‘Hamas can be defeated in few weeks,’ former Israeli Ground Forces Commander says

“Hamas can be defeated in a few weeks,” former Israeli Ground Forces Commander, Major General (Res.) Yiftach Ron-Tal said, advocating for a clear military timetable to bring the conflict to a close in the final stages of the war.

He argues that prolonged conflict will only undermine Israel’s strategic goals and that a defined end to the war is critical for the nation’s future.

Over the past year and a half, Ron-Tal has met several times with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. These meetings were brief, taking place during the height of the war, when Ron-Tal shared his security views with Netanyahu. Despite Netanyahu’s apparent attentiveness, Ron-Tal is doubtful whether the Israeli leader fully agreed with the perspectives of the former IDF commander. The outcome in Gaza left Ron-Tal dissatisfied with Israel’s security management.

“We are in the midst of a difficult and prolonged campaign for the very existence of the Jewish people in their land,” he says. “What brought us to the current situation is not the seventh of October, but the conduct of the army and the state over the years.”

The first mistake: Evacuating South Lebanon

Ron-Tal points to past security errors, particularly the decision by former Prime Minister Ehud Barak in 2000 to evacuate South Lebanon, a move that led to the loss of a strategic security buffer for northern Israel. This decision, made unilaterally, did not come as part of a comprehensive agreement.

“The first mistake was the decision by Ehud Barak to evacuate South Lebanon,” Ron-Tal explains. “He gave up the territory that served as a security buffer for northern Israel. He did not do this as part of a comprehensive agreement but unilaterally and for nothing.”

Ron-Tal argues that in the Middle East, such concessions cannot be made without the support of powerful alliances.

“In the Middle East, you don’t do business with the weak,” he states. “You test your ability to forge alliances and uphold them. Israel, at that time, turned its back on its alliance with the South Lebanese Army (SLA) and abandoned them. To this day, there are Druze and Christians living in Israel who are separated from their families in Lebanon.”

Abandoning the SLA: A missed opportunity

While serving as Chairman of the Israel Electric Corporation, Ron-Tal employed many SLA members and offered them job security. However, he notes that many others were left without support. The withdrawal from South Lebanon allowed Hezbollah to build its strength and establish infrastructure, which led to repercussions in the Second Lebanon War.

“The evacuation of South Lebanon allowed Hezbollah to build itself, strengthen its sources, and establish infrastructure to harm Israel,” he says. “This exploded in our faces in the Second Lebanon War.”

Gaza: The failure to understand the true threat

Ron-Tal also ties the outcome of the Gaza conflict to Israel’s earlier security failures. He contends that the military strategy of the last two decades, based on the assumption that “quiet will be met with quiet,” allowed Hezbollah and other organizations to grow stronger without interference. This ultimately led to the disaster of October 7, 2023.

“Not only did we suffer the greatest failure in Israel’s military history under favorable conditions,” he says. “But we also failed to destroy Hezbollah. After the war, we chose a strategy of ‘quiet will be met with quiet.’ This strategy has been with us for the past two decades, including in Gaza, under the false assumption that rockets would rust in their warehouses.”

This complacency, he believes, allowed Hezbollah to become exponentially stronger. “This allowed Hezbollah to grow undisturbed and reach October 2023, stronger by about four times in terms of readiness and capabilities compared to 2006.”

“In October 2023, Hamas attacked us, not Hezbollah,” Ron-Tal emphasizes, showing how the shifting threats went largely unaddressed.

The Gaza disengagement: A national and security disgrace

Another pivotal moment Ron-Tal highlights is the disengagement from Gaza in 2005, which he calls both a national and a security disgrace. He recalls how, at the time, he could not believe that Israel was forcing soldiers to expel Jews from their homes in settlements that had been established legally and democratically.

“I remember when the disengagement began,” he says. “I couldn’t believe I would have to fight a military that was practically forced to expel Jews from their homes, not in homes that had been broken into under cover of darkness, but in settlements that were established legally and democratically.”

Ron-Tal argues that Israel’s disengagement from Gaza was akin to a child closing its eyes, thinking no one would notice. This allowed Hamas, which had operated in Gaza but did not yet control the strip, to establish a terror state. “We left Gaza like a child closing its eyes, thinking no one would see it,” he says. “We allowed Hamas to establish a terror state under its leadership and build its power there almost uncontested for 20 years.”

The shift in military strategy

Ron-Tal traces Israel’s decline in military readiness to a broader shift in how the IDF viewed its role. While the military once focused on defeating enemies on multiple fronts, it gradually became an institution focused more on conflict management and deterrence. According to Ron-Tal, this shift left Israel vulnerable as it failed to take proactive steps to dismantle growing threats.

“From a perception of victory and an army built to defeat on multiple fronts, we built an army focused on managing conflicts and deterrence, an army that does everything except harming the capabilities that developed right before our eyes,” Ron-Tal explains.

The political echelon and the strategy of deterrence

Ron-Tal stresses that Israel’s reliance on the strategy of deterrence, especially in Gaza, is a product of political decisions. He believes that the responsibility for the strategy of “quiet will be met with quiet” lies primarily with the political echelon.

“The responsibility for this concept also lies with the military leadership,” he says. “But mainly with the political leadership. There is no doubt that the overall responsibility for the use of force and security strategy rests with the political leadership.”

However, he emphasizes that the political echelon often avoids taking responsibility for these decisions, and in this case, the failure to address growing threats in Gaza.

“The political echelon has repeatedly avoided responsibility, like the Agranat Commission after the Yom Kippur War,” Ron-Tal argues. “But it did not allow the political echelon to exercise all its necessary powers during wartime.”

Responsibility and the need for leadership

For Ron-Tal, the ultimate question is not about accepting responsibility but about what that responsibility means. The military leadership, he believes, has failed to meet the objectives set out for them, and as such, must resign.

“There must be a distinction between an appointed echelon and an elected one,” he says. “The appointed echelon that is directly responsible for this disaster should express its responsibility through its resignation. That’s what the Chief of Staff did, that’s what the Head of Military Intelligence and the Southern Command General did, and I believe the Head of the Shin Bet should do the same.”

When it comes to the political echelon, Ron-Tal argues that the only way to regain the public’s trust is through elections. “In a democracy, the way to regain trust is through elections,” he states.

Concluding thoughts on Gaza

Ron-Tal calls for intensified military pressure and the establishment of military governance in Gaza. This would not only remove Hamas’s governing capabilities but would also allow for the emergence of an alternative Palestinian leadership, one not affiliated with Hamas or the Palestinian Authority.

“Full recapture of the strip must be accompanied by the establishment of military governance for a limited time,” he says. “During this time, an alternative Palestinian leadership must emerge, either from within Gaza or with the assistance of moderate Arab states willing to be part of the process.”

The hostages: A moral imperative

When it comes to the hostages, Ron-Tal believes that only military pressure can increase the chances of their return. “Returning the hostages is the supreme moral and ethical objective of a state that abandoned its citizens,” he says. “I don’t think anyone in Israel doesn’t want the hostages to come back home.”

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