What if the U.S. Air Force could adapt small, low-cost drones on the battlefield in a single day, and do that each and every day? That reality might be realized sooner than you think, if leaders make the right decisions.
The ongoing war in Ukraine demonstrates the devastating effectiveness of aerial drones. They have been credited with destroying up to 44 percent of Russian tanks and disrupting supply lines, perhaps even changing the character of modern warfare. The U.S. Air Force has not fully capitalized on new drone technologies because of risk-averse policies governing procurement and operations. A Defense Innovation Unit project manager described stakeholders in the drone arena as lacking an “awareness that drones have changed the way war is fought,” with the services “still treating a 3-pound quadcopter like it’s an Apache or a Cobra in almost every single way.” Gen. David W. Allvin, chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force, recently asserted that “the appearance of drones and the appearance of rapidly replicable, low-cost, mass airborne platforms offers both a threat and an opportunity.” The Air Force has an opportunity to change drone-focused policies, organization, and culture. These changes will empower airmen to seize the advantage on future battlefields.
We set out to develop a practical solution that could empower airmen with adaptable, low-cost airpower at the tactical edge. During our time at the Air Force Center for Strategy and Technology Blue Horizons fellowship, we launched Project Black Phoenix to create a system to enable warfighters to design, build, and fly mission-specific drones in under 24 hours. We realized the possibility of creating custom, low-cost, on-demand aircraft in remote locations for rapidly evolving combat needs. This would enable operators to innovate at the tactical edge, shortening the battlefield adaptation cycle from six months to a single day. Despite demonstrating a viable prototype at multiple locations and briefing multiple senior Air Force leaders in 2024, current policies and procedures restrict the U.S. military from building, testing, and iterating in realistic operational settings.
Time and again, it was apparent that we were hampered by Cold War-era bureaucracy while trying to innovate using 21st-century technology. Changing outdated policies to allow airmen to operate diverse types of drones would enable rapid technological adaptation while encouraging airmen to see drones as opportunities instead of as threats.
To unlock this capability, the Air Force should take four immediate actions. First, it should streamline approval processes by delegating airworthiness and cyber certification authority for low-risk drones to tactical-level commanders, supported by expert advisors. Second, the service should fund software-driven airworthiness validation to enable near-instantaneous certification of mission-specific designs. Third, the Air Force should speed up the stand-up of a dedicated drone program office to manage small drone operations, procurement, and policy across the force. Fourth, it should establish drone “sandboxes” at select bases, allowing airmen to design, build, and fly drones safely and legally.
These steps will empower airmen, shorten adaptation cycles, and reclaim strategic advantage in an era where speed and agility win wars.
Recent Drone Wars
The Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020 provided a stark demonstration of how drones can revolutionize the battlefield. Azerbaijan’s success hinged on its innovative use of loitering munitions, particularly the Israeli-made Harop drones. These “kamikaze” drones were instrumental in destroying many of Armenia’s air defense systems, including S-300s and radar installations. By neutralizing these defenses, Azerbaijan gained air superiority and created opportunities for tactical maneuver, allowing ground forces to advance unimpeded. These drones also targeted logistics and artillery positions, creating a cascading effect that rendered Armenia’s forces unable to mount an effective defense. This demonstrated that small, low-cost systems could achieve disproportionate strategic effects, reshaping the character of modern warfare.
Later, the conflict in Ukraine became a proving ground for drones, with rapid innovation and counter innovation cycles defining modern warfare. Ukraine’s military leveraged off-the-shelf Chinese-made Mavic drones for reconnaissance and artillery targeting, enabling precise strikes at less than $3,000 each, a fraction of the cost of traditional military systems. These drones have been responsible for identifying and targeting Russian tanks and infantry positions during key phases of the conflict. However, Russian forces have countered with advanced electronic warfare systems, such as the Krasukha-4 and Zhitel, which have jammed Global Positioning System signals and disrupted drone communications across large areas. These countermeasures forced Ukraine to innovate and rethink its approach to drone operations.
In response, Ukraine deployed first-person view kamikaze drones in increasing numbers. These drones, often built for under $500, have been highly effective in targeting Russian vehicles, ammunition depots, and forward positions. To counter electronic interference, many of these drones incorporate redundant systems and are operated manually. Russian units have struggled to keep pace with Ukraine’s decentralized and rapidly evolving drone operations. The drone’s low cost and tactical agility underscore the disruptive potential of low-cost innovations in large-scale warfare.
Ukraine’s innovation has not only been in drone use, but also in manufacturing. They established pop-up factories in locations close to the front lines to produce drones tailored to specific missions, reducing the time from design to deployment to mere days. One such factory reportedly produces over 3,000 drones per month, enabling Ukraine to sustain operations despite heavy attrition. On the Russian side, Lancet loitering munitions have emerged as a significant threat, with hundreds of successful strikes on Ukrainian artillery, air defense systems, and supply lines. Russia has employed swarms of decoy drones to exhaust Ukrainian defenses and create openings for precision strikes with more deadly systems. On the other side of Asia, China has taken note and placed an order for nearly one million kamikaze drones, deliverable by 2026.
Gen. Allvin cautioned against directly applying lessons from Ukraine to the Indo-Pacific. The true benefit of drones lies not just in their utility but in their ability to empower innovative responses, enabling militaries to dominate the decision cycle and seize the initiative in dynamic battlespaces. To realize this benefit, Black Phoenix took the ingenuity of Ukraine’s pop-up factories, automated it, and made it mobile.
Not Just for Trinkets Anymore
Black Phoenix was made up of U.S. Air Force Blue Horizons members and a new start-up company named Titan Dynamics. Our team wanted to put the rapid design, manufacture, and assembly of drones directly into the hands of warfighters. Our project combined decentralized design, custom manufacturing, and rapid operations to reimagine the way the United States conducts and deters war. In early 2024, we deployed Black Phoenix’s capabilities with Task Force 99 in Southwest Asia, produced the first known drone to be rapidly designed and validated by a computer, and conducted two successful flights. Our mission: test how quickly we could design, build, and fly drones tailored to real-world combat scenarios. It took 48 hours to design, build, and fly a drone, and we knew it could be much faster.
After our initial success, the Black Phoenix team headed to Eglin Air Force Base in Florida to push the limits of rapid production even further. The goal was to design, build, and fly six different drones, each within 24 hours. We based our design and manufacturing operations out of a small trailer with a laptop, a bank of six 3D printers, spools of filament, and inexpensive off-the-shelf internal components and batteries. Using Titan Dynamics’ automated design software, we created and validated aerodynamic structural designs optimized for mission and payload requirements in under 10 minutes. These designs were then fed into 3D printers to produce the drone aero-body. We found we could go from mission requirements to flight in under 24 hours. Not everything was perfect yet.
Several initial crashes taught us that the internal avionics and payloads were virtually unbreakable in a crash. As needed, we reprinted the outer structure at a cost of $20 to $50 and sent it back up. In true Black Phoenix spirit, even our crashes were learning moments. “We’ll just print another one” became our new motto. Black Phoenix demonstrated the ability to design a drone in minutes, manufacture it in hours, and fly it the same day, providing warfighters an edge in adaptability and operational tempo.
These tests demonstrated not only the production capabilities of the Black Phoenix project but also the shift in operational thinking that needs to occur. Crashing any aircraft, no matter the size, would normally be a significant safety event. However, with an on-demand, extremely inexpensive drone, operators can be unconventional and uninhibited to test new designs. They can iterate faster, addressing a wide variety of battlefield challenges in near-real time including military intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, decoy operations, kinetic strikes, or on-demand delivery of mission-critical payloads.
The U.S. Air Force needs tools like this: resilient systems designed for specific missions, built quickly, and capable of operating in environments where traditional aircraft cannot. Rather than waiting on defense contractors to provide soldiers, airmen, and allies with the latest drones, it is now possible for U.S. forces to design, print, and operate their own custom drones on an as-needed basis.
What is Stopping Us?
To avoid tragedy or obsolescence, the U.S. Air Force should change policy and organization. Current Defense Department and Air Force policies treat drones as if they pose the same operational and security risks as large, manned aircraft. As a result, complex, time-consuming, and labor-intensive approval processes impede the acquisition and fielding of drones. This reduces the demand and capital for domestic innovation. Instead, the Air Force should take four actions:
Streamline Approval Processes
Currently, any unit within the Department of the Air Force seeking to operate or procure a small drone faces an extensive and bureaucratic approval process. This process is governed in part by a memo issued in 2021 by the deputy secretary of defense on the operation and procurement of unmanned aerial systems, which imposes strict scrutiny and approval processes, withheld at senior levels.
For the Air Force, this creates a choke point. At present, no authorizing officials have been designated to issue authorities to operate for drones, meaning requesting an exception to policy is often the only available path. These requests are routed through major commands, office of the assistant secretary of the Air Force for acquisitions, and the office of the Air Force’s chief information officer, often stalling in layers of staff bureaucracy. As a result, even low-risk, domestically developed aircraft may take months to approve, if they are approved at all.
This policy environment has effectively centralized risk decisions in staff offices far removed from operational needs. Commanders at the group or wing level, who routinely approve high-risk flight tests, live-fire evaluations, and classified operations do not have delegated authority to approve even benign drone use in controlled environments. Meanwhile, staff advisors and contractors, often acting as de facto gatekeepers, can halt approvals without providing mission-aligned alternatives or appreciating the operational imperative to move quickly.
This misalignment has contributed to a chilling effect on innovation across the force and a strategic liability in pacing competition with adversaries. It also harms U.S. industry by reducing demand for domestic platforms, as developers struggle to navigate the complex approval system. By contrast, Ukraine is showing the world how to upgrade drones at combat-relevant speeds.
They are showing that there is a better way.
In the United States, it would begin by coordinating with updated guidance, lowering barriers, and incentivizing U.S.-made drone production. Furthermore, the risk management framework should be adjusted to allow delegation of approval authority to O-6 commanders, supported by trained cyber advisors. These changes would align authority with responsibility, reduce administrative delays, and enable tactical adaptation in time-sensitive environments.
The Department of the Air Force should also push to fully utilize the exemptions available under Section 1825 of the Fiscal Year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act and the American Security Drone Act of 2023, which allow for operations and procurement in the national interest for training, testing, evaluation, and development purposes. While the Defense Innovation Unit’s “blue list” authorizes the use of some off-the-shelf drones, it is time-consuming and expensive to add a drone to the list. Instead, there should be a list of pre-approved subcomponents like flight controllers, transmitters, and receivers. This would allow for quick development of new drones while still meeting the intent of Congress.
Fund Software-Based Airworthiness Certification Development
The current airworthiness certification process in the Air Force is tailored to large, manned platforms and is ill-suited for small, low-risk drones. During the Black Phoenix project, we demonstrated that a mission-specific drone could be designed, built, and flown in under 24 hours, but it still took over five weeks to receive flight approval. This delay highlights a bigger issue: Each new drone design should navigate a manual review process, typically through the Air Force Special Operations Command A3OU Office, which is inundated with a constant flow of requests for exceptions to policy and frequently gets backlogged.
To break this bottleneck, the Air Force should fund the development of software-driven certification tools like the one created by Titan Dynamics to automate drone designs during the Black Phoenix project. This software can generate small drone designs, weighing less than 20 pounds, in minutes and was developed to support automated airworthiness validation. By integrating aerodynamic modeling, stability checks, and mission-specific profiles, it could provide rapid risk assessments before flight, reducing the need for protracted manual reviews.
This approach would allow small drones up to 55 pounds to be cleared via software, with final authority delegated to local commanders or designated reviewers. Higher-risk use cases should still follow traditional review channels.
Validated software-based certification can cut approval timelines from months to hours, enabling operators to adapt at the speed of conflict. This is not speculative — it’s achievable with modest investment and existing tools. If the Air Force is serious about accelerating innovation, automating certification for small drones is a critical first step.
Accelerate Program Office Stand-Up
While we executed the Black Phoenix project, no dedicated program office existed within the Air Force to manage small drone operations, approvals, or acquisitions across the enterprise. We were left to navigate fragmented approval pathways involving cybersecurity, airworthiness, and procurement policies. This mismatch reduces demand signals to industry and places unnecessary burdens on units seeking to adapt quickly at the tactical edge.
Today, there are plans to set up a formal program office within the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center’s Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Special Operations Force Directorate, with limited initial funding projected for the next fiscal year. However, without immediate acceleration of resourcing and delegation of key authorities, this office will not meet urgent operational needs.
The Air Force should fast-track the establishment of this office by providing near-term funding, assigning experienced personnel, and empowering it to coordinate across acquisition, cybersecurity, and airworthiness functions. The office should also span combat, base operations, research, testing, and training missions and should serve as the lead integrator for cleared technical components, contracting solutions, and enterprise policy guidance. Accelerating this stand-up will remove institutional friction, align policy with battlefield realities, and help the Air Force lead the future of uncrewed airpower.
Institute Drone Sandboxes
Earlier this year, Trevor Phillips-Levine and Walker D. Mills advocated for the U.S. military to equip its infantry with drones, analogous to individual firearms. Another recent article described future small-drone units, with the further recommendation “to cultivate innovation and creative new ideas and tactics.” This is a good first step that would help define the roles of how airmen operate drones in the fight for air superiority. Airmen need dedicated environments, or “sandboxes,” where they can safely test, iterate, and operate drones. These hubs of experimentation could act as the Air Force’s “forward labs,” accelerating discovery and transition into operational units. Test ranges like those at Edwards Air Force Base and Eglin Air Force Base have the pedigree of pioneering aerospace technology and are the perfect locations to create small drone sandboxes airmen need to collaborate with innovative companies.
Sandboxes complement initiatives like the Drone Crucible Competitions being organized by the new U.S. Drone Association by providing a secure environment for high-risk testing and development out of the public eye. This approach ensures continuous, iterative innovation, allowing only the most refined technologies to advance to competitive showcases, ultimately boosting the military’s adaptability and effectiveness in dynamic battlefields.
The Risks of Lethargy
Decentralized drone production is essential for tactical and strategic superiority, and it’s happening right now. The United States Air Force cannot afford years to develop new technologies, policies, or organizations without risking obsolescence. Rapidly designing and deploying mission-specific drones enables real-time adaptation, leveraging America’s greatest advantage: the resourcefulness of U.S. servicemembers.
Black Phoenix isn’t just a new way to produce drones — it’s a template for how the Air Force can embrace automation and rapid adaptation to outmaneuver adversaries. To fully leverage this potential, we should act now, reforming policies that prioritize speed, flexibility, and innovation. As seen in Ukraine and Nagorno-Karabakh, those who adapt first shape the battlefield. Delay, on the other hand, can lead to strategic irrelevance.
This approach requires a huge shift in how the military thinks about fielding new capabilities. While there are costs to changing how Americans fight wars, there is little alternative. Black Phoenix proved that we can design, build, and fly a drone in under a day. Yet approval to operate that same drone may take months — an unacceptable mismatch in a rapidly evolving fight. This should change. The United States is at risk of being technologically outmaneuvered by the adversary.
Dustin “Whiz” Thomas is the commander of the Defense Contract Management Agency’s office in Palmdale. He is an advocate for agile adaptation in the Air Force and has extensive experience integrating cutting-edge technologies into operational frameworks.
Jordan Atkins is an Air National Guard officer serving in the Air National Guard Plans and Programs Directorate. A career space operations officer, he has held positions at the squadron, numbered air force, major command, and headquarters levels.
Peter Dyrud serves on the U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Strategic Studies Group as director of the Pathfinder Task Force. A career combat rescue officer, he has commanded the Air Force Special Warfare Pararescue School and two expeditionary rescue squadrons. He holds a Ph.D. from Harvard University, where he conducted research on U.S. policy implications of the Chinese-Indian relationship and on deterring transnational kidnapping.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Defense Contract Management Agency, the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
Image: U.S. Air Force
Jesus Christ is King
