Two years ago, we wrote in these pages about the sorry state of Irish defense and security that, we have on good authority, prompted a question on the matter to the then Irish Taoiseach Leo Varadkar when he visited the Biden White House on St. Patrick’s Day in 2023. This was exactly our hope. Following the March 12 visit of the Taoiseach to the Trump White House for St. Patrick’s Day — which proved an exercise in saying very little about national security — we provide an update on Irish progress toward closing its considerable defense and security gaps, what more should be done and how Ireland can do it, and how the country’s partners can continue to nudge Irish politicians to intensify their efforts. Specifically, they should be encouraged and cajoled to spend the required 1.5 percent of real GDP on defense to fund maritime, land, and air forces capable of providing a reasonable military deterrent in relation to Ireland’s size and strategic importance, and in line with the requirements of neutral states.
Irish South Coast, 2029
It is February 2029: The United States is distracted after a deeply divisive and exceptionally contested 2028 presidential election. Europe is on the verge of major war with Russia. And the Irish navy is in a pickle. One of its two operational patrol vessels, the Long Éireannach (Irish Ship) George Bernard Shaw is steaming toward the Goban Spur in the Atlantic. There, on the seabed south of the Kerry coast, are the main fiber-optic data cables connecting Ireland and Europe with the United States: Tata’s TGN-Atlantic link, Apollo North, Yellow Atlantic Crossing-2, and the recently commissioned Amitie. Moving over them is a Maltese-flagged cargo ship, similar to that seized by Sweden a few years earlier for damaging subsea cables in the Baltic Sea. The Irish navy’s already stretched British and French partners have warned that somewhere nearby is a Russian Akula-2 nuclear-armed attack submarine, which they are rightly prioritizing. The Irish are in a better position than they could have been, having invested in 2024 in subsea cable sensors and better sonar equipment, but it is vital that they deter the cargo ship while their naval partners try to flush out the Russian sub.
Just as the Bernard Shaw reaches the Goban Spur, a British maritime patrol aircraft informs the Irish that another cargo vessel is approaching cables off their west coast, far to the north. Ireland scrambles its only remaining operational patrol vessel, the LE William Butler Yeats, to the area, just as the British send one of their few remaining ships to investigate intelligence reports of Russian activity near the Scotland-Ireland interconnector that provides 75 percent of Ireland’s gas. With all attention on the east, this looks like a typical Russian attempt to stretch limited British and French resources away from their renewed major offensive in Ukraine and Estonia. Neutral Ireland, once able to rely on its partners in a security pickle, is out on a limb. Suddenly, its new air defense radar picks up an anomaly: A civilian cargo flight that originated in Moscow and been tracked by the Polish, German, and French air forces, has turned for Shannon Airport, on the country’s west coast, and switched off its transponder. Because it failed to invest in a combat air squadron and air defense in 2025, there is not much Ireland can do, bar rushing the remaining Army Special Forces not stationed in Kyiv and local troops by road to the strategic air hub. As it approaches Irish airspace, the Russian pilot contacts Shannon tower requesting an emergency landing.
Map of subsea infrastructure in and near Ireland’s Exclusive Economic Zone, up to 200 nautical miles from the coast. Source: TeleGeography, https://www.submarinecablemap.com.
Far-fetched? Not really. With over 20 major undersea cables landing on Irish shores, and many more passing nearby, any disruption to data cables and energy interconnectors could have major implications for Ireland, and the European and global economies. Russia preceded its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine with naval activity in the Goban Spur, which badly exposed Ireland’s lack of both naval and air capacity after decades of underinvestment. Since then, a Russian submarine has had to be literally chased out of Cork harbor by the Royal Navy as it probed Britain’s western flank. Meanwhile, the Danish and Estonian intelligence services have warned that Russia retains the intent, and will have the capability, for a major offensive against NATO in five years if a Ukraine ceasefire allows it to rebuild its military. Worst course of action? Perhaps. But militaries, even neutral ones, ought to plan for this. Any renewed Russian aggression in Europe — say an incursion into Estonia — would highly likely be combined with events like those detailed above to stretch British, French, and Nordic resources, create uncertainty, and overwhelm decision-making.
The Decisions Not Taken
In hindsight, 2025 was the crucial year for Irish defense and security. As debate about Ireland’s neutrality, its “Triple Lock” on force deployment, and investment in its defense and security became increasingly politicized, it’s easy to understand why Irish politicians did not to take the bold steps required to increase the country’s resilience. They had responded to the 2022 Commission on the Defence Forces by accepting the median recommendation, known as Level of Ambition 2, the following year. They had increased defense spending by 50 percent, to €1.5 billion by 2028, buying new maritime patrol aircraft and military radar while increasing wages to attract and retain personnel. But when Tánaiste (deputy prime minister) and defense minister Simon Harris mooted going to Level of Ambition 3 in February 2025, Taoiseach Micheál Martin and his Fine Fail coalition partners balked, worried about losing support to Sinn Fein and independents over a perceived move away from neutrality. Level of Ambition 3 would have doubled defense spending to €3 billion by 2028, grown the size of the defense forces, and developed their air, naval, and land capabilities and capacities to that of other comparable European neutral states like Switzerland. The opportunity was there to increase the operational naval fleet to 12 ships, create an air interdiction jet fighter squadron based in Shannon, obtain better mobility and firepower for the army, and improve combat helicopter support and transport for Irish special operations forces. All of this would have come in handy on this day in February 2029.
This was ultimately a political choice. While most of Europe was rapidly investing in defense and increasing cooperation, Ireland chose not to move with equal urgency — in part due to a lack of leadership and in part due to popular attachment to an outdated concept of neutrality. And it had the money. Ireland’s total budget surplus between 2022 and 2024 was over €42 billion, while the €1.5 billion for Level of Ambition 2 was eroded by inflation by 2028. While many European NATO states moved toward 3 percent of GDP on defense spending, Ireland remained at about 0.7 percent of real GDP. As they waited in their crisis room to hear what exactly was in that Russian cargo plane swooping into Shannon, Harris, now Taoiseach, and Tánaiste Martin shared a hard look indicating they both knew they should have funded Level of Ambition 3 back in 2025. This would have only cost 1.4 percent of Ireland’s real GDP and back then some 55 percent of the population favored significantly increasing Ireland’s military capacity. Looking back, 2025 was the crucial year for Irish defense and security.
How Did Ireland Get Here?
As in aviation, when things go catastrophically wrong in modern societies’ security, it is rarely a single point of failure. In our March 2023 War on the Rocks article, we outlined Ireland’s woeful lack of defensive capacity, and the wider shortcomings in the Irish defense and security ecosystem. Since then, there has been increasing media discussion of these issues, increasingly urgent government rhetoric, and some action and investment. This has been especially noticeable since February of this year as the sudden and drastic strategic security shifts that Europe has felt have brought Ireland’s defensive shortcomings to the fore again. It is important to note that there is a new planned series of actions, more on which later.
But, in real terms and given the changing security environment, the situation right now is worse than in 2023. The Irish Defense Forces still have a recruitment and retention crisis despite positive adjustments to pay and terms. As of December 2024, the total defense force (army, navy, and air corps) strength was 7,557 servicemembers — 350 fewer than 2022 — or 78 percent of its current 9,739 establishment. Harris has recently admitted hitting its target of 11,500 by 2028 will be “challenging.” More positively, the reserve strength is up to 1,720 — over double since our 2023 piece but still only 42 percent of its 4,069 establishment. The army still lacks many of basic level capacities for national defense, including modern ground-based air defense systems; a substantial mechanized force with credible force protection, communications, surveillance, and firepower; and a reinvigorated special forces with integrated combat helicopter support.
The air corps has a limited maritime surveillance capacity, some advanced turbo-prop trainers, and a small fleet of small and medium helicopters. There is currently no primary airborne radar or integrated national-level missile defense. The naval service still struggles to deploy ships. It currently has four offshore patrol vessels, two larger patrol vessels, and four inshore patrol vessels. Due to the ongoing personnel crisis the naval service can usually only deploy one of the larger vessels, and recent media reports revealed that none of its vessels have functioning main armament due to the lack of qualified armorer personnel. In short, the air corps and naval service can fulfill few of the roles expected of a modern air force or navy. Ireland still has no primary radar or adequate air defense and, in the maritime sphere, there is still no anti-submarine or subsurface capacity.
Some Progress, But Structural Transformation is Needed
There are some green shoots. On March 4, Gen. Rossa Mulchay was appointed as the new chief of staff, with the unenviable task of overseeing what is promised to be the greatest expansion of Ireland’s forces in the history of the state. It has also been mooted that the air corps could be supplied with a squadron of jet fighters, to be based in Shannon, but there is nothing concrete yet and the political opposition this was greeted with has been noted above. While there has been some movement towards acquiring a primary radar and integrated anti-aircraft missile system — the Swedish Saab RBS-70 and the French VL-MICA are the current frontrunners — for a sum of approximately €300 million, even if this is chosen quickly, it is unlikely to be operational before 2028. Discussions are also ongoing for the army to upgrade its fleet of ageing Mowag armored fighting vehicles. A frequent point of discussion is Ireland’s total lack of a national intelligence/security authority, with those responsibilities being split between the defense forces and the national police force (An Garda Siochana). Ireland is unique in Europe in not having such an agency, and once again discussion has begun around the need for one, along with a centralized, regularly convened National Security Committee led by the Taoiseach. In parallel with these developments, there is a new recruitment drive for all military services, in the hope of overcoming the shocking lack of personnel.
Significantly, it has also been reported that the Washington-based Institute for Security Governance, part of the Defense Security Co-Operation University, has been retained to advise the air corps on its intended transformation. The institute will also cooperate with the newly established Office of Strategic Force Design within the Irish Department of Defence on army and naval transformation. Perhaps more than anything, expert advice and a coherent defense and security infrastructure is lacking in Ireland. There is no permanent government minister whose sole remit is national defense. Unbelievably, the current Tánaiste is also the minister for foreign affairs and trade as well as for defense, highlighting the lack of focus on defense and security. Equally, there is no government committee, preferably with all-service representation, whose sole task is national defense, nor does Ireland have any nationally recognized or publicly funded research institutes or think tanks working in the wider field of defense and strategic studies. Policy thus far has been largely undirected and the responsible government department operates in an administrative role, without the necessary expertise to define national strategy. This situation is unacceptable. There are experts across both the Republic and Northern Ireland, and also internationally, who could advise on a way forward, and perhaps shorten the strategic observe, orient, decide, and act loop in this process.
What We Talk About When We Talk About Neutrality
Within this environment, there are two fundamental issues that Ireland should face.
First, Ireland needs an informed national discussion and a process of education on the issue of neutrality. As Conor Gallagher has examined, like a geopolitical teddy bear, this issue is clung to by both politicians and the general public, without any real understanding of what it means or the obligations that come with being militarily neutral. Under international law, neutral states must be able to offer reasonable credible deterrence to protect their neutrality from one party in a conflict exploiting it over another. While conversations on defense, whether in government, in the media, or in the public square, too frequently descend into largely uninformed, emotionally charged discussions on neutrality, Ireland has failed to untether the need for credible, reasonable defense from the wider discussion of neutrality. Indeed, for most of the population, a declaration of neutrality is the national defense.
The Irish stance, it could be argued, is not informed by any historical awareness of the impact of conflict on neutral states. The list of neutral states that were invaded during the wars of the 20th century is a long one. During World War I, neutral Belgium was invaded as part of the German Schlieffen-Moltke plan, which also initially included the Netherlands. During the course of the war, both sides contemplated invading Switzerland. During World War II, the neutral states of Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, were invaded by Germany, while Iceland was occupied by Britain.
Nevertheless, Ireland fell in love with neutrality during World War II, and sees that phase as being the reason to maintain a neutral stance. Indeed, despite considerable Irish concessions to the Allies in the war, one could argue that military neutrality has become a foundational myth of the modern Irish state, both a principled and a feel-good cornerstone for the general populace to understand Ireland’s foreign and defense policy.
Neutrality, after all, is popular — about 60 percent of Irish people support the current policy. It also served the nation well during periods of major strategic threat. Typical responses to the issue of neutrality include: “Sure, we kept our heads down in World War II and the Cold War, and that worked out alright for us. Let’s let this blow over too.” “Sure, we’re neutral. We don’t need this kind of investment in our security, there’s better things to spend an extra €1.5 billion on.” “Sure, what would the Russians want with us?” All fair points, to be sure, but not entirely accurate either. They do not consider the differing strategic context of the past, one in which Ireland was protected by its remoteness from the main theatres of action, while ultimately its neutrality was shielded by the dominance of the British Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, and later the U.S. military presence in Britain during World War II. This position also loses sight of the historic reality that Ireland has featured in the invasion plans of countries at war with Britain since the 16th century. In this context, Ireland doesn’t actually get to set its own strategic agenda. And as the future hypothetical scenario above shows, a western flank strategy could be part of Russian operational plans in the event of major war with Europe.
Equally, Ireland rarely compares its defense and security posture to the other neutral (and recently neutral) European states. Historically, countries like Sweden, Finland, and Switzerland realized that official neutrality came with the price of investing in one’s own defense, a stance that was embraced by both the government and a public that were willing to serve in their own national defense. Ireland has never learned that lesson in peacetime and has always considered that its location kept it in a benign security environment. Embracing globalization has brought considerable obligations, which Ireland has not fully grasped or respected. All this is not helped by the further element of confusion being introduced by recent Irish governments stating that, while it might be militarily neutral, Ireland is not politically neutral. This position allows some Irish assistance to Ukraine, for instance, and allows Irish politicians to discuss geopolitical affairs. As scholar and former Irish diplomat Edward Burke has pointed out, it is a unique Irish interpretation of neutrality and one that is not viewed as consistent or moral by some of Ireland’s traditional partners. It is time to discuss this issue and define the country’s stance: If Ireland wants to remain strictly neutral, it may need to modify some behaviors, while investing heavily in its own defense to ensure it can reasonably deter incursions into its own air, maritime and land domains, as per its obligations under international law. As the 2029 scenario shows, this matter may be more pressing, and with larger implications, than many realize.
What We Should Talk About When We Talk About Neutrality
Second, a discussion needs to arise on the issue of citizenship and the associated obligations in terms of national defense. Irish citizens are unsurprisingly attached to their rights and privileges, in what the noted philosopher Isaiah Berlin referred to as a tradition of “negative liberty.” As in many parts of the West, the contention that these rights come with obligations for the individual seems to be an alien concept to some Irish people. The issues of defense capacity and infrastructure discussed above have contributed hugely to Ireland’s defense shortfall, but so too has the reluctance of Irish people, young people in particular, who do not subscribe to the idea that they have any obligations to their own state. From the position of a practitioner with long experience at third level (university and vocational schools), this is reflected in discussions in the classroom. When students are pressed on issues relating to Irish defense, the final position seems to be that either Britain or America will turn up to rescue Ireland if it runs into trouble. They seem to see no ethical difficulty with this. While there have been concerted recruiting drives for the permanent Defence Forces, the Reserve Defence Forces, and Civil Defence, these have not produced the numbers needed. In the context of the defense shortcomings across the European Union and NATO that have so recently been highlighted — and as the United States appears less willing to underwrite European defense — this is a point that needs consideration and action in Ireland. The first place to start is introducing a compulsory comprehensive citizenship module at second level education (grades 6–12 in the United States). This would include Irish values; parliamentary democracy and rule of law; neutrality and its obligations; rights and duties of citizenship; the roles and values of the military and security forces; potential threats to Ireland; and understanding disinformation. Modules like this have been successfully used in the Baltic states, for example in Estonia.
Resilience is another major concern, highlighted by the recent Storm Eowyn that left much damage in its wake with serious destruction of power infrastructure. As well as the shortage in regular, reserve, and civil defense personnel, there was insufficient local organization and no supplies (food, water, medicine, and generators) in emergency stores across the country. The storm highlighted the lack of resilience and planning on a governmental, local, and individual level, where Ireland is now lagging behind many of its European partners.
Oddly, within the chaos inflicted by this storm, there were hints of possible local-level models for improvement. The Gaelic Athletic Association organized food runs to the elderly and the vulnerable, and in some locations opened club spaces to provide showers and power points. As an organization, it showed the skills and local knowledge needed to be effective and has historically shown an ability to attract and retain young people. Could this national sporting organization offer a model for the reform of reserve defense units or civil defense units across the country? In a similar way, could not the growing third-level educational sector in the Irish Rupublic have much to offer in this respect? Could not specialized units and teams be developed to capture the skill set of those engaged in medical training, engineering, and the cyber realm? In many ways this would be returning to older, and now abandoned, models. Up to the 1960s, there were university companies that provided medical and engineering capabilities in the military reserve system. With some effort and imagination, models could be found to move toward to a more socially resilient posture that would stand Ireland well in the face of numerous challenges.
How Ireland’s Partners Can Help
Ireland’s international partners such as the United States, European Union, and United Kingdom should keep the public and private diplomatic pressure up, while remaining sensitive to Ireland’s tradition of neutrality. So far, pressure seems to have had an effect given the progress made with defense spending, investment, and wages since 2023, but it is crucial it is maintained lest Irish politicians drop the ball again. The goal has to be that Ireland develops a reasonably resourced credible defense force capable of at least sharing some of the burden of its vast maritime and air policing responsibilities with its partners. Given the recent uncertainties for European security, with future Western support to Ukraine up in the air and the future U.S. role in NATO uncertain, Level of Ambition 3 should now be the expected minimum, enabled by 1.5 percent of real GDP defense spending until 2030 at least. In recent weeks, there have been talks between the Taoiseach and his British counterpart, Sir Keir Starmer, with an emphasis on creating closer security ties, particularly in the context of maritime security. One area could be state-led conversations about F-16, Typhoon, or Grippen sales to help advance the air policing squadron need.
More broadly, pressure and assistance with the transformation of Ireland’s security architecture in a meaningful and funded way that reflects best practices in Europe and the trans-Atlantic is needed. Offers of increased intelligence sharing can be used as leverage, as well as capacity building, and exchanges would also be useful.
Ultimately though, this is about Ireland’s partners continuing to nudge the country’s leaders to take defense and security seriously and to lead their populace on the issue. The key thing is political will, and that can be informally impressed upon the Taoiseach and government bilaterally and multilaterally, in Washington, Brussels, and European capitals.
Patrick Bury, Ph.D., is reader (senior associate professor) in Security at the University of Bath and a former captain in the Royal Irish Regiment.
David Murphy, Ph.D., is an associate professor in Military History and Strategic Studies at Maynooth University in Ireland.
Image: Mhdelaney via Wikimedia Commons.
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