As the war between Ukraine and Russia has raged on, cooperation has grown between Moscow and Pyongyang. Following the Russo-North Korean summit in September 2023, North Korea began providing large-scale military assistance to Russia, reportedly sending military equipment starting that month and deploying troops from October 2024. This has led to an economic recovery in North Korea. Since North Korea is leveraging its military cooperation with Russia to expand and enhance its own military capabilities, the United States and South Korea should employ a combination of diplomacy, intelligence, military, and economic tools to encourage a significant reduction in Russia’s military ties with North Korea both during and immediately after negotiations aimed at ending the Russo-Ukrainian War.
What Would This Look Like?
Unless North Korea suspends nuclear and missile development, the United States and South Korea should employ coercive diplomacy to prevent Russian military aid from strengthening North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. Enhanced multilateral cooperation among the United States, South Korea, Japan, and NATO allies could tighten arms trade restrictions and sanctions enforcement against both Russia and North Korea. Further, prioritized intelligence sharing and targeted sanctions should specifically address high technology transfers, such as space, nuclear, and unmanned technologies, between Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Lastly, recognizing that these measures may not fully curb North Korea’s military advancements, the United States and South Korea should proactively bolster deterrence strategies, including missile defenses and readiness across ground, air, maritime, and undersea domains.
Russia might continue a limited level of military exchange with North Korea to replenish its weapon stockpiles in the post-war period. However, Moscow is likely to shift its strategic focus from wartime necessities to post-war reconstruction, potentially adjusting its partnership with North Korea in line with its evolving strategic priorities, thereby placing less emphasis on strategic cooperation with North Korea. If this is realized, North Korea will no longer be able to rely comfortably on its partnership with Russia and may seek to improve relations with Washington and Seoul.
Constraints on North Korea’s Weapons Production
While production facilities, skilled labor, and basic materials were sufficient, limited demand for weapons constrained the expansion of North Korea’s defense industry after the Cold War. Despite being primarily perceived as a nuclear-armed state, North Korea had already established a self-sufficient defense industry in the 1970s and actively promoted arms exports in the 1980s. Even after the Cold War ended, Pyongyang maintained an overexpanded defense industry under the banner of a “military-first” policy during Kim Jong Il’s rule in the 1990s and 2000s, despite its technological limitations. North Korea’s defense industry technology has often been compared to that of the former Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s.
To address its outdated production capabilities, North Korea introduced computerized numerical control technology in the early 2010s. In 2016, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un also ordered the modernization of the Tae-sung Machine Factory, aiming to transform it into “a world-level ultra-modern machine producer.” These factories enabled North Korea to manufacture modern missiles. As the Tae-sung Machine Factory was considered a key missile production facility, its modernization underscored Pyongyang’s effort to acquire modern equipment for missile development. North Korea then successfully tested the solid-fuel Pukguksong-2 missiles a year later in February 2017, followed by the “March 18” engine, which featured greater thrust, the next month.
Although approximately half a million North Korean defense industry workers suffered from famine, along with the rest of the population, during the mid-1990s, the North Korean government prioritized investment in the defense sector, ensuring the retention of skilled labor thereafter. Regarding basic materials, although Pyongyang still relies on the importation of special alloys and advanced electronic components from other countries, it has maintained a largely self-reliant defense industrial system since the middle of the Cold War.
The primary restraint on North Korea’s defense industry has been declining international demand for its weaponry. The operational rate of its defense industry plummeted from 50 percent in the mid-1980s to just about 20 percent in 1991, following the end of the Cold War. While other countries reduced military spending and reallocated resources to social welfare and economic programs after the Cold War, North Korea instead viewed the post-Cold War world as hostile and prioritized military capabilities. North Korea’s decline in weapon production primarily stemmed from its economic crisis as well as reduced demand for weapons. These differences in both the causes and effects of reduced weapon production in North Korea stood in sharp contrast to the “peace dividend” experiences of other countries.
While North Korea has claimed success in developing advanced and modern weapons using domestic technological capacity, it remained largely isolated from international technology exchange networks. This technology isolation became more pronounced after Pyongyang formally committed to advancing its nuclear capabilities during its last party congress in 2021. Since then, North Korea has struggled to develop key military technologies, including military reconnaissance satellites, nuclear-propulsion submarines, and multiple reentry vehicles.
Although North Korea outlined five modernization priorities for its conventional forces in December 2017, these efforts stalled in early 2020 as Kim Jong Un prioritized nuclear weapons development. However, given North Korea’s significant disadvantage in conventional capabilities compared to South Korea — particularly in naval and air forces — modernizing its conventional forces remains an urgent challenge. Bridging this gap would be nearly impossible without external military assistance.
How Russo-North Korean Military Cooperation Strengthens North Korea’s Defense Industry
The current partnership initiative between Russia and North Korea extends to two key areas: expanding North Korea’s weapons production capacity and advancing military technology. Russia’s ammunition shortage prompted Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s visit to Pyongyang in July 2023. Shortly thereafter, North Korea escalated its military assistance, primarily supplying artillery shells. This move coincided with Kim Jong Un’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Vladivostok two months later. Experts estimated that North Korea may have covered at least half of Russia’s additional ammunition demand, supplementing Moscow’s domestic production. According to a South Korean agency’s estimates, North Korea had supplied Russia with approximately 20,000 containers of weaponry by October 2024. Pyongyang presumably sent mainly artillery shells, short-range missiles, and anti-tank missiles to Moscow. If Moscow continues to require weapon stockpiles, even after the Russo-Ukrainian War ends, arms trade between the two countries is likely to persist.
North Korea leveraged its military aid to Russia to strengthen its defense industry. As Pyongyang and Moscow established a supply chain for military production, Kim Jong Un intensified his focus on boosting North Korea’s arms manufacturing. During on-site inspections of defense factories, Kim repeatedly emphasized increasing the production of artillery shells, tactical missiles, tactical missile launchers, and strategic missile launchers. His directives signal that factories must meet these targets with tangible results. Moreover, he prioritized modernizing production facilities, implying governmental investment in acquiring advanced engineering equipment. During his on-site inspections following Shoigu’s visit, Kim publicly stated that modernization efforts are required in the defense sectors, including ammunition production, tactical missiles, tactical missile launchers, and combat shipbuilding.
While meeting Russia’s wartime demands, North Korea’s weapons production and modernization efforts were also driven by its own military priorities. For instance, its plans to increase the production of strategic launchers and modernize combat shipbuilding facilities were largely unrelated to Russia’s needs in Ukraine. Additionally, Pyongyang used its arms trade with Russia as a means to circumvent international sanctions, further insulating its defense industry from external pressure.
Beyond weapon production, Russo-North Korean military cooperation significantly bolstered Pyongyang’s military technology development. During his visit to Russia’s Far East and Vladivostok in September 2023, Kim Jong Un toured major defense industry sites, including the Vostochny Cosmodrome, an aircraft plant in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, and the Russian Pacific Fleet. His itinerary demonstrated a broader ambition beyond North Korea’s five-year weapons development plan — highlighting his interest in modernizing the country’s outdated navy and air force. As a result, Kim sought Russian expertise in several military domains, including space vehicles and reconnaissance satellites, conventional weaponry (ground, air, and sea), and emerging technologies like drones and electromagnetic operations.
Among these sectors, technical cooperation was particularly evident in space vehicle development, aircraft, anti-air missile systems, and unmanned aerial vehicles. For example, North Korea’s May 2024 reconnaissance satellite launch featured a new kerosene-liquid oxygen engine, presumably based on Russian technology. Additionally, reports from early 2024 suggested that Russian aircraft engineers assisted North Korea in upgrading its aircraft plants, possibly to improve its Mig-29s fleet. Furthermore, Russia’s transfer of five attack drones and one reconnaissance drone to North Korea strongly suggested an exchange of military technology, allowing Pyongyang to reverse-engineer these systems to start its domestic drone capabilities.
Despite these developments, concerns remain over the broader implications of growing military exchanges between Russia and North Korea. The recent deployment of North Korean troops to Russia further raises questions about deeper cooperation. While no concrete evidence has surfaced regarding technology transfers in areas such as strategic missile systems, nuclear propulsion submarines, or modern warship technologies, continued monitoring and containment efforts are essential to prevent further proliferation of advanced Russian capabilities to North Korea.
Countering a Russo-North Korean Military Partnership
President Donald Trump has said that North Korea’s military support for Russia in the Russo-Ukrainian War was “a very complicating” factor. The expansion of North Korea’s defense industrial base — bolstered by its military partnership with Russia — poses an increasing security threat to Northeast Asia. Thus, the United States and its allies, especially South Korea, should address the implications of Russo-North Korean military cooperation on the evolution of North Korea’s military capabilities. Failure to do so could mean that even if the United States ultimately succeeds in ending the Russo-Ukrainian War, President Trump will face a heightened threat and increased demands from North Korea when attempting to negotiate with Kim Jong Un thereafter. Moreover, as long as Russo-North Korean military cooperation continues, North Korea is unlikely to show any interest in improving relations with the United States, remaining content with Russia’s diplomatic, military, and economic support. The Trump administration, therefore, needs to limit Russo-North Korean military cooperation until the Russo-Ukrainian War ends, and work to induce Russia to terminate its military cooperation with North Korea concurrently with the end of the Russo-Ukrainian War. If Russia agrees to scale back the acquisition of North Korean weapons at the end of the war, it may lose interest in defense industrial cooperation and military technology transfer to North Korea as its dependency on Pyongyang diminishes.
First, before negotiations between the United States and Russia to end the Russo-Ukrainian War began, the United States and South Korea had to resort to coercive diplomacy to dissuade Russia from supplying advanced technologies and sanctioned materials to North Korea. Therefore, Seoul warned Russia that Moscow’s continued military cooperation with Pyongyang could prompt South Korea to provide lethal aid to Ukraine. However, after the inauguration of President Trump, the United States and Russia agreed to begin negotiating to end the war in Ukraine. Under this new context, Washington can leverage the negotiations to persuade Moscow to refrain from providing North Korea with the kind of military cooperation that contributes to North Korean missile and nuclear programs.
Second, to counter North Korea’s expanding defense production capabilities — enabled by its military cooperation with Russia — the United States, South Korea, Japan, and NATO countries should intensify efforts to restrict arms trade between Pyongyang and Moscow. These nations, which share concerns over North Korea-produced ammunition and missiles, should further strengthen intelligence-sharing mechanisms to track North Korea’s sanctions evasion tactics. Keith Kellogg, the U.S. president’s special envoy for Ukraine, said that the United States could employ economic and diplomatic pressure on Russia to end Moscow’s war-sustaining effort. In addition, China could play a pivotal role in curbing Russo-North Korean military cooperation, particularly in the context of potential Sino-American engagement during the second Trump administration.
By leveraging collective efforts, they can reinforce export controls against both North Korea and Russia. Moreover, the revival of multinational sanctions enforcement mechanisms — including the UN Security Council’s 1718 Sanctions Committee — should be pursued alongside new initiatives like the Multinational Sanctions Monitoring Team, which was established last October by the United States, South Korea, Japan, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The second Trump administration has continued its participation in this team, aiming to fully implement the United Nations sanctions regarding North Korea.
Third, preventing military technology transfers between Russia and North Korea requires enhanced intelligence-sharing and targeted sanctions. North Korea’s recent deployment of additional troops to Russia may be met with reciprocal transfers of high-tech military technology from Russia. Therefore, monitoring cooperation in key areas — including space systems, nuclear technology, conventional arms, and unmanned weapons — should be prioritized for nations seeking to curtail Pyongyang’s growing capabilities. Tracking bilateral engineering exchanges and illicit high-tech equipment transfers between Russia, North Korea, and Iran will enable the United States and its allies to impose sanctions on individuals and entities engaged in proliferation activities within these sensitive sectors.
Fourth, these measures alone may not be sufficient to fully halt North Korea’s defense industry expansion and modernization, meaning that its military threat to neighboring countries will likely persist. In response, the U.S.-South Korean alliance should prepare to deter future North Korean provocations across multiple domains, particularly in ground and air operations. As the Russo-Ukrainian War winds down, North Korea is expected to acquire more advanced missiles and artillery shells with improved production capacity while simultaneously improving fighter capabilities with Russian military assistance that they secured during the war. Seoul and Washington, therefore, should proactively reinforce deterrence measures.
Furthermore, Washington and Seoul should develop strategic responses to North Korea’s threats in maritime and undersea domains, as well as its efforts to penetrate U.S. missile defenses. There remains a possibility that Russia could eventually transfer shipbuilding technologies, submarine development expertise, and multiple warhead technologies to North Korea should their defense partnership continue. Should this occur, the urgency for robust countermeasures will escalate significantly. During a confirmation hearing at the Senate Armed Services Committee, Deputy Secretary of Defense Stephen Feinberg stated that North Korea remained focused on expanding its illicit nuclear weapons and improving its ballistic and cruise missile programs and highlighted the need to improve missile defense systems for the U.S. homeland.
The Future Trajectory of the Russo-North Korean Partnership
When the Russo-Ukrainian War nears its end, Moscow may downgrade its partnership with Pyongyang. A historical precedent can be found in the early 1990s when heightened Russo-North Korean cooperation in the mid-1980s quickly faded once Moscow reconciled with Washington and Beijing. At that time, Moscow disregarded Pyongyang’s demands and established normal relations with Seoul in September 1990, abruptly severing military and economic assistance to North Korea.
If Russia takes similar steps again, Russia may disregard North Korea’s standing in future negotiations with the United States after its relations with Washington improve following the end of the Russo-Ukrainian War. Then, North Korea may face the prospect of domestic instability due to a cessation of Russian assistance and another “No Deal” negotiation with the United States. In this case, North Korea will seek to rely on China just, as it did after the failed negotiation with the United States in 2019. The diplomatic stalemate between North Korea and the United States could be prolonged for years.
However, some experts consider that heightened Russo-North Korean cooperation could persist, given North Korea’s need for security assurances from Russia and Russia’s interest in North Korean labor forces. Russia has experienced a severe workforce shortage, reaching nearly 5 million workers in 2023. North Korean cheap labor force will help resolve the huge labor shortage in Russia. Bolstering this prospect, Andrei Rudenko, Russia’s deputy foreign minister, explained this month that Russia and North Korea were preparing for Kim Jong Un’s visit to Russia.
In this scenario, North Korea will be able to improve relations with the United States, by using Russia’s diplomatic influence over the Trump administration. With Russia’s diplomatic support, North Korea might repeat its five specific demands to resume the U.S.-North Korean denuclearization talks. Conceding to these demands would weaken U.S. extended deterrence and security guarantees for South Korea. Moreover, North Korea could use its alliance with Russia to initiate provocations against South Korea. In the worst-case scenario, this could escalate into a military crisis, destabilizing the Indo-Pacific and complicating the U.S. military responses across the region.
To ensure lasting regional security, the United States and South Korea must remain vigilant in monitoring and responding to evolving Russo-North Korean ties. Their success — or failure — will shape Asia’s security landscape well into the future.
Choong-Koo Lee, Ph.D., is a research fellow at the Korean Institute for Defense Analyses. His research has covered North Korea, U.S.-Chinese relations, and the impact of emerging technologies on security and defense. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official positions of the Korean Institute for Defense Analyses or the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea.
Image: The Kremlin via Wikimedia Commons
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