Erdoğan’s Last Great Gamble

Over the course of the last 22 years, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey has fought and endured a great deal in order to remain in power. Court challenges, corruption investigations, close elections, economic downturns, armed uprisings and attempted coups have each tested his reign. And through it all, he has grown more powerful.

The events of the last month may prove to be among the most decisive moments of Erdoğan’s era. In the middle of March, an Istanbul court ordered the arrest and imprisonment of the city’s popular mayor, Ekrem Imamoğlu. A series of large demonstrations followed the court’s decision, leading to an extensive crackdown on both protestors and the country’s largest opposition party. With Imamoğlu’s removal from office, many assume that Erdoğan may run against a weaker opposition candidate in his pursuit of a third presidential term after 2028.

Still other events appear to favor Erdoğan’s plans for stronger, more regionally powerful Turkey. As demonstrators first took to the streets, news reports circulated that Turkish troops would remain in Syria and assist the government in Damascus in reconstituting its military. These revelations followed increasing signs that Turkey’s greatest security threat, the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, was at the threshold of disbanding. With the prospect of ending this 40-year insurgency within reach, pro-government have rejoiced. “Turkey is working to manage this historic opportunity it now has grasped,” one columnist declared. “It does not do so with joyful drums and fifes. It governs with an experience that is unique to great states.”

Erdoğan’s simultaneous crackdown on domestic dissent and assertive expansion into post-war Syria represent high-stakes gambles intended to secure his regime’s longevity and regional power. However, these moves risk destabilizing Turkey both internally — through growing unrest and democratic backsliding — and externally, through entanglement in volatile regional dynamics, including potential conflict with Israel.

Turkey’s Pottery Barn Problem

Turkey’s commentariat embraced the opening of 2025 with great cheer.  Weeks earlier, then-President Bashar al-Assad fled Damascus for exile in Moscow. The sight of rebel troops rolling into Syria’s capital was greeted as a welcomed conclusion to Syria’s 15-year civil war. For many Turkish opinionmakers, the coming peace brought with it several potential benefits. An end to the fighting likely meant that millions of Syrian refugees residing in Turkey could soon return home. Their departure, some hoped, would help relieve the country of large number of unwanted immigrants. No less enticing were the economic opportunities that appeared to accompany the war’s conclusion. With U.N. officials estimating Syria’s reconstruction costs topping $400 billion, it appeared likely Turkish commercial and construction interests would reap significant gains from Assad’s fall.

Turkey’s first official gestures towards the new Syrian regime suggested that something more profound was in the offing. Syria’s interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, went out of his way to receive representatives from Ankara. Emblematic of his hospitality was al-Sharaa’s willingness to personally chauffeur his Turkish guest in his private car. Many observers interpreted Al-Sharaa’s acts of deference as more than mere kindness. Turkey had helped protect his rebel stronghold in Idlib for much of the civil war. When his Hayat Tahrir al-Sham fighters embarked on their final offensive against Assad’s forces in November 2024, Ankara-backed guerrillas in the Syrian National Army followed suit. In this regard, Turkish commentators agreed: The victory in Syria belonged to both Ankara and al-Sharaa.

Hayat Tahrir’s triumph, however, did not completely settle accounts with Turkey. Other issues remained. Chief among them was Ankara’s desire to see Kurdish forces in northeastern Syria brought to heel. In January, Turkey threatened to send troops across the border if terrorist-linked Kurdish militias were not dissolved. Intense negotiations between al-Sharaa’s government and factions in the Syria’s northeast soon followed. Damascus signed an agreement in February with the largest Kurdish-dominated faction, the Syrian Democratic Forces, aimed amalgamating it into the regular Syrian army. Ankara hailed this initial breakthrough as promising. However, Turkish commentators have expressed worry that the group may drag its feet in implementing their side of the accord. Erdoğan too has affirmed that Turkish patience is not infinite.

There are still other signs of Turkey’s willingness to insert itself in Syria’s domestic security. In February, reports circulated that al-Sharaa and Erdoğan were seeking a joint defense pact. Elements of this agreement, according to Reuters, would “see Turkey establish new air bases in Syria, use Syrian airspace for military purposes, and take a lead role in training troops in Syria’s new army.” Turkish pundits rejoiced at these revelations, leading to further speculation that the Turkish navy would take over Russia’s basing rights on the Syrian coast. “Turkey,” one prominent defense commentator, Metin Yarar, declared, “is the only country that will advise Syria.”

Turkey’s growing influence over Damascus has prompted mixed reactions. Despite initial indications of an imminent American withdrawal from Syria, the Trump administration has yet to pull troops from their bases inside the country. Washington’s noncommittal approach towards an American presence in the country appears to mirror a general “wait and see” approach towards al-Sharaa’s government. Ankara has sought to hasten Washington’s exit with promises to take over anti-Islamic State efforts in the region, a step Turkey guarantees to undertake in conjunction in Iraq, Jordan, and Syria. There is little likelihood, however, that this coalition will undertake concrete steps in the near future. With the full implementation of an agreement between Damascus and Kurdish representatives still outstanding, it is possible months may pass before Turkey and its partners see any real action.

None of these developments have laid Israeli concerns to rest. With Israel still grappling with the fallout of the October 7 attacks, the Netanyahu government has remained steadfast in its contention that Turkey has provided critical aid to Hamas. Israeli hostility appeared to take a new turn in January when the Knesset’s defense and budget committee issued a scathing report on Turkey’s influence in Syria. Among the committee’s findings is the assertion that Israel “must be prepared for war” with Turkey over its support for Sunni militants in Syria and its potential desire “to restore the Ottoman Empire to its former glory.” Turkish sources have been more demure in acknowledging Israeli hostility. Nevertheless, Turkish media commentators and senior officials have countered that Israel similarly intends to undermine Turkish security by establishing ties with Syria’s Kurdish militias. This belief has crystalized around the conspiracy theory that Tel Aviv intends to occupy and partition Syria by linking Kurdish-held areas with the Golan Heights. The realization of this “David’s Corridor,” as it is termed in the Turkish press, is believed to be a part of a broader Israeli agenda to redraw the map of the Middle East.

Recent Israeli airstrikes against military installations in central Syria raise the possibility that a shooting war between Israel and Turkey is not idle talk. Nor should anyone underestimate the regional instability such an encounter would generate. For Turkey, a costly war with Israel is only one hazard that lies ahead in Syria. Recent waves of sectarian violence in the country have underscored the fragility of the peace the al-Sharaa government has forged. The sheer lack of money, resources and expertise available to the Damascus government has made these communal hostilities worse. To date, no state in the region, including the wealthy Gulf monarchies, have followed through on promises to aid al-Sharaa in rebuilding the country. With the country’s economy still floundering, it appears just as likely that much of Turkey’s Syrian diaspora will not return home. All of these scenarios suggest that Ankara might find itself struggling with what Colin Powell once referred to as the Pottery Barn rule: To its detriment, Turkey may end up owning a thoroughly broken situation in Syria.

One More Encore?

In October 2024, Erdoğan’s governing partner, Devlet Bahçeli, performed a simple act that took much of the country by surprise. While passing through the halls of Turkey’s National Assembly, he willingly offered his hand and greeted members of the Peoples’ Democratic Party. Such a gesture was previously unimaginable: Bahçeli is a die-hard Turkish ultranationalist and a bitter opponent of the Kurdish national movement. The Peoples’ Democratic Party, an opposition party, chiefly represents the interests of Kurdish civil rights movement. Yet in explaining his action, Bahçeli expressed his desire to foster “a new era” of peace within the country.

Events accelerated following Bahçeli’s handshake. In acknowledging his coalition partner’s goodwill, Erdoğan publicly voiced his hope that a “Turkey without terror” was just on the horizon. This aspiration took on greater authenticity when the government allowed a series of official meetings between representatives of the Peoples’ Democratic Party and the imprisoned founder and leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, Abdullah Öcalan. Media coverage of these gatherings led to open speculation that Öcalan was imminently planning to issue a decree ordering the Kurdistan Workers’ Party to disband. In late February, he fulfilled this expectation, issuing a page-and-a-half written statement outlining his desire for his fighters to lay down their arms. Peoples’ Democratic Party members of parliament who helped convey this decree heartily declared that a potential breakthrough in the country’s 40-year struggle was nearing an end. “The first stage has been successfully completed,” one party official intoned. “The first stage is more than 50 percent of this job.”

A timeline leaked to a pro-government newspaper provides some inkling of how Erdoğan’s administration perceives the implications of Öcalan’s historical statement. After a “wait-and-see” period lasting several months, a “democratization” process would proceed within Turkey’s Grand National Assembly. Among the aims of this process, according to sources, would be the reformation of the country’s constitution. As of yet, there is no official word as to precisely what sort of constitutional changes the government has in mind. Analysts speculate that one likely item to be broached is the restriction preventing Erdoğan from running for president in 2028. Shortly after his public embrace of Peoples’ Democratic Party representatives, Devlet Bahçeli publicly advocated a constitutional amendment allowing Erdoğan the option to stand again for election in three years’ time. To ensure passage of such an amendment, Erdoğan’s coalition requires the support of one of the assembly’s main opposition parties. Giving concessions to the Peoples’ Democratic Party, some commentators have reasoned, may secure Erdoğan the votes he so desperately needs.

These positive developments come amid an increasingly strident state campaign targeting other opponents of Erdoğan’s government. The chief victim of this surging crackdown is Turkey’s largest opposition party, the Republican Peoples’ Party. Beginning last year, state authorities removed several locally elected Republican Peoples’ Party leaders from office and placed government-appointed trustees in their place. The arrest and removal of Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamoğlu has taken this campaign one step further. Public polling conducted before and after his arrest indicate that he is both more popular than Erdoğan and more likely to win in a head-to-head matchup for the presidency in 2028. What Erdoğan may not have counted on is the public fury such a stroke has incurred. One recent survey found that 79 percent of Turks supported the protests (with most conditioning their approval so long as the demonstrations remain peaceful). With the numbers in their favor, Republican Peoples’ Party leaders show no sign of letting up.  “It is right to defend democracy against these [acts],” party chair Özgür Özel recently declared before a crowd over a million protestors. “And the place for this defense is the streets.”

Developments on other fronts add further complications for Erdoğan. Despite some initial hesitation, Peoples’ Democratic Party leaders have voiced support for the protests and have called for Imamoğlu’s release. Buoyed by the growing size of demonstrations, Republican Peoples’ Party chairman Özel has now called for early elections, a move that may further upend any plan to implement revisions to the constitution. Added to these dates are concerns that the dissolution of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party may not be so certain. Neither the Syrian Democratic Forces nor other Kurdish factions have official acknowledged Öcalan’s calls for dissolution. One prominent Syrian Kurdish leader has conditioned his participation in the peace process upon Öcalan’s release and the end of the state’s crackdown on elected opposition officials. Öcalan, he contended, “has opened the door to democratic politics; the rest depends on the steps the Turkish state will take.”

Turkey’s Great Unknown

There are other indications that all may not be well inside Erdoğan’s palace. Efforts to stem the lira’s deflating value has brought the country’s technocratic treasury minister, Mehmet Şimşek, further into the public eye. During one rally, Republican Peoples’ Party chair Özgür Özel mused that the government was pressuring the treasury minister not to resign, an accusation that elicited ferocious denials from both Şimşek and Erdoğan’s minister of communication. An opposition press rumor held that Bahçeli had recently been intubated due to poor health, a charge that briefly landed one journalist in police custody.

Both of these stories, regardless of their veracity, are emblematic of the government’s defensive posture. Despite large numbers of protestors turning out across the country, the state’s media watchdog issued blanket bans on live coverage of the marches. As a consequence, major news outlets have gone to extreme lengths to avoid discussion of the size and organic fury of the crowds. CNN’s Turkish affiliate, for example, aired a talk show on Israeli-Turkish tensions rather than broadcast images of an opposition rally that number in the hundreds of thousands. When film surfaced of a protestor dressed as Pikachu, the outlet hosted a roundtable discussion as to whether the appearance of the Pokémon costumed dissident was evidence of a conspiracy targeting the Turkish state. One government think tank has gone as far as to accuse the opposition of being enemies of democracy.

Past precedent tells us not to read too much into these negative signs. At multiple junctures during his now two-decade long reign, Erdoğan has gambled or defied the odds and emerged stronger for it. There is also reason to be hesitant in saying that Turkey has reached a proverbial crossroads (especially since numerous analysts have employed this cliché over the years). Recent events suggest, however, that we should be open to the possibility that Turkey may have arrived at some kind of moment of reckoning.

Erdoğan has wagered a great deal in the hopes of winning on two different fronts. Establishing a firm foothold in Syria while neutralizing the Kurdistan Workers’ Party likely will have a dramatic effect upon Turkey’s regional influence. With Tehran and Moscow still reeling from al-Asaad’s overthrow, Ankara stands poised to exercise greater authority over the Middle East. Success in Syria also may further whet Turkey’s appetite for adventurism. Although relations between Greece and Turkey have warmed significantly in the last year, both countries remain far apart on a number of hotly contested issues. Demobilizing the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and resolving its problems with Kurdish militants in Syria may incentivize Erdoğan to resume his aggressive behavior towards Athens. Crushing the opposition and securing a future term will undoubtedly assure Erdoğan’s domestic dominance. Achieving this goal likely will mean that Turkey will fully shift from a “competitive authoritarian state” to a fully autocratic one. Should that be the case, it is likely we will see a groomed successor emerge to carry on Erdoğan’s style of rule well into the future.

Erdoğan may believe that the bets he is making at home and abroad are worth the rewards. Coming up short, in any regard, may inflict further instability on Turkey. The road to success in Syria is potentially fraught with danger. Should al-Sharaa’s government stumble or fall, Turkey again may be saddled with an unstable neighbor and a tidal wave of new refugees in need of care. Successfully insisting upon a permanent military presence in Syria may also spur a war against Israel. Unlike Ankara’s recent conflicts in Libya, Syria, or Armenia, the Turkish armed forces may struggle against a far more capable opponent.

At home, continuing demonstrations and opposition crackdowns may both whittle away at a potential Kurdish peace accord, thus quashing Erdoğan’s desire for a third presidential term. Should this domestic agenda go south, Erdoğan and his administration may face a difficult choice between harsher forms of oppression or backing down. Whatever choice he makes, Turkish politics will likely grow more volatile. Lest one forget, any one of these scenarios would weigh heavily on Turkey’s long-reeling economy. In light of the Trump administration’s tariff policy and the growing prospects of a global recession, a severe economic downturn is not outside the realm of possibilities for Turkey.

In short, Erdoğan’s dual efforts to strengthen his hold on power, while boosting Turkey’s influence in the Middle East, may weaken him further and precipitate far more severe crises. What sort of dimensions such a crisis would assume is difficult to know. At this stage, given global conditions, it seems easier to imagine Turkey growing weaker, or at least more unpredictable, than not.

Ryan Gingeras is a professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School and is an expert on Turkish, Balkan, and Middle East history. He is the author of seven books, including the forthcoming Mafia: A Global History (due out with Simon & Schuster in January 2026). His Sorrowful Shores: Violence, Ethnicity, and the End of the Ottoman Empire received short-list distinctions for the Rothschild Book Prize in Nationalism and Ethnic Studies and the British-Kuwait Friendship Society Book Prize. The views expressed here are not those of the Naval Postgraduate School, the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.

Image: The Kremlin via Wikimedia Commons

War on the Rocks