As the Trump administration continues to widen its engagement with Iran, Washington has yet to grasp a stark reality: An Israeli-Saudi peace deal is almost certainly beyond reach in the foreseeable future. The reasons for that deserve examination, because they are emblematic of much wider trends in the region and American engagement internationally. The sooner Washington recognizes it, the better.
Two years ago, many insisted Saudi-Israel normalization was possible through a wider U.S.-fostered “mega-deal.” The Biden and Trump administrations were only too happy to buy and promote this narrative. Shortly after being appointed Israeli ambassador to the United States in January this year, Yechiel Leiter told Israeli media that it was “closer than ever.” The U.S. ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee, told lawmakers last month, “The president is in an incredible position to build upon what he did in his first term, expanding the Abraham Accords [which normalized relations between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain] to include not only the Saudis, but other Gulf state nations.”
A former Biden defense official similarly argued in February that such a deal was “within reach.” However, conditions that might have made that plausible two years ago are now completely absent, and unlikely to return in the near future.
The proposed normalization “mega-deal” centered on three components: a U.S.-Saudi defense treaty with security guarantees; a Saudi civil nuclear program with U.S. assistance; and Israeli steps toward peace with the Palestinians.
Nevertheless, circumstances have changed, regionally and internationally, in ways that U.S. leaders do not seem to appreciate. First, regarding the treaty: Riyadh’s desire for a U.S. security guarantee stemmed from its fears of Iranian regional designs. However, in 2025, the situation is dramatically different. Iranian-Saudi relations have been thawing for several years, as recently reaffirmed by the Saudi defense minister’s visit to Tehran earlier this month. The minister held high-level talks with the Iranian Supreme Leader, Iran’s president, and the chief of staff of Iran’s armed forces. The timing of these meetings was deeply significant, taking place prior to talks between Tehran and Washington over Iran’s nuclear program.
Indeed, Saudi Arabian officials have reportedly informed Iran that they would not allow their territory to be used in any future U.S. military operation against Tehran. Riyadh has made it clear that it prefers engagement with Iran, eschews the notion of escalation, and supports President Donald Trump’s efforts to close a deal with Iran, even though it opposed President Barack Obama’s deal with Tehran 10 years ago, cheering Trump’s withdrawal from it several years later.
Considering that Saudi Arabia could be a target for Iranian reprisals in the event of a U.S.-led war, it’s unsurprising Riyadh has come to this conclusion. It doesn’t mean that Riyadh won’t look for further defense industrial ties with the United States — but that would not require a deal with Israel. Indeed, Reuters reported that Washington is poised to offer Riyadh a $100 billion arms package to be announced when Trump visits the kingdom in just weeks.
As for the idea of an ambitious defense treaty, similar to American arrangements with Japan and South Korea, Riyadh abandoned the idea of a defense treaty several months ago, according to a recent Reuters report. The perhaps insurmountable hurdle of getting an actual defense treaty through Congress may have been key in this decision, but an American security guarantee is also not perceived to be as permanent as it once was, as many European nations have also recently concluded. Indeed, Washington’s shifts on the Ukraine file may have already changed perceptions in Riyadh on the value and meaning of a U.S. security guarantee.
As for a civil nuclear energy deal — for those who were paying attention, Riyadh is on track to get much, if not all of that, agreed to, without moving a jot on normalization. The U.S energy secretary’s comments earlier this month made it quite clear that the two countries were on a ‘pathway’ to getting such an agreement — again, as the result of bilateral conversations that did not include any reference to Israeli normalization.
The final element, which related to progress on Israeli-Palestinian relations, was always a difficult square to circle in the original vision of normalization. This Israeli government, formed in 2022, is the most far-right one in Israel’s history, with its orientation being quite a definitive feature long before Oct 7. It has only become more intransient over the occupation and Palestinian issue over the last two years. Israel’s war on Gaza has been accompanied by multiple, open rejections of any positive traction on progress on the Palestinian file from Israel’s government.
This has been met by a corresponding reifying of Riyadh’s position.
Saudi Arabia originally held to the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002, which insisted on an Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories in Gaza, East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights, in return for normalization of Israel with not only Saudi Arabia, but the entire Arab world. But Riyadh seemed to temporarily soften this stance prior to Hamas’ attack on Israel on Oct. 7 and Israel’s subsequent war on Gaza. That is a thing of the past. Saudi leaders are now clear that normalization of relations with Israel could only happen in the event of the establishment of a Palestinian state. There is little to no chance that Israel would agree to such a condition in the foreseeable future.
Riyadh knows Israel’s standing among Saudis, Arabs, and Muslims globally has hit rock bottom. To then embrace Israel now — while its leader faces charges for war crime charges at the International Criminal Court, and the nation answers accusations of genocide before the International Court of Justice (legal fires Washington opposes but cannot extinguish) — would be an act of political self-immolation. That is a price Riyadh will surely refuse to pay. Indeed, the rewards appear non-existent.
Given that Israel is intent on not only continuing its war on Gaza, but has expressed support for further escalation in the West Bank, as well as making Gaza uninhabitable for Palestinians, the calculus in Riyadh is difficult to argue with. It didn’t help that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently suggested that a Palestinian state could be created on Saudi territory instead.
Washington wants normalization, but seems reluctant to openly admit that in order to achieve progress on that front, multiple factors would have to change. Most of these factors are Israeli policies: on the Palestinians, first and foremost, but also on Iran, and, increasingly, on Syria, where Israel is also escalating with its strikes and deepening occupation of Syrian territory following the fall of the Assad regime. All of that is possible, but just remarkably unlikely. As long as that is the case, it would behoove policymakers in Washington to focus their energies elsewhere, rather than expend political capital and energy on a deal that is beyond reach.
H. A. Hellyer, PhD, has operated at the nexus of government policy and think tanks for the past 20 years, focusing on geopolitics and security. He currently serves as senior associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and senior fellow at the Center for American Progress. Formerly deputy convenor of the U.K. government’s working group on tackling radicalization and extremism, Hellyer has held positions at the Brookings Institution, the Carnegie Endowment, and the U.K. Foreign Office.
Image: Khamenei.ir via Wikimedia Commons.
Jesus Christ is King
