The Ides of November: Navigating the Shifting Sands of Iraq’s 2025 Electoral Landscape

What could be the make-up of the next Iraqi government, as geopolitical drama continues to play out across the Middle East?

As Iraq gears up for its pivotal parliamentary elections on Nov. 11, the atmosphere is charged with anticipation. With regional volatility, the fracturing Iran-led resistance axis, and unprecedented divisions within the Shi’a majority, the elections carry immense significance for the country’s trajectory, 20 years after the landmark “purple finger” elections of 2005. Yet, despite the noise around electoral campaigning and registering partisan lists of candidates (list formations), the real drama unfolds post-election, when the power plays and alliances take shape.

Candidates representing each of Iraq’s three main ethno-sectarian blocs — Shia, Sunni, and Kurds — will maneuver to gain leverage, cut deals, and build consensus in the run-up to the election. While politicians of all stripes will take part in the action, the competition is arguably the most intense within the Shia powerhouse (al-bayt al-shi’i).

Iraq’s last parliamentary election, in October of 2021, resulted in a tumultuous 12-month government formation process. This period featured a failed attempt at a majority government that excluded a large portion of the Shia parliamentarians (and parties), a mass resignation of Sadrist (Shia) members of parliament, and the eventual formation of a government under Prime Minister Muhammad Shia al Sudani — though not without a gun battle between Sadrist supporters seeking to storm the parliament building and paramilitary factions linked to the other Shia parties. Hopefully, the next government formation will involve less violent score-settling.

We interviewed several informed observers within Iraq to gain an insider’s perspective on the electoral landscape in the weeks and months before and after the November election.

The Kurdish Question

The Kurds of Iraq held their long-delayed regional elections in October of 2024. These elections can be seen as a litmus test for the expected national elections this fall. The Kurdish Regional Government parliament has 100 seats, making the number of seats and the percentages conveniently identical. In the regional elections, the Kurdish Democratic Party took 39 seats, down six from the last election, while the rival Patriotic Union of Kurdistan took 23, gaining two. The opposition New Generation Party took 15 seats, with the Kurdish Islamists taking seven. Smaller parties and minority quota seats filled the remainder.

Barring some geopolitical shock event in the spring or summer — such as a U.S. attack on Iran — a similar breakdown can be expected from Kurdish seats in the fall. The Kurdistan Democratic Party will probably once more about one and a half times as many seats as the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, while opposition and Islamist parties taking — in total — about the average of the two main parties.

Two major factors can explain the Kurds’ role in negotiating power-sharing settlements.  First, it seems increasingly likely that a regional government will be announced in Erbil before the national elections occur in November. The distribution of offices within the regional government is anticipated to feature a potential deal between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan for dividing the Kurdish “share” of the national government. Thus, in the frenzy of government formation that follows the election, the Kurdish “grand bargain” will add another layer to the horse-trading phase at the national level.

A second question is whether the Kurds will form a unified bloc for government formation. Bafel Talabani, the president of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, publicly proposed a unified Kurdish bloc when speaking at the Baghdad Dialogue conference on Feb. 23 of this year. This would be a U-turn from the last electoral cycle in 2021, when the Kurdistan Democratic Party banded with the Sadrists and Mohammed al Halbousi’s Taqqadum party to try to form a majority government. In opposition, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan party joined a group of Shia and Sunni Arab parties eager to obstruct that majority government initiative. A unified Kurdish bloc would have more leverage over government formation and could — if unified — be a deciding vote on which bloc of majority Iraqi Arab parties would be endorsed to form the government. This would, presumably, allow the Kurds to carve out more policy concessions, especially regarding sustainable salary distribution and a say on oil exports from the Kurdistan region. Nonetheless, despite the optimistic signals from the most recent strategic meeting on March 16 between Talabani and the Kurdistan Regional Government Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, as well as Talabani’s last statement about reaching a governance agreement with the Kurdistan Democratic Party, tensions between the two major Kurdish parties may prevent this otherwise logical move.

The Sunni Component

If this year’s electoral politics for Iraq’s Sunni Arabs were summarized in one question, it might be, “How much power will diffuse from Halbousi’s Taqqadum party to smaller parties?”

The 2021 elections cemented Halbousi as the leading figure in the Sunni Arab community. With his party securing 37 seats, almost three times more than the nearest Sunni competitor (the Azm Alliance of Khamis al Khanjar and Muthana al Samarrai, with 14), Halbousi enjoyed primary of place as both leader of the largest Sunni bloc (again, by far) and in office as the parliament’s speaker, the Sunni leg of Iraq’s “Three Presidencies” system.

This primacy all came crashing down for Halbousi in November of 2023, when he was removed from the parliament, in a controversial judicial ruling, for reportedly forging the resignation letter of another member of parliament who was similarly ejected by the court. While Halbousi remains the head of his party, without the office and ability to grant favors, endow offices, and direct contracts of the speakership, his power is undeniably weakened. The question is, how seriously and how deep?

According to informed observers, it is expected that rival Sunni blocs will chip away at Halbousi’s seat total, leaving him with the largest number of Sunni seats but a less overwhelming majority than in 2021. Indeed, our sources on the ground anticipate that Azm will gain a few seats, while the Decisive Reform list of Defense Minister Thabit al Abbasi should increase its seats from three to between five and seven. Additionally, the new list of Salahaddin tribal leader Yazan al Jabouri, partnered with former Speaker Salim al Jabouri and Anbari tribal leaders (including Sattam Abu Risha, the son of America’s primary partner during the “Anbar Awakening”), could gain 5 to 8 seats. These gains will likely come at the expense of Halbousi’s Taqqadum candidates. A diffusion of power among Sunni lists could thus complicate government formation in unforeseen ways.

The Shia House

With the breakdown of the negotiated ceasefire in Gaza, pro-Iranian factions in Iraq are vying for dominance while seeking to maintain their credentials as champions of the Islamic resistance against Israel. These groups, loosely aligned under the Shia Coordination Framework, are struggling to refocus on preserving their hard-fought gains within the Iraqi state. This balancing act between transnational resistance and domestic politics occurs amid an evolving political landscape, marked by the unprecedented overthrow of Bashar al Assad’s regime in Syria — once a vital ally. The electoral success of anti-Hizballah President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam in Lebanon further underscores the precarious position of Iran-backed forces. These forces find themselves at a crossroads, realizing that revolutionary fervor must yield to a more astute approach to governance and diplomacy if they wish to maintain control.

Among these actors is Nouri al Maliki, a veteran Shia politician who increasingly feels threatened by Sudani, who has been called Maliki’s protégé or “general manager.” Since the Hamas attack of Oct. 7 and Israel’s retaliatory campaign against Gaza, Sudani has navigated the turbulent waters of Iraqi politics, striving to keep the country out of the geopolitical crossfire between Washington and Tehran while managing relationships with both U.S. and Iranian interlocutors. As formidable challenges arise, including debates over electoral law amendments, a critical question looms for Iraq’s ruling elites from the Coordination Framework: Which scenario poses a greater threat to their long-term interests? Is it the prospect of a second term for a politically empowered Sudani or another surprise resurgence of the Sadrists, who could rally last minute support from disaffected Sunnis and Kurds?

Sadr unexpectedly announced once again that he is stepping back from politics and refusing to participate in the upcoming parliamentary elections due to what he sees as a tainted political landscape rife with corruption and partisanship. Having initially forbidden his supporters from voting or running for office, Sadr has nonetheless urged his base to update voter IDs “even in the event of a boycott” of the election.

Reportedly, the Sadrists are eager to learn from the strategic missteps made during the post-2021 elections government formation crisis. According to an informed interviewee, who wished to remain anonymous, the Sadrists may be inclined to welcome disillusioned cadres from the broader Coordination Framework alliance, provided they are not perceived as corrupt. This would align with the Sadrists’ public emphasis on reform and transparency, despite being no strangers to clientelist practices themselves.

Historically, the Sadrists have favored playing the opposition card while reaping the benefits from the existing political system. Should he participate and win, Sadr may endorse a candidate outside his movement for the prime minister’s position, potentially securing high-ranking bureaucratic roles for his allies through positions below the deputy minister level to revitalize his weakened patronage networks. Depending on whether Sadr decides to make a surprise comeback himself or use his leverage indirectly, he may navigate post-election negotiations to overcome the blocking-third barrier that had hindered his national unity bloc’s efforts to select a parliamentary speaker in 2022. However, it remains unclear whether Kurdish and Sunni politicians who initially backed Sadr will re-align with him after the abrupt resignation of his candidates from parliament in June 2022 in the unlikely event that he opts to endorse an electoral list. The leadership of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, relatively supportive of Sudani, had expressed frustration over his attempts to negotiate oil deals in the United Kingdom without its consent. Whether Nechirvan Barzani and Sudani would manage to keep the oil revenue dispute between the Kurdistan Regional Government and Baghdad resolved will thus impact how the Kurdistan Democratic Party would react to Sadr’s potential outreach.

In this politically charged environment, figures like Qais al Khazali and his Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq network emerge as key players, wielding considerable influence over Iraq’s electoral politics. Khazali’s network includes the Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq Sadiqoun political wing, military brigades registered with the Popular Mobilization Forces, and an array of social and cultural institutions. Their collective ability to play kingmakers and power brokers could determine the fate of Iraq’s ruling coalition leading up to the national elections.

As discussions about significant amendments to Iraq’s electoral law continue, Khazali provided clarity in a public interview on March 2 regarding his political movement called al-Sadiqoun. Having previously entertained the option of forming an alliance with parts of the Coordination Framework, Khazali declared that his movement has decided to participate in the upcoming elections with an independent list of candidates under the al-Sadiqoun name. Earlier, Khazali had implied that the Coordination Framework could field candidates on multiple lists while keeping the door open for post-electoral coordination to form winning coalitions.

Another key advantage in Khazali’s arsenal is his ties with Bafel Talabani, who views him as a valuable ally. Their joint efforts during the Dec. 2023 municipal elections significantly bolstered the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan’s position in the politically contested city of Kirkuk.

Furthermore, Khazali had affirmed that Sudani has every right to pursue reelection despite Maliki’s endeavors to curb Sudani’s ambitions for reappointment. This suggests Khazali is not entirely dismissing the possibility of aligning with Sudani if he improves his prospects for a second term. Notably, before a recent eavesdropping scandal implicated members of Sudani’s cabinet in hacking devices belonging to prominent Coordination Framework politicians, including Khazali himself, both leaders had a mutually beneficial relationship. Sudani relied on Khazali’s influence within the Popular Mobilization Forces, while Khazali benefited from his association with the prime minister, casting himself as a statesman advocating for Iraqi sovereignty and stability.

Khazali’s partnership with Sudani was strengthened by their mutual rivalry with Maliki. Despite appearing aligned, Khazali and Maliki have competed for influence over Iraq’s intelligence agency and the Popular Mobilization Forces since Sudani’s premiership. Al-Sudani has also worked to distance himself from Maliki, striving to rebrand himself as more than a general manager of state affairs — a characterization often leveled against him in western and Iraqi public discourse.

Even Khazali’s and Maliki’s shared frustration over the eavesdropping scandal — casting doubts on Sudani’s potential complicity — does not presume that the two would work together to form a new government. Thus, it’s no surprise that Khazali may consider cooperating with Sudani in the future. In a Jan. 11 interview, he emphasized that “the Prime Minister had the right to seek a second term.”

To grasp the shifting dynamics, it is important to note that earlier in January, a photo of the three political rivals — Sudani, Maliki, and Khazali — had circulated in the Iraqi media, sparking speculation about a potential reconciliation between the three. This does not suggest that efforts to undermine each other’s political prospects will come to a halt.

Maliki has emerged as a key proponent of amending the electoral law to divide provinces into multiple districts. He had been advocating for a clause that would have barred current officeholders from participating in the elections unless they resign at least five months before the ballot date. While many politicians and activists who generally support the multi-district approach believe it could benefit smaller and less established political parties, some have publicly acknowledged that the current push for amendments may not solely aim to empower these underdog lists. Furthermore, the former head of the Iraqi Bar Association, Diaa al Saadi, called on the Iraqi legislature to “confront amendments to the electoral law if they are intended to restrict freedom of choice or create obstacles that benefit political parties or groups.”

Maliki’s concerns about Sudani’s electoral prospects are well-founded. Before the eavesdropping scandal, Sudani’s popularity was reportedly gaining momentum, particularly following provincial elections where some observers predicted he could secure at least 50 seats under the modified Sainte-Laguë law in the next election. Since the Oct. 7 attack and amidst recent power shifts in Syria and Lebanon, Sudani has emphasized Iraq’s commitment to regional peace and stability. He has promoted the government’s effort to bring weapons under state control and to move from a U.S.-led coalition presence to a bilateral security partnership. While visiting Iran and the United Kingdom, Sudani reiterated Iraq’s readiness to mediate key regional dialogues between rival powers. Additionally, he ramped up outreach to Gulf partners and neighbors, endorsing a late December visit by Iraqi intelligence chief Hamdi Shatri to Syria, where Shatri met with the controversial Syrian leader Ahmed al Sharaa. It remains to be seen whether Sharaa will attend the Arab League summit in Baghdad in May 2025  due to his perceived association with terrorism. Both Khazali and Maliki oppose Sharaa’s participation in the summit.

All these government-backed initiatives suggest that Maliki fears that Sudani, potentially allied with the Popular Mobilization Forces’ Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh — who enjoys considerable popularity among several Sunni tribal leaders from Ninewa and Anbar — could seriously jeopardize Maliki’s plans for the upcoming elections. To counter Fayyadh’s influence, Maliki had again teamed up with Khazali to push a comprehensive Service and Retirement law for the Popular Mobilization Forces that includes setting the retirement age for the force’s staff at 60, which would automatically compel Fayyadh to resign as the paramilitary’s chairman.

Meanwhile, Maliki must also account for the Sadrists’ yet unlikely, though not unthinkable, return to the electoral race, informed by their previous failed attempt to form a majority government with Sunni and Kurdish allies. As a result, Maliki and his allies face a dilemma. While amending the electoral law with the proposed clauses could potentially diminish Sudani’s prospects, introducing a multi-district distribution may disproportionately benefit the Sadrists, who showed their adeptness at campaigning and outmaneuvering rivals during the 2021 elections. This raises concerns domestically that any changes designed to weaken Sudani could, in fact, bolster the Sadrists’ chances of success in the event of a last-minute decision to reenter the race.

Consequently, the competition to shape the electoral law ahead of the elections will likely reveal whether Maliki and his allies in the Coordination Framework view Sadr’s movement (be that temporarily sidelined), or a rival faction within their ranks, as the greater threat to their state capture. Regardless of the election result, the quota-based muhasasa power-sharing system will provide proportional government representation among the country’s ethno-sectarian partisan factions. Thus, vote counts rarely determine who governs. Instead, a ruling coalition emerges from a complex interplay of calculated coercion, incentivization, and behind-the-scenes negotiations. Institutions like the judiciary may be weaponized or co-opted to legitimize the gains of certain parties while abusing the political rules to freeze the process.

Regarding the judiciary, Judge Faiq Zaidan’s influence in Shia-dominated politics should not be overlooked. People on the ground report he is still disenchanted with Sudani due to the eavesdropping scandal, and therefore Zaidan could pursue some mode of cooperation with Maliki, according to our interviews. Nonetheless, Zaidan’s speculated involvement in former Prime Minister Mustafa Kadhimi’s return to national politics still mostly benefits Sudani’s administration, which is eager to leverage Kadhimi’s reported ties with a number of U.S. policymakers to shield Iraq from President Donald Trump’s so-called “maximum pressure campaign” against Iran. Given Kadhimi’s ties to U.S. intelligence services as former director of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service and his appeal to Western policymakers, he could harbor ambitions to be more than a bargaining chip in the foreign policy strategies of Iran-aligned parties. Kadhimi’s recent meeting with Hikma’s leader, Ammar al Hakim, suggests that Kadhimi may seek to align with moderate, reform-oriented factions such as Ayad Allawi’s newly announced Iraqi National Civil Gathering coalition. That said, despite his curtailed term as prime minister, Kadhimi — according to our conversations with political insiders — is still seen as a “burned card” without his own political base and is therefore too weak to defend Iraqi national interests against foreign — primarily Iranian — pressure.

Conclusion

The ramifications of strategic cross-sectarian alliances and partisan maneuvering will significantly shape Iraq’s political landscape in the coming months. The ability of key players, including Sudani, Maliki, Khazali, and the Sadrists, to navigate this web of interests will determine who emerges not only successful in the elections but in controlling the levers of state power in the aftermath.

As Iraq’s national elections come into focus, the dynamics of ambition, rivalry, and opportunism among the country’s partisan factions will unfold against a backdrop of regional volatility and internal complexities. Whether through formal alliances or covert sabotage, each faction from within the Sunni, Kurdish, and the Shia component will seek to secure its position and sustain patronage networks. In this polarized environment, the stakes are unprecedented and the journey to political dominance is fraught with both risks and opportunities for those willing to navigate the intricate landscape of Iraqi political horse-trading. Predicting Iraqi electoral outcomes and paths for government formation is a fool’s errand, but knowing who the power players are and how they intend to jockey for position helps explain the stakes involved as events unfold.

Inna Rudolf, Ph.D., is a senior research fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and a postdoctoral research fellow at the Centre for the Study of Divided Societies. Within the Cross-Border Conflict Evidence, Policy and Trends (XCEPT) consortium, she studies identity politics and the mobilization of violent memories in conflict-affected borderlands. Follow her on X at @inna_veleva.

Douglas A. Ollivant is a former National Security Council director for Iraq. He is a senior fellow at both New America and the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is also a managing partner at Mantid International, which has U.S. and Western clients in Iraq. Follow him on X at @DouglasOllivant.

Image: Zoheir Seidanloo via Wikimedia Commons.

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