For over a decade, a contentious policy struggle has simmered in the United States over the allocation of radio spectrum — a resource as critical to modern warfare as it is to economic prosperity. Authors in these pages have observed how the electromagnetic spectrum underpins military operations, from communication and navigation to targeting and intelligence, while its strategic importance has only grown with innovations like Starlink’s resilience in Ukraine.
At present, the United States faces a troubling reality: Its once-dominant position in spectrum capability is eroding as adversaries like China and Russia advance, leaving policymakers at a crossroads. Moreover, the U.S. military is still in the 5G testing phase. Meanwhile, three Nordic allies have just demonstrated 5G “slicing” with 10,000 troops across Norway, Finland, and Sweden — a technical breakthrough. How can the United States strengthen electromagnetic spectrum power, ensuring national security with the demands of a wireless economy? The answer lies in rethinking a century-old paradigm that no longer serves either goal effectively.
How should U.S. policymakers address the allocation of the scarce resources of radio spectrum in the critical mid-band range? The federal government enjoys 3300 MHz across the relevant bands, which are optimal for 5G, with the military occupying 60 percent of the relevant spectrum “beachfront.” By contrast, just 1900 MHz are allocated to meet the needs of the private sector and the American public, significantly less than commercial allocations elsewhere, such as in China, Japan, and South Korea. At current growth rates, U.S. users are expected to experience degradation and congestion next year. Congress proposes to identify and reallocate 2,500 MHz of the federal spectrum for commercial use within 5 years to meet commercial demand through 2035 and provide additional funding to upgrade military systems.
The Spectrum Standoff
The mid-band spectrum, spanning broadly between the 1 to 8 GHz range, lies at the core of this contention between a wireless economy and national security. These frequencies strike an ideal balance of range and capacity, making them workhorses for 5G networks while enabling global technical standardization for consumers and device manufacturers alike. Already, the U.S. wireless economy generates trillions of dollars in GDP and millions of jobs. Each additional 100 MHz of mid-band spectrum is associated with $264 billion in revenue in the coming decade.
Yet, through a quirk of history — dating to an era before a wireless economy existed — mid-band spectrum frequencies were allocated to the U.S. military’s use (notably what became the Navy’s Aegis AN/SPY radar). The U.S. military, entrusted with these bands by the Commerce Department a century ago, maintains that relocating its systems to different frequencies is neither practical nor cost-effective, digging in against mounting commercial pressure and technological norms of continuous innovation and upgrade of frequencies. The Department of Defense estimates that the Aegis system alone carries a reported $120 billion price tag — roughly $1.1 billion per ship for the Navy’s 110 Aegis-equipped vessels.
Another quirk of U.S. policy is its allocation of spectrum into federal and commercial categories, which are respectively managed by two separate, if not competing, executive branch agencies. With some exceptions, this allocation has remained largely unchanged since the nearly century-old Federal Radio Act. Hence, federal entities — predominantly the military — control most prime spectrum space, while commercial actors are confined to a lesser share. Despite this limitation, private sector innovation has boosted the efficiency of these limited bands by over 400 percent since the first U.S. spectrum auction in 1994. In fact, U.S. economists won a Nobel prize for auction design and set the new global standard for allocation of this scarce resource. Meanwhile, the efficiency of federal spectrum remains opaque, with little public visibility into how this critical resource is managed.
With the Federal Communications Commission’s spectrum auction authority having expired since March 2023 and with no new frequencies in the pipeline, former Deputy National Security Advisor Matthew Pearl warns of congestion and network degradation beginning in 2026. The Defense Department’s continued resistance to spectrum allocation reform — handing over spectrum space to the private sector for public use — was on full display at a recent Senate Commerce Committee hearing.
Committee chairman Senator Ted Cruz criticized “Pentagon bureaucratic inertia,” which deterred $100 billion in auction revenues that could have fueled investment, job creation, and resources to pay for a secure border and a stronger military. Cruz declared:
I am open to compromise on what the aggregate pipeline target number should be, but zero is objectively unreasonable. And no institution should be afforded blind deference — especially not one that can’t even pass an audit and claimed that leaving billions in tanks, helicopters, and weapons in Afghanistan was more efficient than bringing them home.
The current impasse reflects a classic “guns versus butter” dilemma, pitting defense hawks against budget-conscious reformers. Yet, spectrum allocation need not be a zero-sum proposition. A smart strategy can bolster both military readiness and economic growth, as adversaries like China demonstrate. The question is whether the U.S. military can adapt its approach to leverage cutting-edge technology — even if it doesn’t develop it in-house — while maintaining spectrum superiority against rising threats.
The Strategic Stakes
Control of the radio spectrum has long been a linchpin of military success. Historical examples abound: Radar shaped the outcome of World War II, Scud missile tracking defined Operation Desert Storm, and drones in the Russo-Ukrainian War underscore its modern relevance. For much of the 20th century, the U.S. military operated a vertical supply chain for spectrum-dependent systems, designing, producing, and using equipment tailored to its needs. This monopoly worked when commercial demand was minimal, but the rise of the wireless economy upended that model. Today, the military is no longer the sole operator of radio technology, and its systems increasingly lag behind commercial innovations and geopolitical rivals — look no further than the decline of GPS and its relevance for the warfighter.
China and Russia exemplify this shift toward spectrum dominance. China’s People’s Liberation Army purportedly integrates spectrum warfare into its “informatized” doctrine, wielding passive detection systems to counter stealth platforms like the F-35. Reportedly, China has deployed the world’s first mobile 5G base station for military use. Developed by Huawei, China Mobile, and the People’s Liberation Army, this station supports 10,000 users within a three-kilometer radius, delivering 10 Gbit/s speeds and sub-15-millisecond latency — even in harsh conditions. Russia, meanwhile, has honed its “radio electronic combat” capability against Ukraine, jamming GPS, disrupting drones, and denying spectrum access over vast distances.
The two countries employ both “soft” (jamming, spoofing) and “hard” (physical disruption) techniques. China’s commercial edge amplifies this threat: Its China Mobile (the world’s largest mobile operator by subscribers and revenue) and China Telecom dominate mid-band spectrum with domestically produced infrastructure that enable the incubation and export of platform technologies which power apps like TikTok while blocking foreign competitors through a “one-way mirror” of digital protectionism. The January 2025 release of DeepSeek — an AI rival to U.S. platforms — on China’s 5G cloud ecosystem underscores how spectrum alignment fuels technological and geopolitical power.
The Relocation Debate: Cost Versus Capability
The Defense Department’s claim that spectrum relocation is prohibitively expensive and complex anchors the current deadlock. The $120 billion Aegis estimate, while substantial, pales against a near-trillion-dollar defense budget, raising questions about its scale. Historical reallocations tell a different story: Moving defense systems from the 1755–1850 MHz band in 2011 cost $12.6 billion over a decade. Even adjusted for inflation and complexity, a tenfold jump to $120 billion seems disproportionate. Moreover, in national emergencies, the U.S. military may commandeer private networks and access the full spectrum, suggesting flexibility exists when needed.
Yet, the challenge of vetting these cost estimates is daunting. Cost and feasibility hinge on specific systems, bands, and timelines, yet no independent, public audit has reconciled the Defense Department’s dire projections with industry’s optimism about coexistence. The Dynamic Spectrum Alliance touts dynamic spectrum-sharing as a solution, pointing to the 3.5 GHz Citizens Broadband Radio Service band, where priority access licenses prioritize government use while allowing commercial access. But the Citizens Broadband Radio Service’s low power limits its 5G utility, and broadband demands far exceed its 70 MHz scope. Sharing models, tested in the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Spectrum Collaboration Challenge, promise computational efficiency but remain uncommercialized after decades of development.
Congressional oversight, via hearings and Government Accountability Office reviews, has pressed for transparency, but distrust persists. Defense advocates warn that auctioning mid-band spectrum threatens national security — particularly for systems like Aegis, integral to missile defense. Industry counters that global peers, including 30 countries running 5G in similar bands, coexist with military operations without issue. U.S. forces even navigate these environments abroad, belying the Defense Department’s claims of domestic incompatibility. Moreover, recent friendly fire incidents such as the accidental downing of an F/A-18F Super Hornet by the USS Gettysburg highlight the fragility of the aging Aegis system, which could be cracking from suboptimal spectrum setup, though the investigation is not complete.
Hypersonic Weapons and Spectrum: A Cautionary Tale
The spectrum debate extends beyond 5G to advanced weapons like ballistic missile defense and hypersonic weapons, where radio frequencies enable radar, targeting, and command and control systems. The Defense Department is generally accorded deference in matters of how it uses the spectrum. Yet, its track record offers little reassurance. China leads in hypersonic weapons, fielding the DF-17 medium-range missile system equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle (Mach 10, nuclear-capable) and testing advanced systems like the DF-27 intermediate-range ballistic missile, which outranges U.S. counterparts. Russia and India have also advanced. The United States, meanwhile, has fallen behind. In its latest report on the hypersonic weapons program, the Pentagon explains that “operational effectiveness, lethality, suitability, and survivability” were still unknown because of “insufficient data.” A recent Congressional Research Service report delves into the challenges of the program. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth claims that China’s hypersonic missiles could sink all U.S. aircraft carriers in just 20 minutes.
This apparent capability gap — enabled by China’s scientific superiority — mirrors spectrum mismanagement. The Department of Defense’s reluctance to share progress with Congress, as the Government Accountability Office notes, exacerbates costs and risks. Relying on Defense Department wisdom has left the United States behind not just in hypersonic weapons but also in deterring other threats like electromagnetic pulses, anti-satellite weaponry, and chemical and biological payloads. This has prompted executive action to address the perceived shortfall.
A New Paradigm: Slicing, Not Sharing
Allies and adversaries alike offer a blueprint for reform. The militaries of China, Norway, Finland, and Sweden all align spectrum to maximize commercial benefits, then allocate “slices” — dedicated frequency segments with tailored service levels — for military use. This contrasts with sharing models, where a military retains priority but allows conditional commercial access. Sharing requires significant real-time computation and human coordination, and has limited deployment, despite decades of research. Slicing, on the other hand, dedicates channels — like railroads versus highways for hauling freight — optimizing efficiency without constant negotiation.
The United States could adopt a hybrid approach: reallocate prime mid-band spectrum for 5G, relocating military systems to less congested bands where radar and hypersonic defenses can still thrive. Upgrading to efficient technologies, as 30 countries have done, could lower costs below the Defense Department’s estimates. The U.S. military’s 60 percent hold on prime “beachfront” frequency range between 3 and 8.5 GHz stifles innovation, leaving commercial users with a fraction of what’s needed and no relief in sight.
Industry Pushback and Accountability
Industry’s bid for spectrum auctions — which some in the defense establishment framed as a resource grab — seeks to unlock this potential. Critics in Congress, like Cruz, argue the Defense Department’s inaction after decades of control is unacceptable. The American public, he contends, deserves accountability for airwaves that enable everything from Wi-Fi to satellites. With broadband demand soaring and Federal Communications Commission auctions stalled, the U.S. military’s grip on prime frequencies risks making the United States a spectrum backwater, ceding economic and technological ground to rival powers.
Relatedly, the United States could ease spectrum scarcity by embracing broadband industry consolidation, enabling wireless, cable, and other network providers to merge and secure critical frequencies through market transactions. The necessity of the 2020 C-band auction —a record-shattering success that raised $81 billion for the U.S. Treasury — stems in part from regulators’ 2011 decision to block AT&T’s acquisition of T-Mobile, a move that preserved nominal competition but delayed efficient spectrum reallocation. By contrast, India and China, the world’s most populous countries, each sustain three-operator markets serving over a billion subscribers, leveraging scale to drive network investment. South Korea’s reduction from five to three mobile operators in 2002 catalyzed its rise as a global broadband leader, proving that consolidation can fuel technological edge. Today, U.S. consumers benefit from stable or declining broadband prices amid steady innovation. Further consolidation in the wireless industry could drive further efficiency and unlock spectrum and capital needed to maintain strategic dominance in an increasingly contested digital domain.
Adapting to Win
The U.S. military has a storied history of adaptation. From militias to a professional force at Yorktown, from Civil War industrialization to World War II’s mechanized blitz, from carrier warfare at Midway to the Gulf War’s high-tech precision, it has evolved to meet new threats. Today’s challenge — multi-domain warfare with AI, autonomy, and space — demands similar agility. Spectrum is a small hurdle compared to other technological advancements, yet it’s a critical one. Clinging to an outdated allocation of mid-band spectrum risks losing both the economic edge and the military dominance that spectrum superiority once guaranteed.
China’s integrated approach — tying spectrum to Huawei’s 5G, DeepSeek and TikTok parent company Douyin’s reach, BeiDou navigation, and hypersonic advances — shows what’s at stake. The United States need not reinvent the wheel. Yet, it should align its spectrum strategy with 21st-century geopolitical realities. That means slicing bands for military precision, refarming for commercial growth, and investing in systems that exceed adversaries’ capabilities. The tools of war may not all come from the Defense Department, but leveraging best-in-class technology — wherever it originates — can ensure the United States remains preeminent. To safeguard the spectrum is to secure the future of U.S. power. The time for adaptation is now.
Roslyn Layton, Ph.D., of Strand Consult is an economist focused on spectrum, broadband, and security policy. She serves as a senior fellow of the National Security Institute at George Mason University and advises the Foundation for American Innovation and the Krach Institute for Tech Diplomacy at Purdue University.
Image: Senior Airman John Wright via Wikimedia Commons
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