Indian Ocean and Europe. France’s commitment to the region is essential, given the shared challenges between the Indo-Pacific and Europe. The United States and France have existing synergies in their national ambitions that can help maximize their respective strategies. France is here to stay, but U.S. burden-shifting away from European security will make collaborative advantages in the Indo-Pacific more fragile as well.

The Indo-Pacific as a Continuum

Much like the United States, France views the Indo-Pacific through the lens of certain key sub-regions — some of which it has historically prioritized, some of which it has perhaps overly neglected. And like the United States, it is now increasingly considering this vast region as a more integrated geopolitical ensemble. France is well acquainted with the tyranny of distances in the Indo-Pacific, given that its furthermost overseas territory is almost 17,000 kilometers away from the mainland. Its seven overseas territories are strategically located. In the western Indian Ocean, Mayotte, La Réunion, and the Scattered Islands are at the opening of the Mozambique Channel or near it. In the South Pacific, New Caledonia sits at the entry of the Coral Sea towards Australia, which made it a key support base for the Allies in the Pacific during World War II. Wallis and Futuna is located between Fiji and Samoa. Finally, French Polynesia is at a similar latitude to Hawaii in the middle of the South Pacific between Australia and Latin America. This specificity offers an opportunity to look at the region through the lens of a continuum from the Mediterranean through the Red Sea, the openings of the Indian Ocean, all the way to key straits in the South China Sea towards the South Pacific.

As a “resident power,” France needs to adapt its capabilities to remain a relevant security contributor around its sovereign territories. Three military bases located in La Réunion, New Caledonia, and French Polynesia offer reliable support points during deployments, but are not equipped with key high-end  capabilities. La Réunion and Mayotte use two surveillance frigates with a helicopter each, one supply and support vessel, two patrol vessels (including one polar patrol vessel) and two tactical transport aircraft. In the Pacific Ocean, the French Armed Forces in New Caledonia and in French Polynesia operate two surveillance frigates with one helicopter each, three patrol vessels, two multi-mission ships, five maritime surveillance aircraft, four tactical transport aircraft, and five helicopters. These are not high-end warfighting capabilities, but largely focused on dealing with climate change, illegal fishing, illegal migration, polluting activities, and exploitation of natural resources.

The 2024 to 2030 military programming law, which allocates 13 billion euros to the modernization of forces stationed in overseas territories, aims to close some of the existing gaps, but not all. The currently stationed surveillance frigates are being replaced around 2030 with new assets fitted with anti-submarine warfare capabilities. While there is no specific plan for drones in French overseas territories, their development and acquisition are a major line of general effort. Given the likely increase of the defense budget and production in Europe, an explicit plan to deploy surveillance drones to patrol the exclusive economic zones all the way to the Pacific would be necessary. There are further lines of efforts for France to remain a credible actor in order to enhance deployments, to stay ahead in the hybrid domain, and to enhance partnership strategies based on its post-AUKUS pivot.

Preserving Strategic Commons

With limited means permanently stationed, France’s ability to signal its commitment for the defense of contested strategic commons and contribution to maritime security also relies on first, regularity in high-end deployments from metropolitan France, and second, by showing an ability to react quickly to a crisis.

French military assets deploy with regularity from the Mediterranean to the Pacific, signaling political will and commitment for the defense of strategic commons where they are the most fragile. Since 2021, the French Navy deploys at least twice a year in the South China Sea and at least once a year in the Taiwan Strait. The 2021 port call of a nuclear attack submarine in Perth and Guam is not meant to be a one-off. France also monitors North Korean-related oil smuggling operations in violation of U.N. sanctions as part of a U.S.-led initiative. More frequent deployments are testing the French Navy’s ability to operate in the South China Sea and the Pacific. Every day, a third of global trade passes through the heavily trafficked Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok Straits where the carrier strike group led a nine-nation maritime security exercise in January called La Pérouse. For the first time, the carrier strike group tested its ability to operate with the United States around the Luzon Strait in the Philippine Sea with the U.S. Seventh Fleet and a Japanese warship during exercise Pacific Steller. In 2024, the multi-mission frigate, Bretagne, participated in major multilateral exercises, including the Valiant Shield exercise in the South China Sea around USS Theodore Roosevelt. At the same time, French and Canadian ships transited through the South China Sea to test their ability to conduct precise lethal and multidomain operations.

Armed forces also regularly signal their ability to deploy air and sea assets quickly in times of crisis all the way to the South Pacific and East Asia. In 2023, air assets, including 10 Rafale fighter jets, reached Southeast Asia in 30 hours from France during the PEGASE mission for the first time since the exercise was established in 2018. During its current deployment, the carrier strike group acquired the capability to refuel diesel bunkers at sea for one of its frigates with a U.S. tanker. France also participated in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command-led Rim of the Pacific exercise in 2024. Beyond the United States, Europe has the opportunity to showcase its ability to integrate other European assets, such as in PEGASE 2024,  which included French, German, Spanish, and British air assets.

To enhance its ability to project, more could be done for these strategically located territories to become real regional hubs, especially in the Indian Ocean where most of France’s capabilities are. While the hand-over of the Chagos Islands to the Republic of Mauritius has been paused by the United Kingdom amid  U.S. President Donald Trump’s return to office, it arguably makes La Réunion more important. Current infrastructure in La Réunion is only sufficient to accommodate French naval port calls and small-scale multilateral exercises. France should seize the opportunity and invest in larger infrastructures, which could accommodate for more national and multilateral deployments. La Réunion already serves as an anchor for military cooperation: the Indian Navy deployed P-8I maritime patrol aircraft at Réunion Island in 2020 and in 2022.In March 2024, an Australian P-8A aircraft made an inaugural visit to Réunion Island. In this context, France strengthened its ties with Quad partners, despite not being a member, and could explore more opportunities for ad-hoc collaboration with India and Australia in La Réunion.

Contributing Beyond Maritime Security

The weak infrastructure networks and fragility of island states to climate change means we should pay more attention to hybrid threats. The example of Tonga in 2023 shows how the conjunction of these weaknesses can create a breakdown of sovereignty. Following a volcanic eruption, the island’s communications were entirely cut off from the world, which France helped restore. China has cut multiple cables deliberately around Taiwan in the last few years, and conducted suspected sabotage activities in the Baltic Sea in 2023 and 2024. Given the geography of its overseas territories, France faces threats similar to other island states of the region.

Island states are particularly vulnerable to multiple domains of coercion, including in the cyber and extra-atmospheric spaces, as well as the digital and undersea spaces. The 2022 National Strategic Review emphasizes the reinforcement of France’s ability to protect its sovereignty in these domains, especially in maritime security, as France’s exclusive economic zones in the Indian and Pacific Oceans makes France’s the second largest in the world with 9 million square kilometers. As such, one of the carrier strike group’s main missions in 2025 is to prepare the French Navy to enhance its information superiority through embarked data centers. According to the commander of the carrier strike group, the current deployment should be setting new benchmarks to be applied to the next generation of navy systems. During the deployment, the carrier strike group will test new sensors and big data tools to increase situational awareness.

France’s sovereignty in its overseas territories faces contestations that can be instrumentalized by competitors. In 2022, China proposed a cooperation deal on data and cyber security to Pacific Island nations. While not finalized, it denotes Beijing’s willingness to dominate the immaterial space in the region. Chinese diaspora and friendship groups have been active in New Caledonia and French Polynesia, including to push favorable economic projects for critical raw material or fishing rights. French sovereignty is contested in New Caledonia — with the support of Azerbaijan — and could be further contested in other areas, with Comoros laying claims on Mayotte with the support of China and Russia, or with Madagascar laying claims over Tromelin Island and the Scattered Islands.). New Caledonia, if independent, given its strategic location in the opening to Australia and the Pacific, could quickly become an important asset for competitors.

The Impact of AUKUS on France’s Partnership Strategy

The scrapped French Australian submarine deal would have anchored French forces in the Indo-Pacific in the long term because of implicit guarantees. The deal would also have reinforced French-American defense cooperation, as the submarines incorporated Lockheed Martin combat management systems. Instead, in the two years that followed the announcement of AUKUS, the slow mending of its relationship with Australia gave France more space to invest politically in Japan and India, but also in pivotal smaller-sized littoral and island states all over the region, some where no other French president had been in decades or ever, including Thailand, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, and Vanuatu.

The Indian Ocean is home to France’s most important partner in the region, India, rooted in the respect of each country’s version of strategic autonomy, culminating in 2023 into a joint vision for the Indo-Pacific. French-designed Rafale planes and Scorpene submarines are vital in the defense of India’s security capabilities. The new roadmap goes beyond initial joint surveillance and maritime awareness of the area, opening up new domains of cooperation into industrial ecosystems, space, and energy.

Nations should be equipped to better deal with dilemmas in protecting their sovereignty. In recent years, France upgraded its partnerships with Indonesia, which acquired 42 Rafale since 2022, and with the Philippines, which recently acquired patrol boats from France. Japan and France signed a new partnership roadmap in 2023 to multiply joint exercise towards increased interoperability. Both countries have enhanced their exercises, conducting first land drill and joint amphibious exercises in Japan in 2021 and in New Caledonia in 2023. Partnerships with Japan and South Korea have major potential for growth in already existing maritime, cyber, and space cooperation. Only recently the partnership with Australia gradually returned to the defense domain with the signature of a reciprocal access agreement in 2023. The two countries continued to cooperate on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, in particular to Tonga in 2022 and Vanuatu in 2023 through the disaster relief cooperation FRANZ agreement.

Maintain Trans-Atlantic Ties Across Theaters in Europe and the Indo-Pacific

In the context of limited resources, states can endure or endeavor to choose a hierarchy of priorities and partnerships. France, like many other powers with a global outlook, has been grappling with the difficulty of neatly prioritizing foreign policy. And in the current context, the temptation to forgo one theater for another could be strong in Europe, even more so as the push is now coming from the United States.

France needs to find its interests — and voice — amidst the American rebalancing toward the Indo-Pacific and disengagement from Europe. As an old European power, France wants to avoid history repeating itself and being stuck between the agenda of two competing superpowers — just like most resident countries of the Indo-Pacific. Its narrative of “power of balances” is the translation of this plea, not that it will embrace a form of multi-alignment. Three main priorities are outlined as a consequence: strategic autonomy, European construction, and multilateral engagement. These policies are not designed to come at the expense of relations with the United States but seek to address the lack of predictability and uncertainties regarding future American engagement on the continent and beyond.

France and the United States have held a unique annual defense-led Indo-Pacific dialogue since 2019, along with a  state-led Indo-Pacific dialogue since 2024. The defense dialogues allow both countries to coordinate deployments in the Pacific but also to deconflict divergences. These dialogues need to continue even if there is burden-shifting given the spillover effect of crises with an increasing integration between competitors across theaters. The 2025 carrier strike group deployment enhances interconnection of communication and command systems between French and U.S. regional headquarters. It is a tremendous opportunity to identify areas of growth and existing barriers to the integration of France and the United States in the framework of a high-intensity conflict, work which should continue, albeit in a new context.

France doesn’t have American capabilities in the Indo-Pacific or some of its regional powers, but it is a member of the U.N. Security Council with prerogatives and sovereign missions all over the region. Among European states, France holds a unique perspective of the Indo-Pacific that requires military expertise and capabilities. Efforts engaged to support Ukraine has not led to decreased interest or shifting resources to Europe from the Indo-Pacific after the 2022 National Strategic Review. France continues to maintain means of action that allows it to operate in strategic depth, far from Europe for its sovereign interests, but also because the Indo-Pacific is important in the context of the war in Ukraine. Europe needs to develop its own response to the manifold challenges generated by intensified Sino-Russian cooperation and Russian-North Korean co-belligerence. An update of its 2019 Indo-Pacific defense strategy may be necessary. Some of those answers may be in the Indo-Pacific.

Léonie Allard is a visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. Before her current role, Allard worked for the Ministry of Armed Forces’ Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy.

Image: Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Skyler Okerman via Wikimedia Commons

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