Over a thousand years ago, the Viking leader Erik the Red discovered a new land after being exiled for murdering his neighbor. To entice his fellow Vikings to settle the icy island, he called it Greenland, highlighting its more hospitable southern and western coasts. The settlers that took the bait struggled but endured.
Today, Greenland’s value needs no exaggeration. Its mineral wealth is well-understood, certainly by some in Washington, who seek to acquire the island — a Danish territory. Some of the same voices also promote Greenland’s military value. Gaining political control of the island may, in fact, be a bad deal for the United States, but Washington cannot afford to ignore Greenland’s importance to Arctic and North Atlantic security.
The 2024 Defense Arctic Strategy of monitor-and-respond is insufficiently resourced for competition and not viable for conflict. A geostrategic view shows that the United States should view the Arctic as a connective region with important military ramifications for Europe and the Indo-Pacific, rather than as a separate theater. The United States should re-imagine its strategic framework to view its geostrategic position as a large “line of contact” extending from the South China Sea, over the Arctic, to the Black Sea. Greenland is a linchpin in this framework, providing basing and sensor opportunities permissible by the 1951 Defense of Greenland treaty, with Danish concurrence. Modest investments in sensors and bases in Greenland would significantly enhance America’s strategic Arctic position.
America’s Arctic Strategy
The current American Arctic strategy prioritizes competition over conflict, emphasizing allied cooperation and regional stability, but may shift under the new administration. The Department of Defense follows a “monitor-and-respond” approach, detecting adversary actions rather than maintaining a strong continuous presence. This raises critical questions: What actions — by Russia, China, or any other adversary — would justify a military response? And if the president chooses to act, what options are available?
A new Arctic strategy should answer the first question.
The second question is a military challenge, central to strength in the Arctic. First, what should the United States “monitor” in the Arctic, and how can it do so effectively? Second, what response options exist, and how can they be expanded? More options tend to improve decision-making — more options can lead to better strategic execution. Addressing these issues requires stepping back to assess the bigger picture.
The Return of Geostrategy
As great power competition intensifies, geostrategy takes on a renewed importance. Historically, the Arctic’s harsh geography blocked most ships, allowing only the smallest, best-equipped vessels to navigate its waters. Aircraft, missiles, and submarines eventually operated there, but surface ships remained confined to limited areas during summer, and land travel remains extremely difficult.
Today, shrinking sea ice and expanding icebreaker fleets (especially Russia’s) are opening new shipping routes, primarily in the Eastern Hemisphere. Once a restricted space, the Arctic now provides a growing maritime link between the Pacific and the Atlantic, expanding strategic maneuverability, particularly for Russia.
Moscow aggressively claims vast Arctic territories and has heavily invested in building a formidable Arctic military presence. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine proves its willingness to use force in territorial disputes. Expanding access and growing military capabilities are making the Arctic increasingly volatile. While Russia has not yet destabilized the region, provocative actions, such as dropping paratroopers near the North Pole, signal its willingness to escalate. Competition in the high north will only intensify.
In a conflict, Russia’s expanding Arctic maneuver space and long-range missile capabilities pose a major security challenge. Opening seas allow Russian and Chinese forces to move between the Pacific and Atlantic, while aircraft and naval vessels can launch long-range missile strikes on North America or the North Atlantic from the relative safety of Russian-controlled waters and airspace.
More concerning, Russia and China are rapidly developing “precise mass” — autonomous air, sea, and undersea forces. China is building the first drone aircraft carrier, while Russia already operates autonomous maritime vehicles. The Russian Sarma autonomous undersea vessels can conduct long-endurance missions, enabling a persistent Russian presence unmatched by occasional American, Canadian, or Danish patrols.
Reframing Arctic Strategy into America’s Geostrategy
As the Russia-China-Iran-North Korea axis strengthens, traditional American geostrategic views are outdated. Conventional threats no longer come only from the east or west — the Arctic now presents a growing danger beyond the existential risk of nuclear attack. It has become a zone of daily competition and a potential battleground in future Atlantic or Pacific conflicts. Modern threats extend beyond bombers and intercontinental missiles to include a diverse array of air and sea systems. Autonomous vehicles will fight alongside traditional ships and aircraft in large numbers.
America’s line of contact with adversaries stretches from the First Island Chain, through the Bering Strait, across the Arctic Ocean to Norway, then down the NATO’s eastern border to Turkey.
American national security depends on defeating Arctic-based threats to North America while blocking Russian and Chinese power projection into the North Atlantic and North Pacific. Greenland is the geostrategic linchpin connecting the Arctic, North America, and Europe — a potential the United States and Denmark have yet to fully leverage.
Greenland as the Linchpin in an Arctic Geostrategic Framework
Two strategic lines should be drawn in the Arctic, both anchored by Greenland, combining with existing strategic frameworks to create the global framework the United States needs. The first is a northern defense line linking Alaska to Greenland, emphasizing air and missile defense. The second extends from Greenland to northern Norway via Svalbard, a modernized version of the Cold War-era Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap. These lines would deliver the Arctic strategy’s “monitor” function and enable any “response” during competition. In a conflict, the surveillance capabilities establishing these lines should extend into Arctic strongholds like the Barents Sea, enabling the United States to destroy critical enemy targets.
Arctic Monitoring
U.S. Northern Command Commander Gen. Glen VanHerck repeatedly called for increased awareness across multiple domains, including better sensors and data sharing. The U.S. military defines five domains: space, air, land, maritime, and cyberspace. Some of the domains are broken into sub-domains (e.g., the maritime domain can be broken into surface, subsurface, and seabed). Effective monitoring boils down to maintaining coverage of these domains with appropriate sensors, synthesizing the collected data, then interpreting it to understand the situation and make decisions. Realizing the monitoring goal in the Arctic requires effort across these areas, but the primary shortfall is sensors, especially air and maritime sensors.
I will not dive deeper into space monitoring, since this is a well-researched area. Pituffik Space Base’s primary purpose today is as a crucial node of space detection capabilities, particularly for missile defense and polar orbits. The necessary investments are already being made, or at least debated, within the Department of Defense. Air and sea sensors, though, are a different story.
Air Domain Awareness
Most discussions on Arctic air domain awareness focus on space-based sensors, over-the-horizon radars, and occasional deployments of airborne assets such as large surveillance aircraft like the E-3 or unmanned aircraft. Shorter range radar systems, such as those in the Cold War-era North Warning System, receive little attention since long-range and maneuverable missiles have diminished their effectiveness.
The U.S. Space Force plans to field a space-based sensing constellation for air and surface tracking. The United States should increase this investment to add satellites with this functionality and seek Danish support. A robust polar low Earth orbit constellation would ensure full Arctic coverage while enhancing surveillance in other theaters. Additionally, the Danish Joint Arctic Command in Nuuk should have access to this space-based intelligence.
The United States should complement space-based sensors with air-based platforms, building resilience that improves tracking precision and bolsters communications capabilities, thereby enabling very long-range weapons. Large air surveillance aircraft like the E-3 are overburdened today and demand for its replacement, the E-7, will increase in wartime. High-altitude, long-endurance autonomous aircraft flying from Greenland could significantly improve Arctic surveillance, support American industrial base growth, and provide re-deployable assets for global sensing grids.
Existing systems like the RQ-4 are viable, but cost-effective off-the-shelf options can be rapidly acquired. Many companies offer stratospheric long-endurance autonomous aircraft carrying payloads up to 1,000 kilograms. Arctic weather presents challenges, but flying in the stratosphere mitigates most environmental impacts, with only sensor effectiveness and launch and recovery affected.
Basing these assets in Greenland facilitates patrolling both west across the northern line and east across the Greenland-Svalbard-Norway gap. The US footprint in Greenland would be minimal, potentially fewer than one hundred personnel, similar to a drone launch and recovery unit. Many positions could be contracted, reducing the need for uniformed personnel.
Maritime Domain Awareness
Like in the air domain, a space sensing network can provide surface detection, but the United States should expand its undersea surveillance beyond regular submarine patrols. A moderately sized autonomous maritime force in Greenland, similar to U.S. Central Command’s Task Force 59, could provide persistent coverage of the Arctic east of the Lomonosov Ridge and throughout the Greenland and Norwegian Seas. This force should leverage unmanned surface and undersea vessels, with undersea systems playing a particularly vital role.
Much like high altitude, long-endurance aerial drones, many companies offer surface and undersea systems that the United States could capitalize on quickly. Other unconventional opportunities exist, such as a self-sustaining autonomous system proposed by engineers for Arctic operations featuring a wind- and water-powered surface craft carrying both aerial and undersea drones.
Like its air counterpart, this maritime autonomous task force would also be small. Task Force 59 launched with just 21 sailors; a similar force in Greenland could likely be just a couple hundred personnel.
Positioning this force on Greenland’s east coast could maximize operational impact. Bases closer to patrol areas would increase on-station time while reducing transit time. Enhancing an existing Danish base like Mestersvig would bolster the infrastructure needed to improve Arctic response options.
Arctic Response Options
Thus far, I have focused on monitoring. Now I shift to responding. While the United States has strong response military options from Alaska, there is a notable gap in force posture between Alaska and Norway.
In the western Arctic (west of the Lomonosov Ridge), the U.S. has substantial military assets. Alaska hosts the world’s highest concentration of fifth-generation fighters (F-22s and F-35s) and the U.S. Army’s 11th Airborne Division, reactivated in 2022. Deepwater ports like Kodiak support naval staging, while well-developed infrastructure in Alaska and northwest Canada enables rapid deployment of long-range missile and air defense units if necessary. These bases give the president multiple military response options in the Arctic.
In the eastern Arctic (east of the Lomonosov Ridge), options are far more limited. Year-round sea ice and sparse infrastructure limit deployment capabilities in northern Canada and Greenland. The Svalbard Treaty bars military bases in the Norwegian islands. Denmark’s Joint Arctic Command operates with minimal forces. While Denmark plans to boost defense spending, the impact will be marginal. Beyond Norway, the Arctic from Europe to Alaska lacks infrastructure capable of supporting even small force deployments (i.e., a long-range missile or air defense battalion) — leaving a 3,000-mile strategic gap across some of the planet’s harshest terrain.
Closing this gap does not require bases along its entire length. When needed, major power projection can still emanate from Alaska, northern Europe, or the Atlantic seaboard. However, expanding capacity in Greenland creates an additional staging point, offering strategic flexibility and mitigating political constraints from Canada or Norway during a crisis. In a war, the U.S. Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon and other long-range anti-ship or anti-air systems could allow missile units deployed to eastern Greenland to strike targets across the Russian Arctic and block enemy attempts to move across the Arctic or North Atlantic.
Power Projection
Greenland’s harbors and airstrips cannot currently support large-scale military operations, but the United States does not need large bases there. Targeted infrastructure improvements can significantly improve logistics and access when needed.
First, constructing a 9,000-foot runway in western Greenland at a site like Aasiaat would complement existing and planned capabilities at Pituffik and Kangerlussuaq. This third runway would enhance operational resilience, ensuring fighter or bomber operations continue despite Arctic weather or adversary attacks.
Secondly, establishing a U.S. outpost on Greenland’s east coast would enhance American presence in a strategically important area. A 2023 RAND report found that American ships operating near Greenland had limited on-station time due to distant bases. Creating a base could involve permanently stationed units or a cooperative agreement with Denmark, similar to the U.S.-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. Upgrading an existing Danish base like Mestervig to accommodate C-130 aircraft, frigate-class vessels, and a battalion-sized force would provide a valuable foothold. This base could serve as the hub of the maritime force described above and could be a site for deploying long-range anti-ship and anti-air missile units which could disperse along the rough Greenland littoral.
The Real Threat: Money
While investing in these opportunities would strengthen Arctic defense, their feasibility hinges on funding. The greatest obstacle is not a lack of strategic necessity but financial constraints. As the U.S. military balances immediate threats, primarily from China, with long-term modernization, tough budget choices lie ahead. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth is leading a major reprioritization of the Defense Department budget. Some of the recommendations in this article, particularly improved sensing capabilities for North American defense, align with homeland and missile defense priorities. Others should be considered essential to President Donald Trump’s “Peace through Strength” initiative and merit serious funding consideration.
A key takeaway from this geostrategic discussion is that the Arctic connects these theaters. Prioritizing investments in the Pacific or Europe while neglecting even minor Arctic capabilities creates a dangerous strategic gap that Russia or China could exploit. However, any solution must remain cost-effective, or it will lose out to higher-priority defense programs.
Conclusion
Greenland is a strategic linchpin in the Arctic, offering the US significant opportunities to enhance security and power projection. Peace through strength around the world requires creating a broader geostrategic vision with an Arctic framework connecting the Pacific and Atlantic. Greenland is important terrain which should be integrated into this framework. Establishing autonomous air and maritime surveillance, improving infrastructure, and leveraging Greenland’s position for force deployment will bolster America’s and NATO’s security. These improvements do not require altering Greenland’s political status and could be supported through partnerships with Denmark. However, the biggest challenge is funding. As the United States prioritizes competition with China, Arctic investments risk being sidelined. Yet failing to act creates a dangerous gap that adversaries are preparing to exploit. American cost-effective investments now in the strategic potential of Greenland can secure a dominant position in the Arctic, simultaneously protecting the homeland and global interests.
Aaron Brady is a U.S. Air Force officer. He is currently a national defense fellow in forward defense at the Atlantic Center’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, Air University, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
Image: Spc. Andrew Estrad via DVIDS.
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