A Signal Point of Failure: Integrating BeiDou into U.S. Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Systems

While serving on the National Security Council staff in the Biden administration, I was tasked with strengthening the resilience of U.S. critical infrastructure, namely its reliance on GPS for positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) systems. With little funding or congressional support, I proposed integrating China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system as a backup for civilian use to enhance redundancy and interoperability across the private sector, including in critical infrastructure. The proposal raised eyebrows. Over time, however, it gained traction with key stakeholders across the executive branch, including the National Security Council, the National Space Council, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, and the Department of Transportation. Unfortunately, the administration’s time in office ended before I could bring the proposal to a broader group of agencies for review and approval. A new opportunity may now be on the horizon.

The United States relies heavily on GPS for PNT support. GPS enables countless aspects of our daily lives, from banking to air travel, to electricity. This dependence is a vulnerability, as GPS signals are easily jammed or spoofed and could be targeted by adversaries. While the first Trump administration did recognize the need to strengthen PNT resilience, it narrowly focused on bolstering U.S. systems or using friendly alternatives.

It’s time the United States look beyond such conventional measures.

Integrating China’s BeiDou system as a backup PNT system for civilian application can boost resilience, interoperability, and deterrence. Despite the perceived risk to national security, bringing BeiDou into the fold is both practical and feasible.

Strengthening PNT Resilience: Conventional Measures

The U.S. government and private firms have pursued a range of strategies to bolster PNT resilience. In space, the United States is modernizing GPS satellites with more robust, jam-resistant signals and better cybersecurity protections. On the ground, research is underway into terrestrial backup systems — from resurrecting low-frequency radio navigation to new land-based transmitters and fiber-optic timing networks. The Department of Homeland Security, for its part, uses a “Protect, Toughen, and Augment” model: protect GPS signals, toughen receivers against spoofing, and augment GPS with complementary sources. Notably, other major powers have already implemented such multi-layered resilience. China and Russia have deployed terrestrial PNT systems to complement their satellite constellations, creating layered backups that the United States currently lacks. This multi-layered approach guards against a single point of failure disrupting critical PNT services.

Europe’s Galileo: Interoperability and Shared Risks

The European Union has built Galileo, its own global navigation satellite system. In 2018, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission formally authorized U.S. devices, including critical infrastructure sectors, to access Galileo signals alongside GPS. The rationale was clear: Combining GPS and Galileo improves positioning availability, reliability, and resilience for users. Interoperability agreements ensure Galileo’s signals are largely compatible with GPS, enabling devices to automatically and transparently select the strongest satellite signal without the user even knowing.

Crucially, Galileo, like GPS, can be jammed or spoofed by malicious actors using relatively inexpensive equipment, since both systems broadcast in known frequency bands. Russian electronic warfare has disrupted GPS signals across Scandinavia. Such an attack would equally blind Galileo receivers in the same bands. While Galileo enhances civilian reliability, its shared vulnerabilities with GPS underscore the need for more diversification.

GPS: The Backbone of U.S. Critical Infrastructure

The GPS constellation comprising 31 operational satellites remains the foundation of U.S. critical infrastructure. Its precise timing and ubiquitous positioning capabilities have been integrated into every critical infrastructure sector. Daily activities like withdrawing cash, pumping fuel, or routing an ambulance rely on the timing and location data that GPS provides. This reliance creates a vulnerability that can be exploited by a technologically savvy adversary. Thus, urgent action is needed to diversify PNT sources to safeguard U.S. national security.

Integrating China’s BeiDou into U.S. PNT Systems

The United States should diversify its PNT sources beyond GPS, despite concerns that relying on alternatives like China’s BeiDou could expose the United States to potential coercion or blackmail. The U.S. government, through the National Security Council and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, should authorize the private sector and direct critical infrastructure owners to integrate China’s BeiDou navigation satellite system signals into U.S. commercial and civilian PNT architectures. BeiDou is a fully operational global navigation constellation as of 2020, with 45 satellites in orbit. It offers positioning and timing accuracies comparable to GPS, and China has invested heavily in system redundancy and reliability. U.S. officials acknowledge that China’s PNT capabilities have grown impressively: Federal Communications Commission Commissioner Nathan Simington recently cautioned that GPS vulnerabilities combined with the rising strength of BeiDou is “becoming one of America’s biggest security issues.”

Technical Feasibility

Incorporating BeiDou for U.S. civilian use is technically feasible. Modern Global Navigation Satellite System device chipsets are typically built to be multi-constellation — meaning a single device can receive and process signals from GPS, Galileo, Russia’s GLONASS, or China’s BeiDou. Many U.S. smartphones already do this without the user knowing it. Leading handset manufacturers including Apple, Google, and Samsung have produced phones that automatically use BeiDou and GLONASS in addition to GPS to improve accuracy, even though Federal Communications Commission rules only explicitly allow GPS and Galileo signals.

From a hardware standpoint, adding BeiDou capability to receivers in critical infrastructure (say, telecom networks or power grid timing units) would involve upgrading firmware or swapping in readily available multi-Global Navigation Satellite System device modules. The open civilian BeiDou signals (known as B1 and B2 frequencies) are publicly documented and accessible with no proprietary technology or secret key needed to use them. Regulatory adjustments would be the main hurdle — like how the Federal Communications Commission issued a waiver in 2018 to allow Galileo’s use for U.S. systems including critical infrastructure. The Federal Communication Commission would need to explicitly permit BeiDou signal usage by U.S. devices. This is a policy question, not a technical one. The process for certifying Galileo involved the European Commission requesting a waiver through the National Telecommunications and Information Administration in 2013, followed by a public comment period and Federal Communication Commission approval in 2018. Similarly, the Chinese government could request a waiver for BeiDou, or the U.S. government could unilaterally grant one, and, following established precedent, integrate it with appropriate regulatory steps.

In fact, effective government regulations could address the inclusion of BeiDou by setting clear standards for multi-Global Navigation Satellite System integration. For example, under National Security Memorandum 22, sector risk management agencies are tasked with establishing minimum security and resilience requirements for critical infrastructure, including PNT systems. This provides flexibility for federal agencies and infrastructure owners to address resilience while ensuring compliance with minimum standards. With clear rules of use, the private sector could rapidly integrate BeiDou for private use including into critical infrastructure and industrial GPS receivers, effectively unlocking an entire second constellation for America’s PNT needs at minimal cost.

Resilience and Redundancy Benefits

The primary argument for embracing BeiDou is the significant boost to redundancy. Simply put, more satellites from an independent system means more chances that essential PNT services remain available when GPS is degraded. If GPS were to go offline unexpectedly — whether due to a cyber incident, satellite malfunction, or hostile action — a device configured to use BeiDou could immediately fall back to the Chinese signals to maintain connectivity. This “hot backup” could be the difference between a nationwide outage versus a minor disruption in service. There is already precedence. When Galileo went out for six days in 2019, users barely noticed because their devices seamlessly reverted to GPS. In a possible future scenario in which GPS becomes compromised, having BeiDou enabled would allow the reverse: U.S. systems could lean on the Chinese constellation until GPS is restored.

Using multiple constellations also improves device performance. Devices that combine GPS and BeiDou have access to nearly twice the number of satellites in space, which yields more robust coverage in challenging environments such as urban canyons. This improved signal diversity translates to better accuracy and reliability for all civilian applications — an immediate public benefit. It also provides a check against certain forms of attack: A sophisticated spoofing attempt (where a malicious transmitter mimics GPS signals to deceive receivers) would have to fool multiple constellations simultaneously if the device is cross-checking GPS against BeiDou. In practice, that is far more difficult to accomplish. However, expecting individual users to manually handle spoofing alerts is unrealistic. Fortunately, modern global navigation receivers can employ advanced techniques like Kalman filtering to automatically detect and mitigate spoofing by cross-checking data from multiple constellations. This ensures that if one system is compromised, the device can maintain accuracy using another system. This dual-constellation approach strengthens PNT security and reliability for all civilian applications including critical infrastructure.

Strategic Rationale and Deterrence

Beyond the technical merits, there is a compelling strategic case for multi-constellation integration that incorporates an adversary’s system. Currently, U.S. defense planners worry that a determined opponent like China could degrade American capabilities by targeting GPS, its single point of failure, at the outset of a conflict. This vulnerability creates a temptation for a Chinese first strike against GPS satellites or widespread jamming of GPS signals. If, however, the United States has incorporated BeiDou into its PNT ecosystem, the calculus for an adversary could change. By entangling U.S. systems including critical infrastructure with Chinese owned navigation systems, it would introduce a form of mutual assured PNT stability. China would know that disrupting GPS alone might not be enough to seriously affect U.S. critical infrastructure: American systems could keep running on BeiDou signals (or Galileo’s) for some time.

While integrating Galileo as a backup creates redundancy, integrating BeiDou also yields a strong deterrent effect since it involves a potential adversary’s system. By contrast, since Galileo is operated by U.S. allies, it might appeal as a target in a potential United States-China conflict, whereas integrating BeiDou means that disrupting GPS would not fully achieve an adversary’s goals, as U.S. systems could still function using BeiDou. Moreover, any attempt by China to disable BeiDou signals over the United States (for instance, by geo-fencing, which creates virtual boundaries to restrict or control satellite signal access in specific areas, or degrading service in a crisis) would undercut its own system’s reliability and could invite retaliation. In effect, incorporating BeiDou signals would serve as a form of deterrence by denial: It denies an adversary the quick, decisive impact it seeks by attacking GPS, thereby discouraging such an attack in the first place.

Addressing National Security Concerns

Integrating a competitor’s technology into a U.S. system understandably raises eyebrows. Some may worry that relying on BeiDou could expose the United States to hidden risks. Could China manipulate the signals to mislead the U.S. government or spy on Americans? The short answer is “no.” Like GPS, the civilian BeiDou signals are one-way radio broadcasts of time and satellite position. They do not carry command links into U.S. receivers and using them does not transmit data back to China. In other words, using BeiDou does not allow China to “spy” on a U.S. device — the flow of information is only from the satellite to the end-user.

The primary concern with respect to U.S. national security and BeiDou would be signal authenticity: Could China transmit false data or cease transmission in a crisis? These scenarios, while plausible, can be mitigated. Multi-constellation receivers can validate one constellation against another, so any glaring inconsistency — for example, if BeiDou suddenly started giving time or location data that diverged wildly from GPS or Galileo — would be flagged. Systems could be coded with instructions that if BeiDou data seems maliciously corrupted, they can simply dismiss it and use other sources instead. If China chose to turn off BeiDou entirely for strategic reasons, such as to gain a military advantage or geopolitical leverage, it would deny U.S. users access to its satellite navigation signals. This loss would only reduce the enhanced positioning and timing accuracy that U.S. users gain when combining BeiDou with GPS. Thus, using BeiDou’s open signal carries little downside beyond what U.S. users already face with GPS. Moreover, there is precedent for balancing national security and enhanced access: A Federal Communications Commission’s inquiry highlighted that many U.S.-based phones have accessed BeiDou/GLONASS, and it sought input on potential vulnerabilities. By approaching integration deliberately — through certifying devices that use foreign signals only in tandem with trusted ones and with robust interference detection — the United States can minimize risk while reaping the resilience benefits.

Finally, incorporating BeiDou for civilian resilience need not weaken the U.S. commitment to ensuring GPS remains the world’s predominant source of PNT services. The U.S. military will continue to view GPS as the gold standard for assured PNT in conflict, and developing purely U.S. backups — like advanced terrestrial systems or small satellite constellations — remains important. Incorporating BeiDou into U.S. devices provides a strategic buffer and added resilience as the United States strengthens its own systems. Many U.S. allies and partners already use multi-Global Navigation Satellite System devices: Commercial airlines and container ships routinely use GPS, Galileo, and BeiDou together for best performance. By joining other countries that already do this, the United States would increase international interoperability. In a disaster response scenario, for example, U.S. and Chinese civilian teams could operate on common navigation references if both are using both systems. This interoperability enhances global coordination in civilian applications, enabling closer multi-Global Navigation Satellite System cooperation with partners like the European Union, Japan, and Australia.

Pragmatism Over Fear

As the United States grapples with how to improve PNT resilience, pragmatism should prevail over apprehension and fear. GPS will remain vital for national security and economic activity, which underscores the need for the United States to diversify its resilience. Using China’s BeiDou signals in U.S. civilian PNT systems is a practical step — it uses existing infrastructure to enhance security and stability. Integrating BeiDou could incentivize a form of PNT détente between the United States and China, where each side knows the other has alternatives, reducing the temptation for reckless interference. Furthermore, National Security Memorandum 22 underscores the importance of resilience in critical infrastructure. It tasks sector risk management agencies with establishing minimum security and resilience requirements for their respective sectors. For sectors reliant on PNT, such as transportation and communications, integrating multiple systems, including BeiDou, could be a practical way to meet these resilience mandates while leveraging existing global infrastructure.

Resilience in critical infrastructure often comes from redundancy and diversity. Just as the U.S. electric grid benefits from multiple power sources, U.S. digital infrastructure should draw from multiple navigation constellations. By carefully integrating BeiDou for civilian and commercial use, alongside GPS and Galileo, the United States would take a big, bold step toward future-proofing its PNT services. This move would boost signals resilience and adaptability, ensuring robust PNT services even under disrupted or degraded conditions. Such a strategy embodies an authoritative yet accessible truth for national security planners — redundancy is a strength, and sometimes that means embracing an unexpected partner to secure the nation’s vital interests.

Jesse Humpal, Ph.D., is an Air Force officer who serves in the Chief of Staff of the Air Force’s Strategic Studies Group. Previously, he was the Director for Resilience on the National Security Council staff in the Biden administration.

The views are the author’s alone and do reflect the position of any U.S. government entity

Image: AKAMGO yalms via Wikimedia Commons

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