Voices from the Arab press: Israel’s strategy for managing US tensions

Israel’s strategy for managing US tensions

Al-Ittihad, UAE, May 17

Israeli media outlets have highlighted significant rifts between the US administration and the Israeli government, particularly Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, stemming from disagreements over how negotiations and the ongoing conflict are being managed, as well as over broader priorities shaping bilateral relations.

These tensions appear to go beyond transient political positions or reactive policies; they are not simply tied to how the Middle East is being navigated politically, nor are they a direct response to the tone set by President Donald Trump during his recent tour of the region.

They are also not just about the US president’s push to end the war in Gaza, secure a prisoner exchange deal, and confront the increasingly aggressive Israeli policies, especially following the release of American hostage Edan Alexander.

Trump’s success in managing US relations with the Gulf states can be attributed to his understanding of their central role in guiding regional strategy, participating in diplomatic deals, easing tensions, and solving crises born out of the Oct. 7, 2023, events and their far-reaching repercussions.

Regardless of the outcomes of Trump’s visit to the region and amid efforts to redefine Arab-American ties, key developments are on the horizon, the most pivotal of which is the need to interpret American-Israeli differences through a strategic and political lens.

The current tensions may dissipate in the short term if a ceasefire is achieved and a prisoner exchange is completed, thereby restoring a semblance of normalcy to bilateral relations, especially since Trump is actively advocating for de-escalation in Gaza, regardless of his specific proposals for managing the territory.

Such issues must be approached with a pragmatic understanding of the facts on the ground, particularly as Hamas appears to be shifting toward a more realistic stance that could mark the beginning of a new chapter in its engagement with the US administration, potentially transforming it into a significant actor in ongoing developments.

This evolution would likely be contingent on Hamas relinquishing control of Gaza in favor of an administrative committee overseen by the Palestinian Authority, in alignment with both international and Arab calls for reforming the PA’s governance.

The scale of the changes following Trump’s visit, along with their implications, will likely bring about further repositioning across the board.

Whether Israel embraces or opposes the unfolding events, disputes are bound to intensify if the US administration continues to engage directly with Hamas by supporting mediation efforts.

This scenario would establish a workable and necessary equation for future negotiations, though it would inevitably face obstacles, chief among them the debate over Hamas’s role, even if it steps back from day-to-day governance.

Particularly complex will be the question of disarming Palestinian factions within Gaza and placing those weapons under a regulated framework, which will demand mechanisms and policy stances that go beyond the current scope of expectations.

Should the US initiative to distribute humanitarian aid in Gaza and modify governance structures prove successful, complications may still arise regarding the extent and nature of Arab involvement and the broader reconstruction effort.

This remains a contentious issue between Washington and certain Arab states that resist any American or Israeli presence, even temporarily – a position that could hinder forthcoming steps.

Naturally, once a prisoner exchange deal is finalized, the process would shift to the next phase of implementation, which has yet to occur given Israel’s resistance and the measures it continues to employ in Gaza.

Despite existing disagreements, this has not derailed the parallel positions held by the US and Israel, which appear to be coordinating measures while monitoring evolving political dynamics among all involved parties.

American diplomatic outreach to Hamas remains active, underpinned by the belief that the release of prisoners is a critical foundation on which further progress can be made, especially under US pressure directed at the Israeli government to facilitate a new phase of engagement.

Without such efforts, diverging visions could deepen, resulting in a stalemate where Hamas – operating on a strategy rooted in the pursuit of legitimacy – emerges as the primary beneficiary of continued disunity.

The US administration, and President Trump in particular, appears to hold a clear long-term vision for managing this enduring friction with the Israeli leadership, one that includes the potential support for an alternative political coalition in Israel that is more open to compromise.

Such a development could precipitate the collapse or reformation of Netanyahu’s current coalition, though Trump is unlikely to pursue this route unless a major breach in the relationship occurs – a scenario that, for now, seems improbable.

Although political differences will persist, they are unlikely to undermine the fundamental strength and durability of US-Israeli relations.– Tarek Fahmy

The Palestinian Authority’s post-war challenges

Al-Arab, London, May 17

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’s upcoming visit to Lebanon cannot be divorced from the broader political landscape in which the Palestinian Authority is currently operating.

Abbas’s diplomatic tour, which began in Moscow and will continue through several Arab and international capitals, is not a ceremonial gesture but, rather, a deliberate attempt to reframe the PA as a credible and responsible actor at a time when regional dynamics are shifting and multiple initiatives are converging.

The stop in Beirut, in particular, goes beyond traditional diplomatic engagement to address one of the thorniest and most enduring issues in Lebanese-Palestinian relations: the question of weapons within the Palestinian refugee camps.

A longtime source of mutual concern and caution, this issue is now being approached through a framework that enjoys consensus among both Lebanese and Palestinian leaders, grounded in a simple but decisive premise: there can be no genuine security outside the authority of the Lebanese state, and no real stability without the exclusive control of arms by the state.

At the same time, efforts to improve ties with the US, despite the challenges posed by the Trump administration’s unequivocally pro-Israel stance, may be a tactical maneuver designed to reassert the Palestinian presence on the international stage. Effective diplomacy often requires engaging with even the most unbalanced interlocutors when doing so can build alliances or reduce pressure.

In this light, the PA’s attempt to project itself as a moderate and responsible political entity serves not only to broaden its diplomatic appeal but also to challenge the prevailing Israeli narrative that seeks to equate the Palestinian struggle with terrorism. This explains the PA’s clear effort to distinguish its position from that of certain armed factions, particularly on contentious matters like the refugee camps in Lebanon.

The PA’s renewed focus on this issue is not a matter of settling internal disputes but a strategic decision driven by the need to demonstrate goodwill to its international partners, foremost among them the US administration. Through this initiative, the PA is recalibrating its message, asserting its independence from groups that reject the concept of state legitimacy, and signaling its willingness to engage the evolving regional reality from a place of responsibility rather than reaction.

While the PA harbors no illusions about a sudden policy reversal from Washington, it recognizes that new geopolitical currents are taking shape that demand engagement rather than passivity. The resurfacing debate over regional accords resembling the Abraham Accords is not occurring in a vacuum; rather, it reflects broader attempts to redraw the regional power map in the aftermath of the Gaza war.

Although these agreements were forged under different circumstances, they are now being positioned as a prerequisite for any post-conflict framework for Gaza, suggesting that the path forward is contingent on reconstructing regional alliances under American stewardship. The PA knows its room to maneuver is limited, but it is determined not to be excluded from the discussions shaping the next phase of the region’s future.

The signals the PA is sending through its latest diplomatic efforts are in line with the aspirations of key decision-making capitals, which are eager to see a Palestinian entity capable of meaningful negotiation and of helping reorder the region’s priorities without resorting to reckless escalation or futile confrontation.

Yet this should not be mistaken for a willingness to accept any arrangement that undermines Palestinian rights or reduces the PA to a mere administrative extension of the Israeli occupation. Since Oct. 7, the regional and international calculus has undergone a profound transformation. The assumptions that once governed the Palestinian-Israeli conflict no longer hold, and global perceptions have shifted as well.

Within this altered framework, the PA now faces a pivotal juncture that could be defined as “to be or not to be.” What we are witnessing today is not a betrayal of long-standing principles, but, rather, a deliberate and thoughtful reassessment of how best to act under new conditions – an effort to craft a forward-looking strategy that balances principled political resistance with deft diplomacy, all while maintaining the inalienable right to establish an independent Palestinian state with east Jerusalem as its capital. – Fadhil al-Manasif

Why lift sanctions on Damascus?

Asharq al-Awsat, London, May 18

Sanctions on Syria were expected to remain in place for at least a year, driven by concerns over the country’s uncertain political future, skepticism toward its new leadership, and apprehensions from regional powers such as Israel.

In US policy, lifting sanctions is rarely swift – it typically follows a prolonged evaluative process. Precedents like the US agreement with the Taliban, despite maintaining economic sanctions on Afghanistan for four years, illustrate how political agreements do not immediately translate into economic leniency.

Compounding this, there is an ongoing internal debate within the US administration about whether sanctions on Syria should be lifted at all.

It is within this complex context that a direct appeal to President Donald Trump, facilitated by a key regional partner like Saudi Arabia, emerged as the most expedient path forward.

This strategy, however, requires reciprocal efforts from Syria’s al-Sharaa government, which must demonstrate tangible commitments – namely, ensuring that local armed groups are brought under control, minority communities are protected, and extremist ideologies are actively countered, since failure to do so could ultimately undermine Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s own authority.

Opposition to lifting sanctions largely hinges on the premise that the new Syrian leadership remains designated as a terrorist entity and must first prove otherwise.

The US government has articulated a series of conditions, five of which President Trump emphasized following his meeting with al-Sharaa. These include: the withdrawal of all foreign fighters; cooperation in the global fight against terrorism in Syria; the expulsion of Palestinian militias; the assumption of control over detention facilities holding ISIS members; and, finally, the initiation of formal relations with Israel.

Before assessing the feasibility of these demands, it is worth considering why, as President Trump put it, the new Syrian regime deserves “a chance.”

First, the al-Sharaa government is now a political reality – one that international actors must contend with, much like other regimes in the region that rely on or tolerate militia alliances. Regime change is no longer a viable objective, returning to war is out of the question, and the Syrian people deserve an exit from the seemingly endless tunnel of suffering and instability.

Second, the removal of Iranian influence from Syria represents a historical turning point – not just for Syria but also for Lebanon and Palestine. It has helped liberate these areas from Tehran’s overreach, which, had it continued, could have irreparably destabilized the region.

Weakening the new government now could reverse this progress, either by creating a power vacuum or by inviting Iran’s return through a weakened Damascus.

Third, if the al-Sharaa government fails to meet its obligations, sanctions can easily be reinstated. On the other hand, refusing to ease them could foster rebellion, descent into chaos, or drive Damascus into alliances that increase regional volatility.

Fourth, Israel’s presence looms large. Today, Israel is the principal strategic architect in the region, asserting its dominance and dictating terms on military presence and weapon distribution among its neighbors.

Comparing Damascus to Kabul is misleading, as Syria exists within Israel’s sphere of military influence, where any miscalculation invites swift response. This makes Israeli security interests both a constraint and a stabilizing factor.

Lebanon is already operating under what might be termed Israeli security management, and similar dynamics may apply to Syria.

Caught between the necessity of recognizing the current reality, fears of descending into chaos, and the risk of a renewed Iranian foothold, the international community’s safest course is to help Syria rebuild.

Conditions for cooperation are legitimate and must serve both Syrian stability and broader regional security. Syria remains central to a volatile geopolitical corridor, and abandoning it to chaos is certain to have severe consequences.

The most practical approach – albeit one not without risk – is to allow Damascus to restore itself. It is far preferable to cooperate with Syria now than to face a far more intractable crisis in the years ahead.

If efforts are delayed, the damage may be irreparable. Since December, amid fear and cautious hope, the al-Sharaa government has made visible efforts to show openness and a willingness to cooperate; the next step is for it to move beyond gestures and deliver results.

The conditions set by the US, though diplomatically awkward, ultimately align with Syria’s long-term interests. A ban on foreign fighters is a universal expectation; counterterrorism is a global obligation.

As for the Palestinian groups based in Syria, many are remnants of the Assad regime’s network, used in conflicts against Arab states, especially in Lebanon – Hamas being the exception, as it did not originate in Syria.

It is expected that al-Sharaa will expel these militias, just as Jordan did in the past and Lebanon is attempting to do now.

Regarding the stipulation of establishing ties with Israel, it’s important to note that al-Sharaa and his ministers have previously expressed willingness to consider such a move within the framework of an Arab peace initiative.

Whatever additional concerns remain unaddressed here, the region can absorb and adapt to change, and that is preferable to letting Syria descend into the most dangerous form of disorder.

The Damascus government must recognize and distance itself from escalating regional and international tensions. In his public statements, President al-Sharaa has frequently indicated an openness to engagement and a desire to prioritize development and progress over confrontation. – Abdulrahman Al-Rashed

What Does Patriotism Mean for Kuwaitis?

Al Qabas, Kuwait, May 9

The term “love” may not always seem appropriate when discussing one’s homeland, but in the Arab world, we have become accustomed to framing the relationship between citizen and country in emotional terms – using language filled with notions of love, passion, and heartfelt attachment.

For Kuwaitis, the reactions of certain countries during Kuwait’s Universal Periodic Review at the UN Human Rights Council came as a jarring shock and a source of deep sorrow. This emotional blow was not eased by the words of other nations that commended Kuwait’s overall role in the field of human rights.

The underlying reason for this response lies in the immense value the homeland holds in the hearts of its citizens, politically, socially, and intellectually. This reaction stems from a profound sense of responsibility for the regression Kuwait has witnessed in its human rights indicators. Responsibility, in this context, is not merely an emotional impulse – it is a deeply ingrained duty that surpasses the confines of love.

The founding generation’s bond with Kuwait was not fueled by sentimental slogans or celebratory anthems alone; rather, it was driven by the sweeping transformations the country experienced across all sectors – economic, social, political, and cultural.

Kuwaiti men of that era contributed meaningfully and left an enduring imprint, reflecting a sense of belonging and commitment to their country, and the weight of responsibility they shouldered, whether during the formative years of the 1920s or the post-independence period.

Then came the era of the invasion – a defining moment that marked a new chapter of national responsibility, one that Kuwaitis met with sincerity, resolve, and pride. Their resilience became a national narrative, as they took on societal roles with courage and unity, enabling life to continue with surprising normalcy despite the looming shadows of war, siege, and fear.

Today, a mix of concern and unease has surfaced, particularly with the rise of hate speech, cyberbullying, and other disruptive forces. Yet these remain internal concerns – worries of citizens who have long stood at the forefront of defending Kuwait’s rights and safeguarding its image both officially and in the public sphere.

Daily, people read about issues that strike at the core of their national consciousness, evoking legitimate anxiety.

Economic assessments suggest that Kuwait’s economic engines remain rudimentary, threatening long-term sustainability. Economic reports suggest that “the engines of the Kuwaiti economy are either oil-based or funded almost entirely by oil revenues, and with them the entire economy is changing and dependent on changes in the oil market, which do not appear promising.” This is more than an economic issue – it is a national one.

From this same patriotic lens, citizens monitor the status of the aviation sector, which, once a regional pioneer, has now fallen into a state of decline, creating a stark disparity between Kuwait and the leading Gulf aviation hubs.

The withdrawal of 14 international airlines from Kuwait is a glaring sign of diminished confidence in the sector’s future.

While there are undoubtedly moments of national pride and progress, pausing at these alone would mean relinquishing our broader ambition for a more advanced, stable, and prosperous Kuwait.

Ambition is like a sword: left neglected, it rusts; properly guided and sharpened, it becomes a tool of power, productivity, and brilliance.

A citizen who voices criticism or highlights missteps does not do so out of animosity or disloyalty, but, rather, out of engagement, responsibility, and a genuine desire to contribute to reform, even if that contribution comes only through a word or an opinion.

Patriotism may lack a singular, definitive meaning, but shared experience, national memory, and collective understanding reveal that it goes far beyond songs, chants, or poetry.

At its core, patriotism is a relationship formed by geography, bound by history, and defined by a shared political, social, and cultural fate. It is not a passing emotion or fleeting passion, but, rather, a long-standing commitment rooted in loyalty, participation, and unwavering responsibility.

We need not echo Mohammed Abdel Wahab’s lyric that “loving one’s country is an obligation upon me” merely for sentiment’s sake.

In truth, loving one’s country is first and foremost a responsibility – one that Kuwaitis have embraced throughout history, translating that sense of duty into action long before it became a slogan. – Suad Fahad Al-Mojel

Translated by Asaf Zilberfarb. All assertions, opinions, facts, and information presented in these articles are the sole responsibility of their respective authors and are not necessarily those of The Media Line, which assumes no responsibility for their content.

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