The art of deception, as old as war itself, can garner astonishment when one side’s competence enables it to pull off an audacious plan. Warfighters can exploit the electromagnetic spectrum to deceive as we increasingly sense and understand the battlefield through this medium with equipment like radar, infrared, and passive detection systems. Historical cases when planners employed military deception offer valuable lessons for how the joint force could design its future forces.
On the land, in the air, on the sea, and in space, multi-spectral electromagnetic emitters enable platforms to mask their identities across several parts of the spectrum. For example, these signature-altering tools could cause the adversary, using an array of sensors, to think it detects an unarmed cargo plane. In reality, a bomb-carrying remotely piloted aircraft flies by, wearing an electromagnetic disguise. These emitters can obfuscate operations and hoodwink America’s adversaries, whether using ambiguity-increasing or -decreasing types of military deception.
Ambiguity-increasing military deceptions dazzle an adversary with too many choices regarding what friendly forces will do next. Ambiguity-decreasing deceptions do the opposite, causing adversaries to think — incorrectly — that they know precisely what moves friendly forces will make next, lulled into a finely crafted false reality. Using either type of deception, commanders can achieve an operational advantage, perhaps gaining enough initiative to turn the tide of a battle. We will first describe the value of military deception, then discuss the two types of military deception, and subsequently outline how deception — primarily through manipulation of the electromagnetic spectrum via robotic or uncrewed platforms — can be employed to achieve operational advantages in future combat.
Military Deception
Using military deception results in more favorable casualty ratios and increases the likelihood of achieving surprise. In his seminal work, Stratagem, Barton Whaley analyzed 124 military battles spanning from 1914 to 1969. He found that when the attacking forces employed no deception and no surprise, the casualty ratios were nearly even (1:1.1). However, offensive forces could achieve more favorable force ratios with surprise alone (1:2.0) or deception alone (1:1.3). With both deception and surprise, forces could obtain the most favorable casualty ratios (1:6.3). Whaley’s case studies serve as an essential reminder of the value of military deception that the joint doctrine on the topic highlights these takeaways from Stratagem in its first chapter.
Deception alone only alters force ratio calculations slightly. However, Whaley’s later scholarship ascertained that deception enables surprise. Whaley argues: “Deception has at least an 80% chance of yielding surprise, and the payoffs for surprise are impressively high.” Mark Cancian at the Center for Strategic and International Studies authored a fantastic report on how surprise can lead to an operational advantage in great power competition. Cancian’s research on deception and surprise highlights two notable takeaways. First, military deception works: Even when not wholly misled, adversaries will hesitate, squandering precious decision time if a deception creates uncertainty. Second, surprise enables a fleeting opportunity, temporal in nature, for one side to achieve the initiative. As an enduring principle of war, surprise and the deceptions that enable it will remain imperative for achieving an information advantage, even as modern-day tools of war evolve.
Deception Today Depends on the Spectrum
Today, the U.S. military employs joint electromagnetic spectrum operations across all domains. Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. John Hyten declared this battlespace “critical to establishing information advantage.” The Government Accountability Office cites the increasingly congested and contested electromagnetic spectrum as a critical enabler to all other warfighting domains. Likewise, Russia and China continue to modernize their ability to operate and contest U.S. freedom of action in this arena. Because adversaries will sense future battlefields through the electromagnetic spectrum, the joint force can leverage the spectrum as a conduit to confuse or mislead adversaries.
Deceive to Befuddle or Mislead
Donald Herbig and Katherine Daniel classified two types of military deceptions: A-type and M-type. The ambiguity-increasing (A-type) deception presents the adversary with multiple friendly courses of action. Meanwhile, an ambiguity-decreasing (M-type, for misleading) causes an adversary to be “very certain and very wrong.”
Confuse Adversaries with Ambiguity
Successful ambiguity-increasing deceptions cause adversaries to delay or hesitate as the operational picture dazzles or confuses them. To protect Allied actions across Europe during World War II, the Allies executed a theater-wide deception plan known as Operation Bodyguard. Churchill remarked: “In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies.” Operation Bodyguard aimed to keep Hitler guessing where Allied invasions might occur (e.g., France, Norway, or the Balkans). Today, a theater-wide “bodyguard of lies” could prove helpful for force preservation or contested logistics.
At the tactical level, ambiguity-increasing deceptions cause an adversary to waste expensive munitions and other military resources on cheap decoys or drones. In 2022, Ukraine successfully confused Russian forces with rudimentary decoys. As the war rages on, Ukraine continues to adapt and now employs multi-spectral decoys.
In modern combat environments, a force must disperse to survive. As a result, the U.S. military services have devised warfighting concepts like Agile Combat Employment and Distributed Maritime Operations. Electromagnetic spectrum decoys aid in confusing the adversary in this endeavor.
For a successful ambiguity-decreasing deception, where the adversary is certain and wrong, deceivers should understand a target’s pre-existing biases, implying an intimate relationship between intelligence and the deceiver. Deception planners value intelligence that gives insights into how an adversary thinks because deceivers know that it is far easier to fool an adversary into what they already believe, which forms the basis of Magruder’s principle. Leveraging this principle, some of history’s greatest warfighters have exploited their enemies via a lure or ambush.
Mislead to Lure and Spring Ambushes
Classic ambiguity-deception examples abound, from the Trojan horse to the walls of Jericho falling after trumpeting Israelites encircled the city, ostentatiously making the defenders believe there were more attackers. Another exemplary illustration takes place at the height of the Second Punic War. Hannibal and the cohort of Carthaginians and Celts he recruited crossing the Alps had devastated Italy for two years, yet Rome would not bend. Far from home and outnumbered, Hannibal sought to even the odds by seizing supplies in Cannae. Here, Hannibal used the terrain to funnel naïve Roman troops into a death trap. He deceived them by presenting a weak center as a juicy target. Additionally, he instructed his forces to fall back upon contact, luring the eager Romans into a noose buttressed by reinforced Carthaginian flanks. The Romans took the bait and were annihilated, with a 10:1 kill ratio, conceivably losing 20 percent of the Roman Republic’s fighting-aged males. Although Carthage ultimately lost the war, Hannibal cleverly manipulated an outsized, hellbent Roman army in battle, defeating them in their backyard.
Thousands of years later, American airmen were likewise far from home and contending with a defiant and capable enemy. Newly supplied Soviet MiG-21s had greatly enhanced the North Vietnamese air force. These state-of-the-art jets could adeptly intercept American F-105 Thunderchiefs, whose rocket-style design enabled them to deliver more ordnance than a World War II-era B-17 but also limited their maneuverability. As such, the affectionately dubbed “Thuds” flew predictable sorties. Fortunately, the Americans had their own Hannibal, Col. Robin Olds, a daring fighter pilot with an exquisite mustache, who conceived Operation Bolo to deceive and defeat the North Vietnamese.
Like Hannibal chose his terrain, Col. Olds planned to deceive his enemy into thinking they were confidently attacking a weak point and then spring the trap. He baited the MiG-21s into combat by masquerading his F-4 Phantoms, premier fighters of the day, as the North Vietnamese’s customary prey — the less agile F-105s. To conduct this simulation, the F-4s imitated F-105 radio chatter and protocols, and to solidify the ruse, they carried the Thud’s electronic countermeasure, QRC-160 pods, which rendered a convincing signature to the unsuspecting Vietnamese. Col. Olds’ masterful ambush resulted in a lopsided 7:0 kill ratio, a 4-month grounding of the North Vietnamese Air Force, and the inauguration of the Air Force tradition of mustache March. Deception proved successful yet again, this time in the skies, incorporating the exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum to seal the deal.
Ubiquitous Opportunities for Spectrum Deception
These case studies demonstrate how deception can be effective when a force is constrained or mismatched, shedding light on achieving tactical overmatch in future combat. With decoys, it can boil down to economics: Guided missiles are expensive, while targets vary in importance and price point. In the air, on land or at sea, and seemingly in space, low-cost commercial off-the-shelf systems proliferate across the operational environment. The pervasiveness of these systems and the increasing pace of combat create opportunities for warfighters to either generate targeting dilemmas or conceive ambushes. Future deception, therefore, should be undergirded by the electromagnetic spectrum, and it would behoove forthcoming systems to be equipped with multi-spectral, modifiable signals to mask their true identity and obfuscate adversaries. Equipment like the joint threat emitter should be further developed and modified for ubiquitous drone use. The joint force should rapidly incorporate lessons learned from Ukraine’s practical investments in electronic warfare as they defend their homes from Russian aggression.
Electromagnetic warfare is just as critical in space as it is on the frontlines of Ukraine. Satellites are costly and not readily replaced — though the proliferation and massing of these assets is catching on. Nonetheless, decoys in space can preserve high-value satellites and complicate adversaries’ decision-making processes. Taking a note from theories of nuclear combat, a decoy — in air, space, or the maritime domain — can also serve as a missile sponge. Doing so misdirects an adversary’s attention elsewhere while absorbing hits and preserving forces. As seen in Operation Bolo, lures and ambushes become viable when enabled by existing technology that the adversary employs to sense and understand the environment. In 1967, Col. Olds used the QRC-160 pod to modify his aircraft’s flight profile, but today, the joint force can leverage low-cost multispectral electromagnetic warfare pods on aircraft, drones, satellites, vehicles, or even… elephants, if Hannibal were still around.
Invest in Spectrum Deception
Trickery will always play a role in warfare. New domains offer novel ways to manipulate and fool an opponent. Ambiguity-increasing deceptions, like Operation Bodyguard or through the use of multispectral decoys, cause the adversary to hesitate and waste resources. Meanwhile, ambiguity-decreasing deceptions, like Cannae or Bolo, enable artful ambushes, which increase surprise and lead to favorable casualty ratios. To continue that tradition, the United States should galvanize its investment, development, and incorporation of electromagnetic pods on drones, satellites, and vehicles to leverage surprise and secure success.
Michael Posey is an active duty E-2 Hawkeye naval flight officer with a sub-specialty in information systems and operations. He previously served as the course director for the Defense Military Deception Training Course at the Joint Forces Staff College. He currently serves on the U.S. Army War College faculty in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations.
David Zesinger is an active duty U.S. Space Force space operations officer. Formerly commander of the 23rd Space Operations Squadron, which provides command and control for over 200 satellites, he currently serves on the U.S. Army War College faculty in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations.
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Space Force, or Department of Defense.
Image: 1st Lt. Christine Del Aguila
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