This commentary is published in coordination with the 2025 Global Security Forum, of which Defense One is a media partner.
One of the less-heralded features of the Global War on Terror—roughly, the two decades that followed the 9/11 attacks—were the conversations that the United States shared with Russia and China about counterterrorism. Though Moscow and Beijing were targets of Sunni jihadists such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, there was always some skepticism in Washington about whether China’s terrorism problem was as dire as Beijing proclaimed. Was the Chinese Communist Party exaggerating the threat to justify the repression—which the U.S. and other countries have called genocide—of its Uyghur population?
Now, in 2025, there is less doubt that China is in the crosshairs of transnational terror groups. Capable and determined violent non-state actors could give China trouble in various hotspots around the world—in Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere.
Syria
Since Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad fell in late December, jihadist-cum-statesman named Ahmed al-Sharaa—previously known as Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, al-Qaeda’s former frontman in Syria—has skillfully taken control. But the Chechen, Balkan, and Central Asia hardliners who helped overthrow Assad may not be on board with al-Sharaa’s more moderate state-building project. This could lead to fissures in the Syrian governing coalition, or their recruitment by ISIS.
Among them are jihadists from China or Central Asia who took time after and even during the fight against Assad to threaten China. For example, Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, the leader of the Turkestan Islamic Party—one of the groups Beijing is most concerned about and which maintains links to al-Qaeda and other jihadists—released a statement in the midst of HTS’ offensive: “The Chinese disbelievers will soon taste the same torment that the disbelievers in [Syria] have tasted, if God wills.” And shortly after Assad fled to Russia, Uyghur jihadists released a video showing missiles seized from Assad’s arms depots and directly threatened China.
Afghanistan
The primary terrorism threat to the PRC and its interests in Central Asia stems from the Islamic State Khorasan group, IS-K for short, which operates out of Afghanistan. Since the U.S. withdrawal and the Taliban takeover in 2021, IS-K has orchestrated a string of attacks against Taliban government and security forces as well as foreign nationals and interests—including China’s. In December 2022, the IS-K attack on LongAn, a popular hotel for Chinese business people visiting Afghanistan, killed three Afghans and injured 18 people, including five Chinese nationals. A month later, an IS-K suicide attack targeted a PRC delegation outside the Foreign Ministry in Kabul. And in January, IS-K claimed responsibility for the murder of a Chinese national working for a mining company who was traveling in the northern province of Takhar, close to the Tajik border.
In recent years, IS-K propaganda has increasingly focused on China, highlighting CCP abuses and oppression of Muslim minorities in China. It has threatened Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure projects in Afghanistan, including mining operations and pipeline projects in the north. This is largely because IS-K believes threatening Chinese nationals and economic interests undermines projects and investment that can help the Taliban government.
But the CCP, which was the first government to name an ambassador to Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, has more at stake in the country than profit or resource extraction. It views economic investment as a way to stabilize that country and the Central Asian countries that border China. It has long been wary of the region’s porous borders and the fertile ground for jihadist recruitment that could threaten to China’s economic and energy-security interests in the region. And the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan only exacerbated these fears.
This puts IS-K and the CCP on a collision course inside Afghanistan—and perhaps beyond. The terror group has shown its ability to orchestrate terrorist attacks outside of Afghanistan, such as last year’s devastating bombing in Kerman, Iran, and attack on Moscow’s Crocus City Hall venue.
Pakistan
Terrorism and political violence in Pakistan perhaps pose the most pressing terrorism threat to China’s strategic interests.
Chinese diplomatic presence, economic interests, and nationals have become a target for terrorist and separatist organizations that harbor grievances against Beijing. In 2018, the Balochistan Liberation Army attacked the Chinese consulate in Karachi. In 2021, Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan orchestrated an attack targeting China’s ambassador to Pakistan. Last year saw a string of deadly attacks by the military wing of the Balochistan Liberation Army on Belt-and-Road projects in the south and Chinese workers and businessmen, including in the port city of Gwadar. In October, the group claimed responsibility for an attack on a convoy close to the Karachi airport that killed two Chinese nationals. The attack, which following an especially perilous year for Chinese nationals and projects, drew sharp criticism and concern from the CCP, which urged Pakistan to take action against “all anti-China terrorist groups.”
Meanwhile, Pakistan’s overall security situation has been deteriorating since 2021’s Taliban takeover in neighboring Afghanistan. 2023 saw a 34 percent increase in attacks by terrorist organizations and other armed militants. Last year, the number of terrorist attacks more than doubled to more than 1,000.
Most were focused on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: areas along the Afghan-Pakistan border and in the Balochistan region where many of China’s key BRI projects are underway. This threatens a key strategic goal: building a route to import energy that does not go through the narrow Straits of Malacca. In November, Beijing and Islamabad held their first joint military counterterrorism exercise in five years. In February, President Xi and President Zadari agreed to strengthen bilateral and multilateral counterterrorism cooperation. At the end of March, the PRC permanently deployed private security contractors in Pakistan to protect Chinese nationals involved in CPEC projects—an unprecedented move.
These actions likely reflect Beijing’s mounting frustration and pressure on Islamabad over the deteriorating security situation. It is evident that it is becoming a pressing issue and that China may increase its security footprint in the region in the name of protecting its economic and energy security interests.
Conclusion
Beijing was once suspected of overhyping its terror threat, but no longer. As China continues to expand its Belt and Road Initiative, with Chinese personnel and infrastructure expanding across the globe, there will likely be more incidents of kidnapping for ransom, terrorist attacks, and other actions targeting a growing Chinese presence abroad.
It remains unclear if China is prepared to counter this threat outside of its borders. Primarily, the CCP has obsessively focused on the “three evils”—separatism, religious extremism, and terrorism—at home, a cornerstone security policy used to oppress religious and ethnic minorities in Xinjiang in the name of counterterrorism. The U.S. has assessed that the alleged threat posed by Uyghur terrorist groups in China and the potential ties they harbor with groups overseas is likely overblown and misconstrued by the CCP.
Recent events in Pakistan, however, suggest that the China may be increasingly concerned with the growing terrorism threat targeting its interests overseas. Accordingly, the CCP may seek to shore up bilateral and multilateral avenues—including through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Global Security Initiative—to increase its overseas security footprint in the name of anti-terrorism operations. This may have wider implications for the strategic competition between the U.S. and China.
It behooves Beijing to work with Washington on counterterrorism. After all, the U.S. intelligence community provided forewarning to both Iran and Russia before IS-K attacks in those countries last year. Even as the U.S. and China compete in a range of geopolitical arenas, counterterrorism can and should remain a vector for open and transparent cooperation.
Mollie Saltskog is the Chief of Staff at The Soufan Group and a Research Fellow at The Soufan Center.
Colin P. Clarke, Ph.D., is the Director of Research at The Soufan Group and a Senior Research Fellow at The Soufan Center.
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