A wave of violently suppressed political protests following the October 2024 National Election Commission’s announcement that the ruling party candidate Daniel Chapo had won the presidential election has rocked Mozambique. Coupled with an ongoing insurgency in the north and a spate of kidnappings of business leaders, these challenges risk jeopardizing U.S. strategic interests, specifically political stability and access to strategic resources such as critical minerals.
Protecting U.S. interests will require the Trump administration to take a balanced approach that, leveraging America’s economic heft, both preserves the existing bilateral partnership with Mozambique while pushing for greater government accountability and transparency.
Election Opens a Pandora’s Box of Grievances
As is typical for Mozambique, last October’s elections were clouded by accusations of voter fraud, resulting in parliamentary and presidential victories for the ruling Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambique Liberation Front).
However, this time the ruling party faced Venâncio Mondlane, a challenger who rallied a public long frustrated by rampant corruption at all levels of government as well as failures in transportation, health care, and security. Mondlane leveraged social media to build support among the country’s youth, believing that they would most reliably act on his calls for action. Using these social networks, Mondlane proclaimed that he was the rightful victor of the election, priming his supporters to protest when the National Election Commission instead announced Chapo’s win with over 70 percent of the vote. In response, Mondlane’s supporters took to the streets. Early protests included not just youth clamoring for a greater political voice, but also segments of the business and medical communities. Building on pre-existing frustration with poor investment in the country’s health infrastructure, doctors protested equipment and supply shortages to treat the growing number of injured protestors. Meanwhile, businesses, already upset with weak preventive actions against kidnapping-for-ransom schemes, protested the harsh police response to the protests.
The Security Picture Grows More Complicated
The violence associated with the post-election protests points to an increasingly complex security environment in Mozambique. Chapo’s inauguration in January of this year did little to diminish popular discontent as lesser forms of protest, such as refusing to pay tolls enforced by government authorities, continued. The global press coverage of the protests amplified the existing weaknesses within the security services, including internal division and poor relations with the public. Indeed, Mozambican civil society organizations, such as Plataforma Decide, claimed that as of March 2025, the national police were responsible for over 300 civilian deaths during the first 6 months of protests. Furthermore, the protests show the depth of negative sentiment toward the Mozambique Liberation Front government, as even the prospect of violent repression failed to deter people from taking to the streets. Growing public grievances toward heavy-handed security measures, such as the use of live ammunition to disperse crowds, and a president whose election victory they do not readily accept, has the potential to lead to future political violence. While Chapo and Mondlane opened a dialogue in March — a promising development — Mondlane’s ability to inspire people to act suggests Chapo will need to tread carefully to avoid further protests. Moreover, the public’s determination to see meaningful change in the country also opens the possibility of more unrest if people believe that Mondlane has sold them out.
While the protests took center stage, an insurgency in Cabo Delgado province in northern Mozambique continued to disrupt travel, agriculture, and trade. Born of a religious sect in 2007, Ahlu-Sunnah Wa-Jama, or al-Shabaab, as it is called locally, has exploited social and economic grievances to transform into an armed group. At its peak in 2021, it proved capable of holding strategic transportation corridors and territory in Cabo Delgado. Al-Shabaab’s allegiance to the so-called Islamic State bolstered its operational knowledge and media presence. It has thus rebranded itself as the Islamic State Mozambique.
At the request of the Mozambican government, the Southern African Development Community and Rwanda deployed troops to Cabo Delgado in 2021 to combat the insurgency and restore order. The increased military presence managed to push the insurgents out of key strongholds, such as the port city of Mocímboa da Praia. However, the conclusion of the Southern African Development Community deployment in July 2024 allowed the insurgents to regain momentum. Throughout 2024, the Islamic State Mozambique increased improvised explosive device attacks and began imposing taxes and tolls on locals. At the same time, the group has shifted its approach to civilians, putting a greater effort into winning support from local residents.
The insurgency’s expansion into new parts of Cabo Delgado and its threat to mining interests show its continued commitment to targeting sources of wealth for Mozambican elites. The Rwandan military’s significant role in providing security in Cabo Delgado, whose contract terms are notably opaque, generates similar concerns for mining. The Rwanda Defense Force’s proximity to critical minerals sites and allegations that Kigali might be receiving lucrative benefits from such resources convolutes Mozambique’s security picture even further.
Mozambique’s Economic Value Revealed
The post-election protests have also brought to the fore Mozambique’s quiet but important role in the regional and global economy. In the aftermath of the national elections, Mondlane directed protesters to Mozambique’s ports, such as Nacala and Maputo, and the border with South Africa. He also encouraged truck drivers to block roads and stop work for three days, disrupting the transportation of goods. In December, Zambia suspended fuel imports through Mozambique after disruptions at the Beira Port. Protesters also vandalized the Nacala railway, which disrupted the flow of goods through the Nacala port. This disruption also impacted the trade in minerals crucial to economic and national security. For example, the United States imports 74 percent of its chromium, a critical mineral essential to the production of stainless steel and defense-related superalloys, the vast majority of which is mined in South Africa and then exported through Mozambique. However, protest-related closures of the port of Maputo hindered South Africa’s ability to export this mineral during the latter half of 2024.
Political unrest and the ongoing insurgency in the north of the country have impacted the development of Mozambique’s critical minerals sector at a time when the United States is seeking friendly and reliable sources of these high-demand products. Critical minerals, of which China controls 60 percent of global production and 85 percent of the processing capacity, are a growing source of interest in Africa. Graphite, a necessary component in lithium-ion batteries, mobile phones, nuclear reactors, and electric vehicles, is a mineral on which the United States is entirely reliant on imports. The United States has thus been eager to secure alternative sources of this widely applicable mineral, investing heavily in Syrah Resources, an Australian company whose subsidiary operates the Balama graphite mine in Cabo Delgado. Syrah recently secured a deal to export graphite to its processing facility in Louisiana to supply U.S. electric vehicle manufacturers.
However, two months after Syrah secured a $150 million loan from the U.S. Development Finance Corporation, the graphite project declared force majeure in December 2024 due to the unrest in Mozambique. While the company argues that opposition to its mining operations stems from land disputes, local governance challenges remain at the root of barriers to diversifying America’s supply chains. For now, it’s unclear when the Balama mine will be back online. Syrah announced in early February that it aims to restart operations in the coming months. The Development Finance Corporation has granted a waiver for default events on the loan to Syrah, which has yet to default on its obligations. The vulnerability of this investment and its role in reducing U.S. dependence on Chinese graphite demand that the underlying political factors hindering its sustained operation be addressed.
Ongoing security and political risks also continue to delay the development of liquid natural gas projects off the coast of northern Mozambique, which would expand U.S. energy sources, generate returns for American investors, and create a long-term platform for U.S. influence in a burgeoning market and region. The intervention of Rwandan and Southern African Development Community forces in 2021 and the initial progress this additional presence made on security in Cabo Delgado served to buttress government claims that the projects would likely restart soon. However, four years on they remain stalled, as Western firms, including Total and ExxonMobil, assess the associated risks. Taken together, the insurgency and political instability have cast doubt on progress toward improving security in the province where the United States has invested billions of dollars.
Striking a Balance
The post-election protests in Mozambique underscore the depth of public discontent with the political status quo and point to a society on edge. The willingness of the public to take on personal risks to continue protesting despite the government’s violent response reflects the deep political roots of these grievances.
Addressing Mozambican insecurity will require sweeping reforms of the security services that deal with both the material and cultural issues impeding progress. Mozambique’s security services have consistently been plagued by inadequate resources. This has led to low morale and a vulnerability to exploitative practices, such as shakedowns and harassment of civilians, which has undermined relations with the public. The Mozambican government’s focus on improving security in Cabo Delgado — and Rwanda’s success in this realm — have likely helped to deprioritize the reforms needed to enable the Mozambican security services to become effective and self-sufficient.
Recent overtures between Chapo and Mondlane suggest these two political leaders are seeking to restore calm to the country, potentially making them more receptive to offers from foreign partners also seeking to achieve stability. Chapo agreed during his March meeting with Mondlane to provide support to victims of police violence and to grant amnesty to those detained during the protests. Holding the government to these commitments will be a vital step toward repairing its relationship with the public and making progress toward long-term cultural shifts in the security services.
The United States can take several constructive steps, leveraging programs that are already in place, to promote political stability in Mozambique while diversifying its access to critical minerals. First, the United States should prioritize innovative approaches spearheaded by the Global Fragility Act and spur investment through the Development Finance Corporation, both of which President Donald Trump launched in 2019. For example, the Global Fragility Act, already active in northern Mozambique, can be used to stabilize areas around the Balama graphite mine by expanding support for community-based reconciliation programs, local governance capacity, and early warning systems to defuse tensions near extraction sites. These tools reduce insurgent threats, limit operational disruptions, and help protect U.S.-backed mineral supply chains. Meanwhile, the Development Finance Corporation should expand its support for U.S. firms in Mozambique’s extractives sector through political risk insurance, loan guarantees, and co-investment tools. U.S. funding should be tied to transparency reforms — such as contract disclosure and streamlined permitting — to ensure that U.S. capital is shielded from corruption and volatility. This approach secures American commercial interests while reinforcing governance standards necessary for long-term investment.
Second, the United States could use the $537 million Millennium Challenge Corporation compact, awarded in September 2023, to invest in sectors where U.S. strategic interests coincide with the Mozambican public’s most pressing needs, such as infrastructure. The compact dedicates over $310 million to upgrading roads and bridges in Zambezia Province and enhancing access to export corridors that support U.S.-bound shipments of critical minerals like graphite. While these investments are vital for securing long-term American supply chain resilience, deploying a funding mechanism long known for its commitment to democratic governance in a country where elections are rigged, opposition members are assassinated, and protests are routinely suppressed raises serious concerns. To uphold the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s mission and advance U.S. interests, the investment should be contingent on political reform — leveraging the mutual economic benefits of the compact to push for meaningful governance improvements.
Finally, the United States should leverage the economic potential it is offering Mozambique to press its leaders to follow through on political reform. For example, one of the outcomes of the Chapo-Mondlane meeting in March was a promise from Chapo to investigate allegations of police brutality and compensate victims. Pressing Chapo to carry out this commitment, whether through the provision of the investigative tools and training necessary to do it, or by threatening to withhold important investments, would be a major step in improving governance and building trust between the state and the public. Indeed, political stability and accountability are prerequisites to achieving the U.S. goal of long-term mineral extraction. The accountability that stems from genuine political competition and a free society directly benefits the United States. Closed societies benefit foreign adversaries like China that can bribe their way to securing access in opaque backdoor deals. Continued Mozambique Liberation Front impunity means more unfettered and unchecked cooperation with China in a wide variety of domains, including military exercises and access. While allying with Mozambican elites at the expense of democratic progress may appear appealing to augment critical mineral exports in the short run, experiences in countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo demonstrate that in the long-term, this is a losing proposition.
The United States has generally upheld its commitment to democratic development and good governance in Mozambique. However, U.S. criticism of irregularities following both the 2023 municipal elections and 2024 national elections has been insufficient to give most Mozambicans greater access to political power. The increased relevance of Mozambique’s natural resources to Western interests led to a more pronounced focus on securing access to these assets while relegating the critical underpinnings of democracy and good governance to the margins, despite the linkage between political stability and reliable resource extraction. Moving forward, the United States should see these issues as inextricably linked and avoid succumbing to a simplistic view that it can simply choose domestic champions, as it did at times in the past. Instead, the United States should leverage its economic portfolio to more assertively promote capable and accountable governance, seeking mutual wins with the ruling government through investment deals while accounting for the opposition’s concerns. Only by doing so can the United States help support the stability necessary to maximize its investments in technological advancement and outcompete its adversaries.
Emilia Columbo is a senior associate (non-resident) in the Africa program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a senior analyst at VoxCroft Analytics. She previously served as a senior analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency, covering African and Latin American political-security issues. She served as an international observer for the International Republican Institute’s 2024 international election observation mission to Mozambique.
Mike Brodo is an Africa-focused political and security analyst. He previously was a senior program associate for Southern Africa at the International Republican Institute, where he served as a member of the core team and observer for the 2024 international election observation mission to Mozambique.
The views expressed are the authors’ alone and do not reflect those of any organizations with which they are affiliated.
Image: Francisco Júnior via Voice of America
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